State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Ray Cureton
The trial jury convicted the defendant, Jimmy Ray Cureton, of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. However, the trial court amended the defendant's attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction to attempted aggravated robbery based on the wording of the defendant's indictment. This Court subsequently reversed the trial court, finding that the indictment language was sufficient to allege attempted especially aggravated robbery. See State v. Cureton, 38 S.W.3d 64, 83-84 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). We remanded the case for re-sentencing, and, upon remand, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve ten years for his attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction consecutively to his life sentence for the felony murder conviction. The defendant now brings this direct appeal contending that his sentence is both (1) excessive and (2) improper because his indictment alleges that he merely committed attempted aggravated robbery. After reviewing the procedural history of this case and the record of the sentencing hearing, we find that neither of the defendant's allegations merits relief. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua S. Grubb
Joshua S. Grubb appeals from the Anderson County Criminal Court's imposition of incarcerative sentencing for his three aggravated burglary and three theft convictions. Contending that the lower court erroneously denied him probation, he asks us to reverse the sentencing orders entered below. We are, however, unpersuaded of the defendant's worthiness for probationary sentences and, therefore, affirm the lower court's judgments. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Andrew Nicholson, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
David Andrew Nicholson, Jr., appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that he was not effectively represented by counsel at his trial and on direct appeal. He also claims that his due process rights were impaired at trial when the court interrupted a defense witness's testimony and played an audio recording of the defendant's statement to the police for the witness. Because the record supports neither allegation, we affirm the lower court's order denying relief. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Devon Lee Ramsey
Defendant, Devon Lee Ramsey, pled guilty to one count of Class D felony theft and three counts of Class E felony forgery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve three and one-half years for the theft conviction, and one and one-half years for each of the forgery convictions. The trial court further ordered the sentences for the forgery convictions to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the sentence for theft, for an effective sentence of five years on these convictions. These sentences were further ordered to be served consecutively to an effective sentence of two years for ten forgery convictions in Coffee County. Defendant has appealed arguing that the trial court erred by imposing excessive sentences and by ordering consecutive sentencing. After a review of the entire record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronnie Jerome Russell
Following an evidentiary hearing, the Criminal Court of Sumner County entered an order finding the Defendant, Ronnie Jerome Russell, to be in violation of the conditions of his supervised probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The Defendant appealed arguing that the trial court failed to exercise a "conscientious and intelligent judgment" in finding that he had violated the terms and conditions of probation and in revoking his probation. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clemmie Rhyan
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Clemmie Rhyan, of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-two years in the Department of Correction (DOC). The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense; and (3) that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Johnson Jr.
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Donald Johnson, Jr., of first degree murder in perpetration of robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to life. On appeal, this court vacated the judgment of the trial court and remanded for findings relating to the motion to suppress the defendant's statements to police officers. Upon remand, the trial court made additional findings and again denied the motion. Upon reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis Cedric Woodard, Jr.
The Defendant, Dennis Cedric Woodard, Jr., was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial is not sufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Art Mayse
The Defendant, Art Mayse, was convicted by a jury of eleven counts of rape of a child, each a class A felony, and seven counts of aggravated sexual battery, each a class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced as a Range I offender to an effective sentence of fifty years to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges: (1) the adequacy of the bill of particulars, (2) the constitutionality of the delay between the commission of the offenses and the disclosure to authorities, (3) the trial court's denial of his request for a change of venue and motion to excuse a juror for cause, and (4) the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the evidence is insufficient to support two of the aggravated sexual battery convictions, those convictions are reversed and dismissed. The remaining convictions are reversed and the case is remanded for a retrial on those charges because the trial court failed to require the State to elect the offenses on which it relied to support the convictions. |
Fentress | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lester E. Elliott
The Defendant, Lester E. Elliott, was convicted by a jury of driving in violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act. He was sentenced to two years in the Department of Correction for this offense. The Defendant now appeals as of right, arguing that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Maurice Lamont Davidson
The Defendant, Maurice Lamont Davidson, was convicted by a jury of one count of second degree murder, one count of voluntary manslaughter, and one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to twenty-two years for the second degree murder, three years for the voluntary manslaughter, and two years for the attempted voluntary manslaughter, with the first two sentences to be served concurrently and the third sentence to be served consecutively, all to be served in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding certain expert testimony; that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions; and that the sentences are excessive. We affirm the Defendant's convictions, reduce his sentence for the second degree murder to twenty years, and order that his sentence for attempted voluntary manslaughter be served concurrently. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Wayne Herron
The Appellant, Robert Wayne Herron, was convicted by a Putnam County jury of felony possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, simple possession of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. In this appeal, Herron contends that (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior drug activity in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and (2) the evidence is legally insufficient to support these convictions. After review, we find these contentions are without merit. Although not raised as error, we find Herron’s multiple convictions for simple possession and felony possession, stemming from a single cocaine possession, violate principles of double jeopardy. The misdemeanor cocaine conviction is, therefore, merged with the felony cocaine conviction. We remand for entry of judgments of conviction consistent with this holding. Herron’s convictions for felony possession with intent to deliver and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia are affirmed. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark A. Griffin
The appellant, Mark A. Griffin, was convicted by a jury in the Anderson County Criminal Court of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of an aggravated robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the appellant raises several evidentiary questions, contests the jury charge, and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Allen Dale Cutshaw v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Allen Dale Cutshaw, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the petitioner asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clyde T. Smith
While serving a sentence in a community corrections program, the defendant was indicted and arrested on two counts of selling and delivering cocaine. His community corrections status was revoked upon proof of the indictment and arrest alone. The defendant claims that proof of an indictment and arrest, standing alone, is insufficient to support a revocation of a community corrections sentence. We agree and reverse the judgment from the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Victor Eugene Tyson
The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted first degree murder and five counts of reckless endangerment. A Davidson County jury found the Defendant guilty of second degree murder, felony murder, attempted first degree murder and five counts of reckless endangerment. After merging the Defendant's convictions for second degree murder and felony murder, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to thirty-five years for the attempted first degree murder conviction to be served consecutively to the life sentence. The trial court merged the five reckless endangerment convictions and sentenced the Defendant to three years to be served concurrently with the other sentences. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on all lesser-included offenses; (2) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to suppress a photographic lineup; (3) that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the Defendant's convictions; (4) that trial counsel was ineffective; and (5) that the trial court improperly assumed that as a matter of law, the sentences in this case must be served consecutively to a prior federal sentence. Concluding that the trial court committed reversible error (the State concedes), by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser-included offenses of premeditated murder, felony murder and attempted first degree murder, we reverse those three convictions and remand Counts 1, 2, and 3 to the trial court for a new trial. We affirm the conviction for reckless endangerment in Count 4 and the three year sentence imposed in that count. We also remand Count 4 for the trial court to determine whether the sentence imposed in Count 4 should be served concurrently with or consecutively to the Defendant's federal sentence. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tammy B. Davenport
The defendant pled guilty to six counts of forgery over $1000, a Class D felony, and four counts of forgery, a Class E felony, with the sentences to be set by the trial court. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to the maximum terms of four years for each forgery over $1000 conviction and two years for each forgery conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. The trial court denied the defendant's request for full probation or split confinement. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to place its findings on the record and by denying probation or a sentence of split confinement. Based on our review, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Branden Haney and Lawrence Davis
The appellants, Branden Haney and Lawrence Davis, pled guilty in the Cocke County Circuit Court to one count of possession of more than .5 grams of a substance containing cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony; one count of possession of more than .5 ounces of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony; and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Haney as a Range I standard offender to an effective sentence of eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with the sentence to be suspended and served in a community corrections program. The trial court sentenced Davis as a Range I standard offender to an effective sentence of eight years incarceration, with the sentence to be suspended and served in a community corrections program "after [one] year split confinement in [the] Cocke County Jail." Pursuant to their plea agreements, Haney and Davis reserved the right to appeal certified questions of law challenging the trial court's denial of their motions to suppress. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Melvin Waters
The Supreme Court remanded this case to determine the issue of whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to twelve years for the facilitation of aggravated robbery. The defendant was classified as a Range II offender. Twelve years is outside the range of a Range II offender, Class C felony. We conclude that the sentence is proper in that it does not exceed the range for a Class C felony. Offender classification ranges are non-jurisdictional and may be exceeded. We affirm this sentence. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mila Shaw
The defendant was found guilty by a jury of theft of property over ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and sentenced to four years and six months in the county workhouse. She contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert James Yoreck, III
The Appellant, Robert James Yoreck, III, was indicted by a Montgomery County grand jury for rape, a class B felony. A negotiated plea agreement allowed the Appellant to plead to class C felony aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a nine-year sentence. On appeal, Yoreck argues that his sentence was excessive. After review, we find that plain error dictates the conviction be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings because aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of rape. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis R. Goltz
The Appellant, Dennis R. Goltz, was convicted by a Hickman County jury of class E felony theft and sentenced to a term of two years, with sixty days to be served in confinement. On appeal, Goltz raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by removing a juror during the trial after that juror expressed concern about his ability to be fair and impartial; (2) whether he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct during the State's closing argument; and (3) whether his sentence was excessive based upon the trial court's failure to apply a mitigating factor. After review, we find no error with respect to issues (1) and (3). With regard to issue (2), we find that the prosecutor's closing argument affected the verdict to the prejudice of Goltz. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this case is remanded for a new trial. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Maurice Vaughn
Defendant, Kenneth Maurice Vaughn, appeals his convictions in the Davidson County Criminal Court for vandalism and aggravated criminal trespass. At his arraignment, Defendant entered a pro se plea of not guilty. During a hearing on several pretrial motions, at which Defendant proceeded pro se, Defendant signed a written waiver of his right to a trial by jury. After Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, the trial court appointed counsel to represent Defendant and scheduled a bench trial. Following a bench trial, Defendant was convicted as charged, and he received an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each charge, to be served consecutively. In this appeal as of right, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in accepting his jury waiver because he signed the waiver without the assistance of counsel. We conclude that Defendant was not unconstitutionally denied the right to counsel and that he made a valid waiver of his right to a jury trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard D. Sykes v. State of Tennessee
In July 2000, pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner pled guilty to eight felonies: one count of aggravated kidnapping, four counts of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery, one count of attempted first degree murder, and one count of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him pursuant to the agreement to an effective sentence of twenty years with a release eligibility percentage of 30% and a concurrent sentence of twelve years with a release eligibility percentage of 100%. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and following a hearing on the petition, the trial court denied relief. This appeal ensued. The Petitioner argues on appeal that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he entered his pleas and that his pleas were thus not entered knowingly or voluntarily. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Petitioner was not denied his right to effective representation at the time that he entered his pleas, and we conclude that the Petitioner entered his pleas knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jack Hackert
The Appellant, Jack Hackert, appeals the sentencing decision of the Williamson County Circuit Court. The sentence arose from a guilty plea entered by Hackert to: (1) two counts of sale or delivery of marijuana, class E felonies; (2) simple possession of marijuana; and (3) misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. Following a sentencing hearing, Hackert received an effective sentence of two years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days, with one-hundred days to be served in the county jail. On appeal, Hackert raises the single issue of whether the trial court erred by denying full probation. After review, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals |
