State of Tennessee v. Alex Dewayne Wells
The defendant, Robin McNeal Vanhoose, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to correct illegal sentence. The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, to affirm the dismissal by the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon reviewing the record, the defendant’s brief, and the State’s motion and brief, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s motion to correct illegal sentence. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher L. Dethrow v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Christopher L. Dethrow, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. A review of the record supports the State’s position. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephen Nicely v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Stephen Otis Nicely, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his rape of a child conviction, his aggravated sexual battery conviction, and his resulting effective sentence of twenty-two years. The petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney (1) refused to let him testify at trial; (2) failed to challenge the admissibility of evidence of the victim's post-traumatic stress disorder; (3) failed to prepare and investigate adequately for trial; and (4) failed to instruct the petitioner on the range of punishment if convicted. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael McGill
The defendant, Michael Ray McGill, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to violating a motor vehicle habitual offender order, a Class E felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant received a four-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for an alternative sentence and ordered that he serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony J. Ramey
The defendant, Anthony J. Ramey, appeals his jury conviction of aggravated sexual battery, a lesser-included offense of rape of a child with which he was originally charged. He claims (1) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to find him guilty of aggravated sexual battery; (2) that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) that the length of his sentence is excessive; (4) that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser-included offense of child abuse; and (5) that Code section 40-18-110(c), which requires a written request for an instruction on a lesser-included offense, is unconstitutional. Upon review, we are unpersuaded by the defendant's arguments and, accordingly, affirm his conviction and sentence. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christa Gail Pike v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Christa Gail Pike, appeals as of right from an order denying her motion to reinstate a petition for post-conviction relief. Her counsel had previously appealed an order approving the withdrawal of the post-conviction claim. In this appeal, the petitioner asserts (1) that an inmate under a sentence of death should not be permitted to waive post-conviction review of a capital case; (2) that the hearing conducted by the post-conviction court to determine whether her decision to waive further challenges to her conviction and sentence did not comply with due process requirements; and (3) that the post-conviction relief petition was not properly withdrawn. This court concludes that the petitioner, under a capital sentence, may waive post-conviction review; that the hearing was in compliance with due process standards; and that the evidence supported the findings that the petitioner was competent to withdraw her post-conviction petition and that her decision to do so was voluntarily and knowingly made. The judgment of the post-conviction court allowing the withdrawal of the post-conviction petition is affirmed. The order denying the motion to reinstate the petition is also affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Darrell Hines v. State of Tennessee
The opinion of the court in this matter was released on January 23, 2004, and the petitioner filed an application for permission to appeal. On June 28, 2004, our supreme court granted the application and remanded to this court, directing that we reconsider our previous conclusion that "the trial court charged the incorrect version of the aggravating circumstance in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-2-203(i)(5) (1982)." We have reconsidered this issue and conclude that the trial court utilized the correct version of this statute when instructing the jury at the resentencing hearing as to aggravating circumstances. Additionally, as explained in this opinion on remand, we erred in the original opinion by stating that our supreme court had addressed, in the direct appeal of the resentencing hearing, whether "instructing an inapplicable version of aggravating circumstance (i)(5) was harmless error." In fact, the court did not do so. In our opinion on remand, we again affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief, and refile our opinion which has been altered only to reflect our consideration of those matters, as previously explained, set out in the remand order. |
Cheatham | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Rogers
The appellant, Michael Rogers, was found guilty by a jury in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with the intent to deliver. He was sentenced to six years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Fuller and Marcellus Betty
The defendants, Antonio Fuller and Marcellus Betty, were each convicted of one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of evading arrest, and one count of reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced defendant Fuller, a Range II offender, to ten years for aggravated burglary, eighteen years for aggravated robbery, thirty-five years for each especially aggravated kidnapping, seven years for evading arrest, and four years for reckless endangerment and ordered partially consecutive service for an effective sentence of fifty-six years. The trial court sentenced defendant Betty, a Range I offender, to six years for aggravated burglary, twelve years for aggravated robbery, twenty-five years for each especially aggravated kidnapping, four years for evading arrest, and two years for reckless endangerment. The terms for especially aggravated kidnapping were ordered to be served concurrently to each other and consecutively to the other sentences, which are to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty-nine years. In this appeal, Fuller asserts that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping of one of the victims violates the rule established in State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991); (3) the trial court erred by refusing to provide a range of punishment instruction to the jury; and (4) the trial court misapplied certain enhancement factors and should not have imposed consecutive sentencing. Betty contends (1) that the trial court erred by refusing to sever his case from Fuller's; (2) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (3) that the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial when the state failed to disclose a recording of a 911 call; (4) that the trial court erred by failing to merge the convictions for aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping; (5) that the trial court misapplied certain enhancement and mitigating factors; and (6) that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. Because each of the defendants' convictions for the especially aggravated kidnapping of one of the victims violates the rule established in Anthony, they are reversed and dismissed. Further, because the sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping were ordered to be served concurrently to each other, no modification of the effective sentence is necessary. Otherwise, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Juan Luis Ravell
The defendant entered guilty pleas in Giles County to aggravated rape, especially aggravated burglary, and assault. After imposition of the sentences, but before the judgments became final, the defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant also filed a motion alleging error coram nobis, which was denied by the trial court. Both denials were consolidated for this appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Griffin v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Steven Griffin, appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for forensic DNA analysis, pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. Our review discloses that the trial court ruled correctly, and we affirm the denial of the petitioner’s request. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Griffin v. State of Tennessee - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached in the majority opinion. The Post- Conviction DNA Analysis Act has no provision that even hints of waiver relative to a request to test evidence for the first time. The applicable requirement for consideration is T.C.A. § 40-30-304(3) which states: “The evidence was never previously subjected to DNA analysis or was not subjected to the analysis that is now requested which could resolve an issue not resolved by previous analysis.” The focus is on the fact that no test occurred, not on whether a previous opportunity existed or was pursued to have the test done. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James G. Huppe, Jr.
The defendant, James G. Huppe, Jr., was convicted of burglary and theft over $1000, Class D felonies, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of three years, suspended except for fifty-three days, with the balance to be served on probation. Additionally, he was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $4278 and was fined a total of $10,000. On appeal, he argues that he was denied his right to a speedy trial, the court erred in restricting his cross-examination of the victim, and the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Scales v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief relating to his convictions for felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery. On appeal, the petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Watson
The Appellant, Brandon Scott Watson, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court. In January of 2003, Watson pled guilty to two counts of burglary of an automobile, class E felonies. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Watson received concurrent two-year sentences and, following a sentencing hearing, he was placed in the Community Corrections program. On April 15, 2003, a warrant was issued, alleging that Watson had violated conditions of his behavioral contract. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court revoked his community corrections sentences and modified the previously imposed concurrent sentences to reflect that they be served consecutively. In this appeal, Watson contends that: (1) the trial court erred in revoking his community corrections sentence based on "unreliable hearsay" evidence, specifically, the testimony of his community corrections case officer's referencing a report prepared by a Davidson County Drug Court investigator, who was not present to testify at the revocation hearing, and (2) the trial court erred in ordering his sentences to run consecutively. After a review of the record, we find no reversible error and affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Aldred N. Mason
The defendant, Alfred N. Mason, pled guilty to possession of over twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class B felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Agee Gabriel
Agee Gabriel appeals from the Giles County Circuit Court's revocation of his probationary sentence. Alleging myriad procedural and substantive errors, he asks this court to reverse the revocation order. However, we are unpersuaded of error and therefore affirm the lower court. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Amanda Jo Goode
The defendant, Amanda Jo Goode, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's revoking her probation that was ordered for her sentences for solicitation to commit felony murder; two counts of facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping; and two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The defendant contends that although the trial court was justified in determining that she violated the terms of her probation, it erred by ordering her to serve her sentences in confinement and consecutively to a federal sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randy Hurley v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We agree with the habeas court that the petitioner has failed to state a facially valid claim for habeas corpus relief. We affirm the habeas court's dismissal of the petitioner's application for the writ of habeas corpus. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas Perkey v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Thomas Jeffrey Perkey, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marcus Epps v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Marcus Epps,1 pled guilty to second-degree murder, three counts of aggravated assault, two counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery, reckless endangerment, and unlawful possession of more than 0.5 grams of a controlled substance with intent to sell. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to fifteen years in prison at 100 percent for the second-degree murder conviction and ordered that the other sentences, which were of shorter duration, run concurrently to the fifteen-year sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging that his attorney was ineffective for: (1) failing to explain the lesser-included charge of facilitation of felony murder; (2) denying to the Petitioner the right to testify at his motion hearing; and (3) depriving the Petitioner of his right to a speedy trial. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donnie Moore
The Appellant, Donnie Moore, appeals from the ruling of the Carroll County Circuit Court, which found that Moore violated the conditions of probation imposed by the Carroll County General Sessions Court. Following a hearing, the general sessions court partially revoked Moore’s probation and ordered him to serve ninety days in jail. Moore appealed to the Carroll County Circuit Court. The circuit court agreed that Moore had violated the terms of his probation and remanded the case to the general sessions court for enforcement of the sentence. On appeal, Moore argues that the circuit court erred by failing to conduct a de novo review of the sentence imposed by the general sessions court and that his sentence was the result of vindictive prosecution. Because the circuit court failed to review Moore’s sentence following revocation of his probation, we remand the case to the circuit court for that limited purpose. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Marler
A jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of reckless homicide, Class D felonies, and one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. He contends on appeal that (1) the evidence was insufficient to corroborate the unindicted accomplice's testimony, (2) the trial court erred in refusing to grant a continuance in order to locate a material witness, and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The evidence is sufficient for any rational trier of fact to have found the essential elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon consideration of the factors enumerated in State v. Howell, 672 S.W.2d 442, 445-46 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984), we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the continuance. The defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been waived. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Neal Davis
Defendant, Andrew Neal Davis, was indicted on one count of first degree premeditated murder, one count of first degree felony murder, and one count of aggravated child abuse of a child under the age of eighteen. Defendant’s first jury trial ended in a mistrial. On the first day of the second trial, the trial court granted the State’s motion, over Defendant’s objection, to amend count three of the indictment, aggravated child abuse, to substitute the words “under six years of age” for “under eighteen years of age.” At the conclusion of his second jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of first degree felony murder and one count of aggravated child abuse of a child under the age of six. Prior to the jury’s verdict, the State entered a nolle prosequi as to count one of the indictment, first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-two years imprisonment for the aggravated child abuse conviction as a Range I offender and ordered the sentence for aggravated child abuse to run concurrently with Defendant’s life sentence. Defendant does not appeal his sentence for aggravated child abuse. Defendant appeals his convictions alleging (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions for first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce autopsy photographs of the victim; (3) that the trial court erred in permitting the State’s expert witness, Dr. Ellen Clayton, to offer opinions outside her area of expertise; (4) that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Bruce Levy to testify as a rebuttal witness; (5) that the State’s improper cross-examination of Dr. Charles Harlan at Defendant’s first trial which led to Dr. Harlan’s refusal to testify at Defendant’s second trial resulted in a denial of Defendant’s due process rights; and (6) that the trial court erred in allowing count two of the indictment, aggravated child abuse, to be amended on the day of trial to reflect that the victim was under the age of six. After a thorough review of the record and the arguments and briefs of counsel, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Neal Davis - Concurring
I concur in the results reached by the lead opinion but write separately to amplify some of my concerns. The prosecution has placed the conviction for aggravated child abuse of a child under the age of six in peril through mistakes, inadvertence, or neglect. There exists no evidence of intentional misconduct on the part of the District Attorney General’s office. I hasten to add that this District Attorney General’s office is not an abuser of the power or processes used to prosecute crimes in its jurisdiction. Although I have voted to affirm this conviction, I feel I must add a word of warning to others who may wish to rely upon my decision. At first glance, the practice of amending an indictment without the defendant’s consent at such a late date is looked upon with disfavor. The practice suggests that someone was inattentive to the process and comes dangerously close to violating principles of fundamental fairness. It is akin to changing the rules in the middle of the game, a gamewhich is played by professionals in which inches determine the winner and loser. This competent defense counsel did not appear shaken or surprised by the State’s amendment. Indeed, I have determined trial counsel’s trial strategy was not changed in the least. That is the main reason I have chosen to affirm this conviction. However, I am mindful of the time trial counsel takes in explaining to a client what has just transpired in court. Imagine explaining to a client that after being put to trial once on what was a Class B felony, the client is now facing a Class A felony with a potential for greater punishment. This could have taken away valuable time which counsel could have used to ready for the trial which was about to begin moments later. The impact could have been great upon a trial counsel that was not as prepared or strong as the one in this case. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |
