Carlos Jones v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Carlos Jones, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed an effective forty-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, petitioner sought post-conviction relief in the Shelby County Criminal Court, alleging multiple instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, and petitioner now appeals the judgment of the post-conviction court, claiming that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately communicate with him prior to trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Smith
The Defendant-Appellant, Joshua Smith, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a term of ten years imprisonment at the Department of Correction to be served at thirty percent. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court improperly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marvin McCall
The Defendant, Marvin McCall, entered a plea of nolo contendere to theft in case no. CR5297. The trial court sentenced him to four years to be served in Community Corrections. In case no. CR5699, the Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to aggravated burglary and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to four years in Community Corrections to be served consecutively to case no. CR5297. After two subsequent arrests and the issuance of a probation violation warrant, the trial court revoked probation and ordered incarceration for the remainder of the Defendant’s sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred: (1) when it failed to dismiss the violation of probation warrant, and (2) when it revoked an expired probation sentence. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we reverse and dismiss the trial court’s judgment revoking the Defendant’s expired probation sentence in case no. CR5297, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in case no. CR5699. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re: Sparta Bail Bonds, a/k/a Freedom Bail Bonds
The Appellant, Sparta Bail Bonds, a/k/a Freedom Bail Bonds, appeals the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denial of its petition to obtain bonding privileges. The Appellant contends that the evidence did not support the trial court’s denial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Bradford Stewart
The defendant, Charles Bradford Stewart, appeals from his Montgomery County Circuit Court jury conviction of vehicular assault, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Because the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is procedurally barred and because the defendant raises no other challenge to the judgment of the trial court, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Chadwick
On December 2, 2005, the Defendant, Roderick Chadwick, was indicted for selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; possession of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-603(a), -17-417, -17-425. The State later dismissed all counts of the indictment except for the counts for selling less than .5 grams of cocaine and evading arrest. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of both counts. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for selling less than .5 grams of cocaine; and (2) that the trial court erred by not allowing the Defendant to cross-examine the undercover officer involved in the drug buy about “inaccurate testimony” he had given in a prior unrelated criminal prosecution. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shakendra N. Boggs
Shakendra N. Boggs (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of theft over $500 but under $1,000, with no agreement as to her sentence other than that she would be sentenced as a Range I offender. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve eighteen months in split confinement with 104 days to be served in jail on 52 consecutive weekends. The Defendant has appealed, alleging error in both the length and manner of service of her sentence. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elmi Abdulahi Abdi v. State of Tennessee
Elmi Abdulahi Abdi (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a Davidson County jury of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, consecutive to a previous sentence. The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that his counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to compel the production of crime scene surveillance video; (2) failing to adequately challenge the admission of video clips of his interview with police; and (3) failing to file a timely motion for new trial. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the Petitioner’s trial counsel was deficient in failing to file a timely motion for new trial and that the Petitioner was presumptively prejudiced by that deficiency. Therefore, we grant the Petitioner a delayed appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lee Hall
Christopher Lee Hall (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means. The plea bargain provided that the Defendant would be sentenced to nine years as a Range I standard offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. The Defendant has appealed, arguing that the trial court should have granted him probation. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cheryl Rebecca Norwood
The defendant (along with several co-defendants) was indicted on eight counts of a ten-count indictment: one count of first degree murder; one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder; one count of arson; two counts of tampering with evidence; one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more; one count of abuse of a corpse; and one count of credit card fraud. Prior to trial, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress three statements given to police after the defendant was “voluntarily” detained. The State sought and received permission to file an interlocutory appeal. Upon review, we conclude that the defendant was, in fact, arrested when she was detained but that her arrest was supported by probable cause. We further conclude that the defendant was given sufficiently prompt judicial review of the officer’s probable cause determination. For these reasons, the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wesley Chad Bouterie
The Defendant, Wesley Chad Bouterie, appeals the Hardin County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for convictions for selling one-half gram or more of methamphetamine and selling four oxycodone tablets and ordering his effective eight-year sentence into execution. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darnell White v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Darnell White, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery. After a jury trial, he was convicted of the offense as stated in the indictment. As a result, he was sentenced to ten-years as a Range I, standard offender. Petitioner did not seek a direct appeal of his conviction. Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. After a review, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mario Johnson
Appellant, Mario Johnson, entered guilty pleas without recommended sentences to five counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III persistent offender to fifteen years for each count and ordered two of the five sentences to be served consecutively to each other, for an effective sentence of thirty years at forty-five percent release eligibility. Appellant now challenges the trial court’s determination with regard to sentence alignment. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Eugene Kelly, Jr.
The Defendant, Timothy Eugene Kelly, Jr., was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of three counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, and one count of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-402; 39-13-101 (2010). The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to eighteen years for the aggravated robbery convictions in Counts 1 and 4, twenty years for the aggravated robbery conviction in Count 3, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the assault conviction. The court ordered the Defendant to serve Counts 1 and 3 consecutively, for an effective thirty-eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Alvin Harding
The defendant, Michael Alvin Harding, appeals his Maury County Circuit Court jury convictions of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, and that the 15-year sentence was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sterling Jerome Davis
The defendant, Sterling Jerome Davis, was convicted by a Monroe County jury of possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class A felony; possession of more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to concurrent terms of forty years at 35% for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, four years at 35% for possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence; (2) whether the trial court improperly limited defense counsel’s questioning of venire members; (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions; (4) whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the defendant’s petition for a hearing on a forfeiture warrant; (5) whether the prosecutor engaged in improper closing argument; and (6) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ricky Dale Netheron v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ricky D. Netherton, appeals the Macon County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for first-degree and second-degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Macon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jawaras Beauregard
The Defendant-Appellant, Jawaras Beauregard, was indicted by the Davidson County grand jury for attempted especially aggravated robbery and attempted first degree premeditated murder. He was convicted by a jury of the charged offense of attempted especially aggravated robbery and the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to nine years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction and as a Range II, multiple offender to a concurrent sentence of five years for the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction. On appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the victim’s identification of him in a photographic lineup; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tenneseee v. Gary D. Jones
The appellant, Gary D. Jones, pled guilty in the Henderson County Circuit Court to theft of property valued more than $500 but less than $1,000; felony evading arrest; driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license; and leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage greater than $400. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to an effective four-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jason Martindill v. Dwight Barbee, Warden
The Petitioner, Jason Martindill, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of summary dismissal. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael L. McKillip v. State of Tennessee
Proceeding pro se, the Petitioner, Michael L. McKillip, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the Petitioner did not comply with the requirements in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-117(c) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, section 10(B), this court is without jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph Nelson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Joseph Nelson, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that it was untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that due process concerns should toll the one-year statute of limitations to allow review of his underlying claims. Because the Petitioner has failed to prove any grounds upon which to toll the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brandon Compton v. State of Tennessee
A jury convicted the Petitioner, Brandon Compton, of two counts of first degree murder. On direct appeal, this Court vacated the judgments of conviction and entered convictions for second degree murder, remanding to the trial court for resentencing. State v. Brandon Compton, No. E2005-01419-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2924992, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 13, 2006) perm. to app. denied (Feb. 26, 2007). After the trial court resentenced the Petitioner to twenty-five years for each of his second degree murder convictions to be served consecutively, this Court affirmed the twenty-five year consecutive sentences. State v. Brandon Compton, No. E2007-01790-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 4071825 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Sept. 2, 2008) perm. app. denied (Feb. 17, 2009). The Petitioner timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s denial, claiming that his attorney failed to: (1) adequately investigate witnesses, (2) present the theory of self-defense, (3) refute the State’s characterization of the Petitioner as a drug dealer, and (4) present expert testimony on gunshot residue. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Jason Vance
Defendant, Michael Vance, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder, making a false report to a law enforcement officer, evading arrest, aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a deadly weapon, unlawful possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court severed counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 from counts 4, 6, 7, and 8, and upon the State’s motion, the trial court subsequently dismissed with prejudice counts 6, 7, and 8 of the indictment. Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of first degree murder, making a false statement to a law enforcement officer, evading arrest, and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for felony murder, three years for making a false report, three years for evading arrest, and one year for unlawful possession of a weapon. Defendant’s sentences in counts 2, 3, and 5 were ordered to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to his life sentence. In this direct appeal, Defendant raises the following issues for our review: 1) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; 2) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence the testimony of the victim’s divorce attorney; 3) the trial court erred by allowing evidence of prior bad acts under Tennessee Rules of Evidence 404(b); 4) the trial court erred by limiting the testimony of the defense mental health expert, Dr. Lynn Zager; 5) the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of the defense mental health expert, Dr. Murray Smith; 6) the trial court erred by allowing the testimony of the State’s mental health expert, Dr. Rokeya Farooque; 7) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence a photo of the victim taken while the victim was living; 8) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence autopsy photographs of the victim; 9) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence a durable power of attorney executed by the victim; 10) the trial court erred by not severing count 1 from the remaining counts; 11) the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing; and 12) the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s convictions. After a careful review of the record before us, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Jason Vance - Concurring
I respectfully write separately to express somewhat different views from the majority on two issues. First, relative to the 911 dispatcher’s testimony that the 911 system maintained a “flag” on the defendant’s address that indicated issues of officer safety, the majority relies upon the failure of the “flag” to identify the defendant as the source of the issue as a basis for denying the defendant relief. I believe that, given other evidence in the case, the officer-safety flag substantially implicated the defendant. Consequently, the trial court should have excluded the evidence. On the other hand, the totality of the evidence in the case renders the admission of this evidence harmless, and I would have affirmed the denial of relief on that basis. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals |
