State of Tennessee v. Alfonso Martinez
The appellant, Alfonso Martinez, was found guilty by a jury in the Henderson County Circuit Court of felony possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant’s sole issue is the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-17-424 and 39-17-425 (2003). Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the appellant has waived his issue. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darry Miller
Darry Miller appeals from his Lauderdale County Circuit Court conviction of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance less than 0.5 grams. He claims that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain a conviction. We disagree and affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Morrow
The appellant, Gregory Morrow, was found guilty by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of possessing 300 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, possessing 300 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, and two counts of possessing marijuana. The appellant received a total effective sentence of fifteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress and raises complaints regarding the application of Rule 41(g) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but we remand for a merger of the appellant’s two cocaine convictions and his two marijuana convictions. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Gilmore
The Knox County Criminal Court denied the motion of the defendant, Eric Eugene Gilmore, to set aside his 2001 guilty pleas to a number of charges. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Neal Armour
The defendant, Neal Levone Armour, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's revocation of probation. Because the record supports the trial court's actions, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Bell, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, James Bell, Jr., entered pleas of guilty to a number of offenses in the Shelby County Criminal Court in 1997 and 2000, and subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lake County Circuit Court, asserting that his convictions were void and his sentences illegal. The court denied the petition without a hearing, and this appeal followed. We affirm the denial of the petition, but remand to the Shelby County Criminal Court for a hearing to identify what disposition was intended as to each of the indictments and entry of corrected judgments to reflect those determinations |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Memphis Bonding Company v. Willie James Bassett
The appellant, Memphis Bonding Company, appeals the trial court's order requiring a partial refund to the defendant, Willie James Bassett. Because the governing statute does not permit a refund under the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sherry Lynn Johnson
Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Sherry Lynn Johnson, was convicted of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court placed the Defendant on judicial diversion. In this appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court misinterpreted the assault statute and that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. Because the Defendant was placed on judicial diversion, no judgment of conviction has been entered, and the Defendant has no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alvin Dobbins, Jr.
The Defendant appeals from an order of the trial court which found him to be in violation of the terms of his community corrections sentence. The trial court ordered that the remainder of the Defendant's sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement rather than allowing him to continue in the community corrections program. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roger K. Jones
The petitioner, Roger K. Jones, appeals the order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish either a void judgment or an expired sentence. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tony Ivens v. State of Tennessee
Defendant, Tony Ivens, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for new trial. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual battery. Defendant was fined $3,000 and sentenced to serve two years with all but 90 days to be suspended and served on probation. Defendant filed a motion for new trial or mistrial, alleging that one of the jurors failed to disclose during voir dire that she was related to a staff member of the Monroe County Sheriff's Department. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant appeals. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Derrick Bryant v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant, Derrick Bryant, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Derrick Bryant, No. E2000-01835-CCA-MR3-CD, 2001 WL 1187916 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Oct. 9, 2001). In this post-conviction proceeding, the Defendant alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the trial court denied relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Hickey v. David Mills, Warden
The petitioner, Richard Hickey, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. We affirm. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Carl Ganus
The Appellant, Joseph Carl Ganus, appeals the sentencing decision of the Hardin County Circuit Court. Ganus pled guilty to Violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO) statute and DUI, third offense. Following a sentencing hearing, Ganus was sentenced to four years confinement in the Department of Correction for violation of the MVHO statute and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for DUI, third offense.1 These sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. On appeal, Ganus argues that the trial court erred: (1) by not granting him a non-incarcerative sentence and (2) by improperly weighing enhancing factors in establishing the length of his sentence. After review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Calvin Grissette
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Calvin Grissette, of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on self-defense. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Edward Bellamy
The petitioner, William Edward Bellamy, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's action pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The motion is without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Abernathy
The Defendant, Brandon Abernathy, pled guilty to two counts of armed robbery. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the Defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Lee Mallard
