Jeffery Gaylon Douglas v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jeffery Gaylon Douglas, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his convictions for rape and sexual battery on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing, finding that the Petitioner had failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by improperly advising him to testify at his trial. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Earl Genes
The defendant, Ricky Earl Genes, pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated assault, and the Hickman County Circuit Court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to a term of 18 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in its application of certain enhancement factors. In addition, the defendant challenges both the manner of service and the alignment of his sentences. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles D. Sprunger
Following a jury trial, the defendant, Charles D. Sprunger, was convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I offender to eight years at 100%. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in sentencing him. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charhela Wilson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Charhela Wilson, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that her pleas of nolo contendere to two counts of aggravated child neglect, a Class B felony, were not knowingly and voluntarily entered into due to the ineffective assistance of her trial counsel. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-402. However, the Petitioner’s notice of appeal was untimely filed. Following our review, we conclude that the interest of justice does not require waiver of the timely filing requirement in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Matthew Jackson v. State of Tennessee
Matthew Jackson ("the Petitioner"), acting pro se, filed for post-conviction DNA analysis after pleading guilty to two counts of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of theft of property over $500. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lonnie Lee Owens v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Lonnie Lee Owens, appeals the Franklin County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for second degree murder, abuse of a corpse, and theft over $10,000 and his effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) counsel was ineffective by failing to object to an erroneous statement contained in the presentence report and by failing to include the trial transcript in the appellate record, (2) counsel was ineffective in cross-examining the medical examiner, (3) counsel was ineffective by attempting to negotiate a plea agreement in the jury’s presence, (4) counsel was ineffective by failing to request a jury instruction on lesser included offenses, (5) counsel was ineffective by failing to interview a witness before the trial, (6) counsel was ineffective by failing to request a change of venue, (7) counsel was ineffective by failing to file a motion for a new trial and by failing to appeal his conviction, (8) the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel, and (9) he is entitled to a delayed appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Lamont Hodge, a/k/a Gregory L. Locke
A Williamson County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Gregory Lamont Hodge a.k.a Gregory L. Locke, guilty of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a career offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the Williamson County Sheriff’s Department’s refusal to allow defense counsel to record an interview with the confidential informant who purchased drugs from the appellant prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph Shaw v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Joseph Shaw, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel because trial counsel failed to challenge a juror who was previously acquainted with the Petitioner; (2) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call several witnesses to testify as to the Petitioner’s character; and (3) that the Petitioner was denied his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Telly Lamont Booker
The defendant, Telly Lamont Booker, appeals from his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine in a school zone, evading arrest, and unlawful possession of a weapon. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his previous convictions, by permitting a police officer to testify as an expert witness on the habits of individuals involved in the illegal drug trade, and by refusing to provide a requested jury instruction. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paula Crowder
The Defendant, Paula Crowder, pled guilty to vehicular assault, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to serve three years in the Department of Correction (DOC). She challenges the trial court’s denial of probation and alternative sentencing. After consideration of the applicable authorities and the record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Arnes'a Hart
Appellant, Arnes’a Hart, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of felony murder, one count of aggravated child neglect, and one count of child neglect after the death of her infant son. In exchange for pleas of guilty to criminally negligent homicide and child neglect, Appellant received sentences of six years and one year, respectively. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The charge of aggravated child neglect was dismissed. The plea agreement specified that the trial court would determine the manner of service of the sentence after a hearing. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing, ordering Appellant to serve her sentence in confinement in order to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense and due to Appellant’s lack of truthfulness at the sentencing hearing. Appellant appeals the denial of alternative sentencing. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude the record indicates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an alternative sentence where the proof showed that there was a need for deterrence of similar crimes, and Appellant was untruthful at the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Olivia Kathleen Epps
The Defendant, Olivia Kathleen Epps, pleaded guilty to first offense driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-1-401 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven months and twenty-nine days, all suspended but forty-eight hours. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to her arrest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court./p> |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cleo Henderson v. Dwight Barbee, Warden
The Petitioner, Cleo Henderson, appeals the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Thacker v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Thacker, appeals the Circuit Court of Hardeman County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Richard Lening v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, James Richard Lening, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2008 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, felony vandalism, and aggravated criminal trespass, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deangelo Thompson
Defendant, Deangelo Thompson, appeals from his conviction in the Shelby County Criminal Court for reckless aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. Defendant was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II multiple offender to five years incarceration. In this direct appeal, Defendant asserts that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; that the trial court erred by sentencing him to five years in confinement for his conviction; and that certain comments and questions by the trial court constitute plain error. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey L. Vaughn
The defendant was convicted of possessing more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to fourteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress cocaine that was seized by police after they searched his person. We conclude that the defendant waived this argument by failing to include it in his motion for new trial. The defendant also claims that the State violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), by using two of its peremptory strikes to remove two African American potential jurors. We conclude that these potential jurors were removed for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by allowing a felony drug conviction that was more than ten years old into evidence after the defendant denied that he sold drugs on the stand. We agree, but we conclude that the error was harmless. We affirm the judgments of the trial court accordingly. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Damien Clark v. State of Tennessee
Following a jury trial, Petitioner, Damien Clark, was convicted of second degree murder. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction in State v. Damien Clark, W2007-00651-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 890886 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 1, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2009). Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the petition was dismissed. Petitioner appeals, asserting that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lewis Green
The defendant, Lewis Green, appeals the trial court’s decision to deny his request for alternative sentencing and judicial diversion. The defendant pled guilty to seven counts of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and one count of possession of marijuana with intent sell. He received an effective five-year sentence for the convictions. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered that the sentences be served in incarceration and denied the defendant’s request for judicial diversion. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentencing decisions of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Clarence Nesbit v. State of Tennessee - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the numerous deficiencies in counsel’s performance failed to prejudice the Petitioner cumulatively in his right to a fair proceeding and failed to call into question the reliability of the jury’s verdict. I agree with the majority’s conclusions regarding counsel’s deficiencies except its conclusion that counsel were not deficient in their pretrial investigation and trial preparation. The majority concludes that because the trial began one year and seven months after the Petitioner was indicted, counsel “would not have had time or resources to conduct the investigation performed by post-conviction counsel after the trial.” Although the majority is correct in noting the length of time it took for all the relevant witnesses to be found and presented at the post-conviction hearing, I simply cannot agree that counsel did not have adequate time to investigate and prepare for the trial. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Philander Butler v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Philander Butler, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of error coram nobis which challenged his 1989 and 1990 guilty pleas to sale of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, and attempted possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell. The trial court dismissed the petition on grounds: (1) that it was filed outside the applicable statute of limitation; and (2) that the petition failed to state a cognizable claim. On appeal, he contends that the dismissal was erroneous. The petitioner also contends that the court erred in summarily dismissing his “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59.04 and Motion to Set Aside Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60.02(2)-(3).” Following review of the record we discern no error and affirm the dismissal of the petition and motion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dale Keith Larkin
Dale Keith Larkin (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and one count of insurance fraud. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and to a concurrent term of eight years for the fraud conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to sequester the jury; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the Defendant’s expert witness to testify for the State; (3) the trial court erred in admitting autopsy photographs and some of the victim’s bones into evidence (4) the trial court improperly limited the Defendant’s right to cross-examine a State’s witness; (5) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument; (6) the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions; (7) the trial court failed to discharge its duty as thirteenth juror; and (8) the cumulative effect of these errors violated the Defendant’s rights to a fair trial. Upon our thorough review of the record, we have determined that (1) the trial court failed to satisfy its mandatory duty to act as thirteenth juror; (2) the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the Defendant’s expert witness to testify for the State; (3) the State failed to adduce sufficient proof to support the Defendant’s conviction of first degree premeditated murder; and (4) the State failed to adduce sufficient proof to support the Defendant’s conviction of insurance fraud. Therefore, we must reverse the Defendant’s convictions and remand this matter for a new trial on the charge of second degree murder and any appropriate lesser included offenses. The charge of insurance fraud is dismissed. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles W. Elsea, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Charles W. Elsea, Jr., appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction proceedings. However, because the Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28 section 10 for seeking discretionary review of the denial of his motion, this court has no jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Clarence Nesbit v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Clarence Nesbit, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree murder and sentenced to death. He sought post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court vacated the death sentence and granted a new sentencing hearing, which the State has not appealed. The post-conviction court denied Petitioner relief from his first degree murder conviction. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his claim that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of the trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcie Lynn Pursell, aka Marcie Pursell Frazier
The Defendant, Marcie Lynn Pursell, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of three counts of aggravated child abuse, Class A felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-15-402 (2006) (amended 2009, 2011, 2012). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three concurrent terms of fifteen years’ confinement. On appeal, she contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court erred by not allowing her to present evidence that she consented to a polygraph examination. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |
