State of Tennessee v. Derrell Bender
The Appellant, Derrell Bender, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his "Motion for Reduction or Modification of Sentence" filed pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35(b). Bender pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and received an agreed-upon sentence of ten years as a Range III career offender. In his motion, Bender requested that the trial court impose a sentence within the sentence range of a Range I standard offender. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Bender was "not an appropriate candidate for a suspended sentence." Bender seeks review pursuant to a "Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari." Because the trial court's order fails to address Bender's request for sentencing as a Range I offender, we reverse and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the Rule 35 motion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randolph Anderson
The defendant, Randolph Anderson, appealed a conviction in the Sumner County General Sessions Court for simple possession of marijuana. In the trial court, the defendant filed a motion to suppress which was granted. In this appeal from the order of suppression, the state argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the arresting officer lacked any basis to stop the vehicle driven by the defendant. The judgment is affirmed. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christy Mechelle Thompson
The defendant, Christy Mechelle Thompson,1 broke into a private residence and stole personal property worth more than $500.00. The Cocke County Grand Jury indicted her for one count of aggravated burglary and one count of theft over $500.00. The defendant pled guilty. As part of her plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the defendant to three (3) years as Range I offender for the aggravated burglary and one (1) year for the theft over $500.00. She also agreed to pay restitution in the amount of $1,016.85. Under the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the method and manner of sentence. The trial court sentenced the defendant to incarceration with the Tennessee Department of Corrections. The defendant appeals her sentence, arguing that: (1) the trial court improperly weighed the enhancing and mitigating factors; and (2) the trial court erred in denying the defendant probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tiffany Lea Packard
The appellant, Tiffany Lea Packard, pled guilty in the Sevier County Circuit Court to manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. She received a total effective sentence of four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court denied the appellant alternative sentencing, and the appellant now appeals that denial. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric Phillips v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Eric Phillips, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was subsequently amended. Following an evidentiary hearing, the petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel both at trial and on appeal. After a thorough review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas L. Jackson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Thomas L. Jackson, was convicted of possessing drugs in a penal facility, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison. This conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carlos C. Beasley v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and especially aggravated robbery. The Defendant received an effective thirty-year sentence for these crimes. This court affirmed the judgments on direct appeal. See State v. Carlos C. Beasley, No. W1999-00426-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 527715 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, May 2, 2000). The Defendant subsequently filed for postconviction relief on the ground that his trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy Ray Sanlin
The defendant, Billy Ray Sanlin, was convicted by jury of two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. On appeal he contends that: (1) he was substantially prejudiced when the trial court improperly allowed the State to call his codefendant to testify after the codefendant previously indicated his unwillingness to testify; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to allow his defense counsel to argue the difficulties inherent in cross-racial identification in closing argument; and (3) the evidence relating to the defendant’s identification as the perpetrator of the offenses was insufficient to support his convictions. Because we determine that reversible error occurred in the State’s direct examination of the codefendant as a witness, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Freddie Alton Moss
The defendant, Freddie Alton Moss, appeals the trial court's revocation of probation. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court abused its discretion by revoking the probation based upon charges for driving under the influence and violation of the implied consent law. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Keith Matthews
This is a direct appeal as of right from a bench trial conviction of first degree premeditated murder. The Defendant, William Keith Matthews, was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the Defendant argues four issues: (1) there was insufficient evidence to find the Defendant guilty of first degree premeditated murder beyond a reasonable doubt, and in the alternative, the defense of insanity was established; (2) the trial court erred in not granting the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) the Defendant was not competent to stand trial; and (4) the Tennessee statute providing for the insanity defense is unconstitutional. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Houston | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vick R. Nichols, Jr.
The Appellant, Vick R. Nichols, Jr., appeals his convictions by a Lewis County jury finding him guilty of two counts of felony reckless endangerment as lesser included offenses of the indicted charges of aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, Nichols was granted judicial diversion. On appeal, Nichols raises five issues for our review: (1) whether felony reckless endangerment is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault; (2) whether the trial court violated Tenn. R. Crim. P. 30(c) by failing to reduce supplemental jury instructions to writing; (3) whether the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury with regard to certain hunting rules and regulations contained in Title 70, Tennessee Code Annotated; (4) whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the defense of third parties; and (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts. The State concedes that felony reckless endangerment is not a lesser included offense of aggravated assault as indicted. We agree. Notwithstanding reversible error, we conclude that no appeal of right, as provided by Rule 3, Tenn. R. App. P., lies, as the Appellant was granted judicial diversion and no judgment of conviction has been entered. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Lewis | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Wilson
The defendant, Robert Wilson, was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of six years and twenty-five years, respectively. In this appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) that the evidence presented to the grand jury was insufficient to support the finding of the indictment; (3) that the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by failing to adequately respond to the motion for a bill of particulars; (4) that the state elicited and failed to correct false testimony in violation of his due process rights; (5) that the trial court failed to exercise its role as the thirteenth juror; and (6) that the sentence is excessive. The judgments of conviction are affirmed. The sentences are modified to four years and twenty-three years, respectively, and are to be served consecutively. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Abel Torres
A Warren County jury convicted the defendant, Abel Torres, of one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery and two counts of attempted second degree murder, Class B felonies, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years for each conviction, to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of thirty-six years in the Department of Correction (DOC). On appeal, this court affirmed the defendant's convictions but modified the length of his sentences from twelve years to ten and remanded the case for a determination by the trial court of the reasons justifying the imposition of consecutive sentencing. State v. Abel Caberra Torres, No. M2001-01412-CCA-R3-CD, Warren County (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 2003). On remand, the trial court again imposed consecutive sentencing and the defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred under both state law and the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The state contends the trial court properly sentenced the defendant. We affirm the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentencing but conclude that Blakely requires us to modify the defendant's sentences from ten years to eight for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert L. Levertte v. James A. Bowlen, Warden
In 1996, the petitioner, Robert L. Leverette, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Bedford County to four counts of rape, Class B felonies, and to one count of incest, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to ten years for each rape and to five years for the incest to be served in the Department of Correction. The trial court classified him as a Range I, standard offender with a release eligibility at thirty percent of his sentence and ordered two of the rape convictions to run concurrently. The Department of Correction, however, classified him as a multiple rapist pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-523, which requires that multiple rapists serve one hundred percent of a sentence. As a result, the petitioner filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The trial court granted partial relief and vacated three of his four rape sentences. On appeal, the petitioner claims that his entire sentence should be vacated and the case remanded. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Mullins
The Appellant, Gregory Mullins, appeals the decision of the Sullivan County Criminal Court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In March 2003, Mullins pled guilty to three counts of burglary, three counts of theft under $500, two counts of theft over $1000, evading arrest, and speeding. Mullins' effective eight-year sentence was suspended, and he was placed on supervised probation. On October 1, 2003, and October 10, 2003, probation violation warrants were filed against Mullins. After a revocation hearing was held on the October 10th warrant, he was found to be in violation of his probation, and his original sentences to the Department of Correction were reinstated. On appeal, Mullins does not contest the trial court's findings that he violated the terms of his probation. Rather, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering confinement rather than reinstating his probation with more restrictive conditions. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip Aaron York
The defendant, Phillip Aaron York, was convicted of eight counts of child rape. Sentences of twenty-five years were imposed for each conviction. Two convictions were ordered to run consecutively, with the remaining convictions to run concurrently, for a total effective sentence of fifty years to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence, and (2) the length of the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions for rape of a child, but that pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ----, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), enhancement factors (2) and (16) cannot be applied. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions, but modify the sentence imposed from a fifty-year effective sentence to a forty-year effective sentence. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Ramsey Duncan
Following a jury trial, Defendant, John Ramsey Duncan, was convicted of four counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and four counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-two years for each rape of a child conviction, and ten years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant's sentence for his rape of a child conviction in count two to run consecutively to his sentence for his rape of a child conviction in count one, and all other sentences to run concurrently to count one, for an effective sentence of forty-four years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred in ruling certain out-of-court statements made by the victim to witnesses Lisa Dupree and Julie Carter as admissible. In addition, since the filing of the briefs, Defendant has also asked us to consider the impact of the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) on the length of his sentences and the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant's convictions and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. We modify under Blakely each of Defendant's sentences for rape of a child to twenty years, and each of his sentences for aggravated sexual battery to eight years. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tim Brawley
The defendant, Tim Brawley, appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation. On appeal, he claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation because his sentences had expired before the violation warrant was issued. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s order |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Kimbrough
The appellant, James Wayne Kimbrough, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and two counts of spousal rape. Following a capital sentencing hearing, the jury imposed a sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction without the possibility of parole for his felony murder conviction. Additionally, he received a sentence of fifteen years for each of his spousal rape convictions as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant "all aspects" of his motions to suppress, that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court made numerous errors during the sentencing phase of his trial. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael McKellar
The appellant, Michael McKellar, pled nolo contendere to multiple charges of theft of property between $10,000 and $60,000 arising from indictments in both Cheatham County and Humphreys County where the appellant and a partner solicited funds from investors to finance the purchase of a defaulted Nigerian oil contract. In Cheatham County, the appellant was sentenced to a three (3) year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction, but the sentence was suspended. In Humphreys County, the appellant was sentenced to a four (4) year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Humphreys County sentence was also suspended. After a joint restitution hearing, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay restitution to one of the victims in Cheatham County in the amount of $1,000 and to one of the victims in Humphreys County in the amount of $22,900 based on finding that the appellant had converted that amount of money to his own personal use. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence presented at the restitution hearing was insufficient to support the award of restitution and that the trial court erred in ordering the appellant to pay restitution without making specific findings or reviewing evidence of the appellant's ability to pay the restitution. Because we hold the trial court erred in determining the amount of restitution by focusing on whether the appellant had converted the money for his own use rather than the actual pecuniary loss suffered by the victims and because the trial court did not make specific findings regarding the appellant's ability to pay restitution, we remand for a new restitution hearing. |
Humphreys | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Emmanuel S. Trotter
The appellant, Emmanuel S. Trotter, also known as "Batman," was indicted on charges of felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated burglary, and especially aggravated robbery. The appellant primarily represented himself at trial and was ultimately convicted by a jury of criminally negligent homicide, especially aggravated burglary, criminal attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery, and second degree murder. The trial court merged the criminally negligent homicide conviction with the second degree murder conviction and sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of fifty-five years. The issues presented on appeal are whether: (1) the appellant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel; (2) the evidence sufficiently corroborated the accomplice testimony of Helen Trotter; (3) the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; and (4) the State knowingly proffered false testimony. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Lamar Hopkins v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Kenneth Lamar Hopkins, pled guilty to one charge of misdemeanor assault. He received a suspended sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that: (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; (2) his waiver of right to counsel was not knowing or voluntary; (3) his guilty plea violated due process; and (4) the district attorney general promised him that his parole would not be violated as a result of his guilty plea. After a post-conviction hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. The petitioner appeals, arguing that: (1) the post-conviction court erred when it allowed the inclusion of the expected testimony of the assistant district attorney as a stipulation at the post-conviction hearing; (2) the post-conviction court erred "when it sustained the contentions of the state in violation of the missing witness rule;" and (3) the post-conviction court's actions violated the petitioner's due process rights. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Royston, Jr.
Aggrieved of the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing for his convictions of aggravated assault and coercion of a witness, the defendant, Johnny Royston, Jr., appeals. Because the record supports the trial court's judgments, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jackie Samuel Finger
The appellant, Jackie Samuel Finger, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and attempted rape. The plea agreement specified that he would receive a four-year sentence on each charge as a Range I, Standard Offender and that the sentences would run concurrently, for an effective sentence of four years. The manner of service of the sentence was to be determined by the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered the appellant to serve the sentence in the Department of Correction in the Special Needs Facility. On appeal, the appellant challenges his conviction for aggravated burglary as void due to a mistake on the judgment form and the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. Because the trial court corrected the judgment to reflect the proper conviction and properly denied alternative sentencing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George A. Johnson
The defendant, George A. Johnson, was convicted of rape, a Class B felony, and statutory rape, a Class E felony, and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years at 100% in the Department of Correction for the rape conviction and four years at 35% for the statutory rape conviction, to be served concurrently. Additionally, both sentences were to be served consecutively to the remainder of a three-year sentence for attempted aggravated sexual battery for which the defendant's probation was revoked as a result of the convictions currently on appeal. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) whether the trial court erred in not suppressing his confession, imposing the maximum sentence, and not allowing the defendant to impeach the victim with a prior inconsistent statement. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals |
