State vs. Helen Dixon Devers M1999-00427-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Stella L. Hargrove
Wayne
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Dennis Daughtry W1999-00792-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Arthur T. Bennett
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. John Roy Polly M1999-00278-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: William Charles Lee
In this direct appeal, the defendant argues that he was incorrectly sentenced as a "persistent offender." We agree that the twenty-four hour merger rule bars use of one of his previous convictions and therefore reverse and remand for resentencing as a "multiple offender" within Range II.
Marshall
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Toronda Sherelle Williams M2000-00212-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
Following a grand jury indictment, Toranda Williams, the defendant and appellant, was tried and convicted of first-degree murder in the Davidson County Criminal Court. On appeal, she argues (1) that the trial court erroneously admitted testimony about the results of a polygraph examination; (2) that the court erroneously admitted hearsay testimony; and (3) that the cumulative effect of these errors was substantial enough to require reversal. Because we find the trial court's error in admitting the polygraph test results was harmless, and because the issue regarding hearsay testimony has been waived for failure to include it in the motion for a new trial, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Mark E. Oliver vs. State M1999-02323-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
The petitioner, Mark E. Oliver, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He contends that his original sentence of sixty years as a Range II offender for the offense of second degree murder is an illegal sentence because the trial court was without jurisdiction to sentence him under the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1982. We hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence the petitioner under the 1982 Act; therefore, the sentence imposed is an illegal sentence. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Hickman
Court of Criminal Appeals
Claude Garrett vs. State M1999-00786-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
The defendant, after being convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, was denied post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court of Davidson County. Defendant now appeals that denial and asserts that (1) the State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, thereby undermining the confidence of the outcome of the trial; (2) the trial court erred by unconstitutionally instructing the jury; (3) the defendant was not afforded effective assistance of counsel; and (4) juror misconduct and bias violated the defendant's constitutional rights. The issue of juror misconduct was addressed by this court on direct appeal and, therefore, is not properly before this court. After review, we affirm the trial court's finding that the defendant received effective assistance of counsel; however, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial because the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, thereby undermining the confidence in the outcome of the trial.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Andrew D. Bledsoe M1999-00788-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.
The defendant, after being convicted of reckless homicide, appeals his sentence of three and one-half years incarceration. He argues that the trial court incorrectly imposed an excessive sentence and that the trial court erred by not imposing any form of alternative sentence. We hold that a death, although unfortunate and tragic, standing alone, is insufficient to deny an alternative sentence given our legislative mandate that Range I standard offenders convicted of any Class D felony are presumed to be favorable candidates for alternative sentencing. Therefore, after careful review, we affirm the length of the sentence; however, we modify its manner of service to an alternative sentence of split confinement of one year and the remaining two and one-half years on probation.
Joey Lee Smith vs. State M1999-01896-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: William Charles Lee
In April of 1995, a Bedford County jury convicted the petitioner of one count of child rape, multiple counts of aggravated sexual battery, one count of sexual battery, and two counts of reckless endangerment. For these offenses he received an effective sentence of nineteen years. Having unsuccessfully pursued a direct appeal, the petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition and subsequently received appointed counsel. Through his amended petition the petitioner contended that counsel's alleged misdeeds had risen to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel and also that certain actions taken by the trial court had violated his due process rights. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on these matters and denied the petitioner relief. From this denial the petitioner brings this action again asserting that he received ineffective assistance both at trial and on direct appeal. However, following our review of the record, we find that the trial court correctly denied the petition, and we, therefore, affirm the lower court's decision.
Bedford
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Charles S. Jones M1999-02335-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: John H. Gasaway, III
On October 30, 1997, the defendant offered guilty pleas to six counts of aggravated burglary, five counts of theft over one thousand dollars, one count of theft under one thousand dollars, and one count of possession of an illegal weapon. After a December sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant placed on probation and granted him post-trial diversion for a period of six years during which he was to comply with a variety of requirements. Subsequently, separate affidavits were filed in July and September of 1998 alleging that the defendant had violated the terms of his probation. Following a March 1999 hearing concerning these allegations, the trial court entered judgment on the defendant's aforementioned twelve guilty pleas and sentenced him as a Range I Standard Offender to serve an effective sentence of four years for the burglary and theft charges consecutively to eighteen months for the possession of an illegal weapon offense. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by (1) failing to consider him for alternative sentencing; (2) improperly enhancing his possession of an illegal weapon sentence and one of his aggravated burglary sentences; and (3) ordering the possession of an illegal weapon charge to run consecutively. After having reviewed the record and applicable authorities, we find these issues to be without merit and, therefore, affirm the trial court's sentence.
Montgomery
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Rhonda Jennings M1999-01093-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
On October 28, 1998, at the conclusion of a bench trial, Rhonda Jennings, the defendant and appellant, was found guilty of one count of theft over five-hundred dollars and one count of theft under five-hundred dollars. Following a sentencing hearing on February 26, 1999, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve two years on community corrections after serving twenty days in jail. On April 29, 1999, a warrant was filed against the defendant alleging that she had violated a condition of her community corrections sentence. After an evidentiary hearing on July 12, 1999, the trial court revoked the defendant's community corrections sentence and re-sentenced her to eighteen months incarceration. On appeal, the appellant claims that her sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Williamson
Court of Criminal Appeals
James Earl Kirk, et al. vs. State M1999-01369-CCA-OT-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton
In this interlocutory appeal the State raises the question of whether the Maury County Circuit Court, relying on Tenn. R. Crim. P. 5(a), erred by ordering that all proceedings in a case heard in general sessions court must be heard in the court closest to the location of the offense. It is the opinion of this Court that the plain language of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 5(a) controls the outcome of this case. The controversy in this case turns on the word "nearest" as used in the statute. A cursory reading of the statute could understandably lead one to believe that the term "nearest" was intended to convey geographic proximity. However, such a narrow reading of the word does not yield the desired result the Rule was intended to have, and cannot be read within the strict confines of the plain language set forth therein. The term "nearest" is broader in scope than mere geographical distance. It is the opinion of this Court that as used in Tenn. R. Crim. P. 5(a), "nearest" was intended to be analyzed temporally.
Maury
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Bobby Garner M1999-01427-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Robert W. Wedemeyer
Following a Montgomery County Grand Jury indictment, Bobby Garner, the defendant and appellant, pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary and one count of theft of property over one-thousand dollars. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve five years for aggravated burglary and three years for theft. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve the sentences consecutively. On appeal, the defendant argues (1) that the sentences imposed were excessive, (2) that he should have been sentenced alternatively, and (3) that consecutive sentences were inappropriate. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
