State of Tennessee v. Johnny Summers Cavin (Concur)
I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals, and I agree with much of the majority opinion’s analysis, including its determination that the trial court did not err in ordering Johnny Cavin to pay restitution. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the restitution order here was final and appealable, but I reach that conclusion by way of a slightly different analysis. I write separately to explain how my reasoning differs from that of the majority. While the majority asks whether the trial court’s judgment satisfied the statutory requirements for restitution orders, I would focus instead on whether the record shows that the trial court thought it was finished with the case. In my view, the restitution order here was final because nothing in the record or on the face of the order suggests that the trial court believed there was more to be done, not because it did everything it was supposed to do. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Gevedon
A trial court ordered a defendant to pay a set amount of criminal restitution but did not |
Giles | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Gevedon (Concur)
I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals, and I agree with much of the majority opinion’s analysis, including its determination that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider Joseph Gevedon’s ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution.1 I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the restitution order here was final and appealable, but I reach that conclusion by way of a slightly different analysis. I write separately to explain how my reasoning differs from that of the majority. While the majority asks whether the trial court’s judgment satisfied the statutory requirements for restitution orders, I would focus instead on whether the record shows that the trial court thought it was finished with the case. In my view, the restitution order here was final because nothing in the record or on the face of the order suggests that the trial court had any intention of setting the time for payment, not because the trial court did everything it was supposed to do. |
Giles | Supreme Court | |
Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. v. Division of Tenncare et al.
Article II of Tennessee’s Constitution vests legislative authority in the General Assembly. We have held, however, that the General Assembly may “grant an administrative agency the power to promulgate rules and regulations which have the effect of law in the agency’s area of operation.” Bean v. McWherter, 953 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tenn. 1997). The General Assembly frequently has done so. But it also established important guardrails for administrative agencies by enacting the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. One of those guardrails is the requirement that agencies engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking: a process that gives the public and other affected parties an opportunity to weigh in. Here, we consider whether a reimbursement cap imposed by TennCare is a “rule” within the meaning of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act that should have been promulgated through the notice-and-comment process. We hold that it is and reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al. - Concurring
I concur fully in the majority opinion. I write separately to highlight the flawed and impractical analysis in the concurring in judgment opinion, authored by Justice Campbell and joined by Justice Kirby. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al. - Concurring
I agree with the Court’s decision to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. But my agreement with the majority ends there. I would not adopt a new evidentiary privilege for expert witnesses because that privilege is not grounded in the Constitution, Tennessee’s statutes, the common law, or this Court’s Rules—the only permissible sources of a privilege under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 501. Although the trial court erred by excluding the expert opinions at issue in this case, that error was harmless and did not warrant reversal of the judgment below or a new trial. For that reason, I join in the Court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al. - Concurring
I am pleased to concur in Justice Campbell’s separate concurring opinion, concurring in the result of the majority opinion but not the reasoning. I write separately on particular problems with the majority’s reasoning, as well as far-reaching unintended consequences of this ill-defined new common-law privilege. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al.
This appeal primarily concerns the compulsion of a physician’s deposition testimony in a health care liability action. In 2014, a child was born via cesarean section and suffered permanent brain damage and severely debilitating injuries. By and through her next friend and mother Brittany Borngne (“Plaintiff”), the child sued the doctor who delivered her and the certified nurse midwife who was initially in charge of the birthing process, among other defendants. The trial court dismissed all claims of direct negligence against the defendant physician but allowed the plaintiff to proceed against the physician on a vicarious liability theory as the midwife’s supervising physician. However, during his deposition prior to trial, the physician refused to opine on the midwife’s performance outside of his presence. The trial court declined to require the physician to do so, and after a trial, the jury found in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, partially reversed the judgment. The intermediate court concluded, among other things, that the trial court committed reversible error in declining to order the physician to answer the questions at issue in his deposition and remanded for a new trial. After review, we hold that a defendant healthcare provider cannot be compelled to provide expert opinion testimony about another defendant provider’s standard of care or deviation from that standard. We therefore conclude that the trial court here properly declined to compel the defendant physician’s testimony. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
In Re Markus E.
In this appeal, we address the standards for severe child abuse as a ground for termination of parental rights. The statute defining severe child abuse includes “knowing” failure to protect a child from abuse or neglect likely to cause serious injury or death. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(22)(A)(i) (Supp. 2016). The statutes do not define “knowing.” We hold that, for severe child abuse, a person’s conduct is considered “knowing,” and a person is deemed to “knowingly” act or fail to act, when he actually knows of relevant facts, circumstances or information, or when he is either in deliberate ignorance of or in reckless disregard of such facts, circumstances, or information presented to him. Under this standard, the relevant facts, circumstances, or information would alert a reasonable parent to take affirmative action to protect the child. For deliberate ignorance, a parent can be found to have acted knowingly when he has specific reason to know the relevant facts, circumstances, or information but deliberately ignores them. For reckless disregard, if the parent has been presented with the relevant facts, circumstances, or information and recklessly disregards them, the parent’s failure to protect can be considered knowing. Here, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the parents of an infant who suffered over twenty rib fractures, in part for knowing failure to protect the child. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse, holding under the particular circumstances of this case that the proof in the record does not clearly and convincingly show that the parents’ failure to protect the child was “knowing.” |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
In Re Markus E. - Concurring
I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the termination of parental rights as to both Mother and Father, and I join nearly all of Justice Kirby’s opinion for the majority. In particular, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that this case presents circumstances that call strongly for application of the prior-construction canon. I would hesitate to apply the canon if only one or two intermediate appellate courts had interpreted the language at issue. Here, however, the Court of Appeals had issued at least eight opinions interpreting “knowing” in a uniform manner before the General Assembly’s reenactment of that language. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998) (finding “the uniformity of . . . judicial precedent construing the [statutory] definition significant”); Kentucky v. Biden, 57 F.4th 545, 554 (6th Cir. 2023) (noting that the force of the prior-construction canon is “stronger when the lower courts uniformly adopt a particular interpretation of an oft-invoked statute”); cf. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011) (declining to apply canon where “widespread disagreement exist[ed] among the lower courts”). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
George Gary Ingram v. Dr. Michael Gallagher Et Al.
The issue before us is whether the voluntary dismissal of a defendant in a multi-defendant case that is governed by the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) may be set aside and the claim against the dismissed defendant reinstated on the motion of a plaintiff pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. The plaintiff in this case initiated a healthcare liability action against a physician, a hospital, and two other defendants. Before any responsive pleading was filed by any defendant, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, naming only the physician as a defendant. The plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of voluntary dismissal that dismissed all of the defendants except the physician, and the trial court entered an order of voluntary dismissal the following day. In his answer to the amended complaint, the physician argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed under the GTLA because the hospital, which was his employer and a governmental entity, was not a defendant. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend in which he sought to set aside the trial court’s order voluntarily dismissing the hospital from the action. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend. The trial court later dismissed the hospital from the action with prejudice and granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the physician. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the order of voluntary dismissal. Upon our review of this case, we do not reach the question of whether the voluntary dismissal order could be altered or amended pursuant to Rule 54.02. Because the plaintiff removed the hospital from the lawsuit when he filed his amended complaint, the plaintiff’s notice of voluntary dismissal and the trial court’s order of voluntary dismissal were of no legal effect. Accordingly, there was no valid order of voluntary dismissal to alter or amend. As a result, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issues it deemed pretermitted as moot. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Lyons, James Michael Usinger, Lee Harold Cromwell, Austin Gary Cooper, and Christopher Alan Hauser
The Uniform Commercial Code provides a mechanism for secured creditors to give notice to the world of their security interest in debtors’ property as collateral for debt by filling out a form for a financing statement and posting it on the website for Tennessee’s Secretary of State. In this case, that system was weaponized. Collectively, the defendants filed over a hundred bogus financing statements on the Secretary of State’s website regarding over forty Tennessee residents, including judges, mayors, public officials, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and ex-spouses. The online financing statements falsely claimed liens for the defendants’ alleged security interest in the victims’ property as collateral for millions of dollars in fictitious debt. All were done for the apparent purpose of vexing and harassing the victims. All of the defendants were convicted of multiple counts of filing a lien without a reasonable basis, a Class E felony, and forgery of at least $250,000, a Class A felony. We granted permission to appeal in this case to address the forgery convictions. We hold that the defendants’ conduct fits within the statutory definition of forgery. We also hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the apparent value associated with the fraudulent financing statements was over $250,000. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Lyons, James Michael Usinger, Lee Harold Cromwell, Austin Gary Cooper, and Christopher Alan Hauser - Concurring in part and Dissenting in part
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendants’ convictions for forgery. I agree with the majority that the Defendants’ conduct fits within the statutory definition of forgery under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39- 14-114(b)(1)(B). I write separately to dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support sentencing the Defendants for forgery as a Class A felony. Based on the text of the applicable statutes, I would hold that the evidence was not sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the UCC-1s had a fair market value of at least $250,000. 1 I would reverse the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals as to the value associated with the Defendants’ forgery convictions. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Kemontea Dovon McKinney
A Robertson County jury convicted Kemontea Dovon McKinney (“Defendant”), a juvenile at the time of the offenses, of aggravated robbery, premeditated first-degree murder, two counts of first-degree felony murder, and theft of property valued at over $10,000. The trial court merged the murder convictions and merged the theft conviction into the aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court imposed a life sentence for the murder conviction and eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction. This appeal concerns whether Defendant’s pretrial statement to detectives was voluntary, whether Defendant validly waived his Miranda rights, and whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for premeditated first-degree murder. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress and admitted Defendant’s pretrial statement into evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to consider whether the intermediate court erred when it stated that an involuntary confession claim is “inextricably linked” to a Miranda-waiver claim, such that the two inquiries can be considered together. We also granted the State’s application to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in determining that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for premeditated first-degree murder. After review, we conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred with respect to the issues raised by the State. We reiterate that the voluntariness test is distinct from the test for Miranda waiver, despite similarities between the analyses. After separately considering both questions, we conclude that Defendant’s overall statement was voluntary and his Miranda waiver was both knowing and voluntary. Additionally, we conclude that the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for premeditated first-degree murder. We reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgments. |
Robertson | Supreme Court | |
Kenneth J. Mynatt v. National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 39 Et Al.
Kenneth J. Mynatt (“Plaintiff”) served as the vice president of the local chapter of his union. He filed an action for malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy against the union, the local chapter, and several individuals associated with the union. He alleged that after he publicly criticized the union’s financial waste, its leadership accused him of misusing union funds. Those accusations led to his indictment on two felony charges. In the resulting criminal case, the State filed a motion to retire the charges for one year, and those charges were ultimately dismissed after the year passed. In Plaintiff’s complaint for malicious prosecution, he stated that he continued to maintain his innocence, that he refused any plea deals, and that the criminal case terminated in his favor because it was ultimately dismissed. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the retirement and dismissal of the criminal charges was not a favorable termination on the merits. Thus, they argued his complaint was missing an essential element of a malicious prosecution claim. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the underlying criminal proceedings terminated in his favor. The defendants sought review from this Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not apply the correct standard for determining what constitutes a favorable termination for the purpose of a malicious prosecution claim. We conclude that the prohibition in Himmelfarb v. Allain, 380 S.W.3d 35 (Tenn. 2012), precluding a factintensive and subjective inquiry into the reasons and circumstances leading to dispositions in civil cases also applies to dispositions in criminal cases. We hold that plaintiffs can pursue a claim for malicious prosecution only if an objective examination, limited to the documents disposing of the proceeding or the applicable procedural rules, indicates the termination of the underlying criminal proceeding reflects on the merits of the case and was due to the innocence of the accused. Under this standard, Mr. Mynatt did not allege sufficient facts for a court to conclude that the dismissal of his criminal case was a favorable termination. We therefore reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to dismiss. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Paul Zachary Moss v. Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board
The issue presented is whether a civil service merit board acts arbitrarily or capriciously |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Penny Lawson et al. v. Hawkins County, Tennessee et al.
Governmental entities generally are immune from suit. But the Governmental Tort Liability Act removes immunity for certain injuries caused by the negligent acts of an employee. In this case, we consider whether the term “negligent” in the Act’s removal provision is limited to ordinary negligence or instead also encompasses gross negligence or recklessness. We hold that the Act removes immunity only for ordinary negligence. Because the Court of Appeals held to the contrary, we reverse the decision below and remand for further proceedings. |
Hawkins | Supreme Court | |
Penny Lawson et al. v. Hawkins County, Tennessee et al. (Concur)
I concur in the majority’s analysis and holding that Tennessee Code Annotated |
Hawkins | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Quinton Devon Perry
In this appeal, we address principles governing the imposition of consecutive sentencing for “an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(2) (2019). Quinton Devon Perry pleaded guilty to twenty-four counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor that took place during the years 2016 and 2017, stemming from the discovery that he had uploaded 174 images or videos comprising child pornography or child erotica to his electronic file sharing account. Although Mr. Perry had no prior criminal convictions, the trial court imposed partial consecutive sentencing after finding that he qualified as an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive. A divided panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. State v. Perry, No. W2019-01553-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 2563039, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 22, 2021), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Nov. 18, 2021). The dissenting judge, citing a lack of proof that Mr. Perry engaged in a continuous course of downloading and uploading materials over the alleged time period, concluded that the record did not establish him as an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive. Id. at *6–7 (McMullen, J., dissenting).1 Mr. Perry sought permission to appeal, arguing that the lower courts improperly found him to be an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive based solely on the number of offenses to which he pleaded guilty. We accepted Mr. Perry’s appeal. In this opinion, we clarify certain principles for imposing consecutive sentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(2) and set forth a non-exclusive list of considerations to aid determining whether a defendant qualifies as an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive. Based on our review, we have determined that the trial court adequately articulated the reasons for ordering consecutive sentencing on the record. Affording the trial court’s decision a presumption of reasonableness, we conclude that the trial court did not err in imposing partial consecutive sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Joseph H. Crabtree, Jr., BPR #011451
This is an attorney discipline proceeding concerning Tennessee attorney Joseph H. Crabtree, Jr. and his representation of several clients with varying legal issues. The Board of Professional Responsibility ("the Boare) filed formal petitions for discipline against Mr. Crabtree in February 2019. A Hearing Panel of the Board ("Hearing Panel") adjudicated the petitions and rendered a judgment suspending Mr. Crabtree for two years and ordering him to serve six months as active suspension and the remainder on probation. It also directed Mr. Crabtree to pay restitution to two clients, to reimburse one client for any costs assessed against her upon the dismissal of her case, and to reimburse the Tennessee Lawyers Fund for Client Protection ("TLFCP") for any money it pays to the complainants in this matter. Mr. Crabtree failed to perfect an appeal from the Hearing Panel's decision, and the Board petitioned this Court for an order enforcing the Hearing Panel's judgment. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, sections 15.4(d) and (e), we determined that the punishment imposed by the Hearing Panel appeared inadequate. Thus, we proposed to increase it. Based on our careful consideration of the entire record, "with a view to attaining uniformity of punishment throughout the State and appropriateness of punishment under the circumstances of each particular case," we modify the judgment of the Hearing Panel to impose a three-year suspension, with one year served as active suspension and the remainder on probation. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(b), (d). During the first year of the probationary period, Mr. Crabtree shall engage a practice monitor at his own expense to supervise his compliance with trust account rules and office management procedures in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 12.9. Finally, as a condition of reinstatement, Mr. Crabtree shall complete twelve hours of continuing legal education ("CLE"), with six hours focused on ethics and six hours on law office management, in addition to the annual fifteen-hour CLE requirement. In all other respects, including payment of restitution to his clients and reimbursement to TLFCP, the decision of the Hearing Panel is affirmed.
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McMinn | Supreme Court | |
City of Knoxville, Tennessee v. Netflix, Inc. et al.
This is a case about fitting new technology into a not-so-new statutory scheme. Exercising our power to answer questions certified to us by federal courts, we consider whether two video streaming services—Netflix, Inc. and Hulu, LLC—provide “video service” within the meaning of a Tennessee law that requires such providers to obtain a franchise and pay franchise fees to localities. Netflix and Hulu say they do not provide “video service” and therefore do not owe franchise fees; the City of Knoxville says they do. We agree with Netflix and Hulu. |
Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Tyshon Booker
Tyshon Booker challenges the constitutionality of Tennessee’s mandatory sentence of life imprisonment when imposed on a juvenile homicide offender. In fulfilling our duty to decide constitutional issues, we hold that an automatic life sentence when imposed on a juvenile homicide offender with no consideration of the juvenile’s age or other circumstances violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Mr. Booker stands convicted of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery—crimes he committed when he was sixteen years old. For the homicide conviction, the trial court automatically sentenced Mr. Booker under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(h)(2) to life in prison, a sixty-year sentence requiring at least fifty-one years of incarceration. But this sentence does not square with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. When sentencing a juvenile homicide offender, a court must have discretion to impose a lesser sentence after considering the juvenile’s age and other circumstances. Here, the court had no sentencing discretion. In remedying this constitutional violation, we exercise judicial restraint. We need not create a new sentencing scheme or resentence Mr. Booker—his life sentence stands. Rather, we follow the policy embodied in the federal Constitution as explained in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) and grant Mr. Booker an individualized parole hearing where his age and other circumstances will be properly considered. The timing of his parole hearing is based on release eligibility in the unrepealed version of section 40-35-501(h)(1), previously in effect, that provides for a term of sixty years with release eligibility of sixty percent, but not less than twenty-five years of service. Thus, Mr. Booker remains sentenced to sixty years in prison, and after he has served between twenty-five and thirty-six years, he will receive an individualized parole hearing where his age and other circumstances will be considered. Our limited ruling, applying only to juvenile homicide offenders, promotes the State’s interest in finality and efficient use of resources, protects Mr. Booker’s Eighth Amendment rights, and is based on sentencing policy enacted by the General Assembly. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tyshon Booker (Concur)
Not so long ago, it was commonplace for states to require juveniles convicted of homicide to serve sentences of over fifty years. Now, that practice has vanished. A review of sentencing statutes enacted by state legislatures and court decisions shows that there is now only one state where juvenile offenders face a mandatory non-aggregated sentence of more than 50 years for first-degree murder with no aggravating factors—Tennessee. In the entirety of the nation, Tennessee stands alone.
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Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tyshon Booker (Dissent)
I respectfully dissent from the result reached by a majority of the Court today. Quite frankly, I find the policy adopted as a result of the plurality opinion of Justice Lee and the concurring opinion of Justice Kirby to be sound. However, it is just that. It is a policy decision by which the majority today has pushed aside appropriate confines of judicial restraint and applied an evolving standards of decency/independent judgment analysis that impermissibly moves the Court into an area reserved to the legislative branch under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions.
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Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Lynn Frank Bristol
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Coffee | Supreme Court |