The defendant, Robert Lee Mallard, appeals the revocation of his probation relating to his convictions for attempting to tamper with evidence and resisting arrest. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in revoking his probation; (2) the drug tests administered by the probation officers constituted improper body cavity searches; and (3) the drug tests violated his right to privacy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Freddie L. Osborne v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner was convicted for sale of a controlled substance and sentenced to 32 _ years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner appealed his conviction to this Court. We affirmed his conviction. The petitioner then filed a Petition for Post-conviction Relief. The post-conviction court granted his petition. The State now appeals the post-conviction court's decision, arguing two issues: (1) Whether failure of trial defense counsel to follow the mandatory provisions of Rule 609 amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and (2) whether failure of trial defense counsel to request the jury charge of facilitation amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, where that charge would now be automatically given. We reverse and remand the decision of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Lamar Tucker
The petitioner, Kenneth Lamar Tucker, plead guilty to one count of rape of a child in exchange for a fifteen-year sentence at 100%. In this post-conviction appeal, the petitioner argues that: (1) he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea of guilt; (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (3) he was denied the right to a trial by jury; (4) the state withheld exculpatory evidence; (5) the newly discovered exculpatory evidence entitles him to relief; and (6) the post-conviction court erred in refusing to admit trial counsel’s case file into evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the post-conviction petition. |
Van Buren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Lee Bellamy - Concurring
In my view, we must recognize the possibility that Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), hampers a trial judge’s authority to make the fact findings necessary to overcome the statutory presumption of favorable candidacy for alternative sentencing. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102(6) (2003) (establishing presumption of favorable candidacy for alternative sentencing for certain mitigated or standard offenders convicted of felonies in Classes C through E), -103(1) (2003) (establishing factual bases which may support a sentence of confinement). |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Matthew Kirk McWhorter
A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Matthew Kirk McWhorter, of three counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court imposed an eight-year sentence for each conviction, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) insufficient evidence exists in the record to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by not requiring the State to elect the offenses it wished to submit to the jury; (3) the trial court improperly admitted a law enforcement officer's testimony about the Defendant's uncharged conduct; (4) the trial court erred by permitting a law enforcement agent to testify about a recorded recollection; (5) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to prohibit testimony of the victim; (6) reversible error occurred when the State failed to disclose, preserve and turn over a law enforcement official's notes made during the Defendant's initial interrogation; (7) the trial court erred by allowing the State to submit an insufficient Bill of Particulars and to deviate from its Bill of Particulars; (8) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his written and oral statements made to law enforcement officials in Florida; (9) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on child abuse as a lesser-included offense; (10) the State's closing arguments were so improper that they infected the trial with unfairness and denied the Defendant due process; (11) the trial court erred by interrupting the natural flow of jury deliberations to give supplemental instructions; and (12) the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to serve his sentences consecutively. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court erred by failing to require the State to elect which incident of sexual touching the State intended for the jury to consider for Count 1, aggravated sexual battery. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and the sentence in Count 1. We affirm the remaining convictions and sentences. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Parks
The Appellant, Jeffery Brian Parks, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Lincoln County Circuit Court. In 2003, Parks pled guilty to two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, two counts of incest, and two counts of statutory rape. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Parks, as a Range I standard offender, to six years for each count of sexual battery by an authority figure and incest, both class C felonies, and to two years for each count of statutory rape, a class E felony. These sentences were ordered to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, Parks argues that the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences with respect to each sentence and by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than a less restrictive alternative. The State, on appeal, asserts that consecutive sentencing should be imposed by this court following de novo review. Because the trial court failed to impose a sentence in accordance with our statutory sentencing scheme, we remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing to determine the length of the Appellant’s sentences, the appropriateness of consecutive sentencing, and the Appellant’s suitability for an alternative sentence. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Parks - Dissenting in Part
I believe the sentencing in the instant case is controlled by State v. Marshall, 888 S.W.2d 786 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), and Rule 4(H)(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court require it be followed. To the extent that the majority opinion holds this trial judge fashioned an improper sentence, I disagree. The two holdings in Marshall which apply to the instant cases are as follows: |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Guadalupe Arroyo, Alias
The defendant entered guilty pleas to two counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication and was sentenced to consecutive twelve-year terms of imprisonment. The defendant appealed the imposition of maximum sentences and the order to serve the terms consecutively. After this, our second review, we again remand for a new sentencing hearing in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), and the trial court's failure to find specific findings justifying the necessity for consecutive sentencing. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |
