James A. Welch et al. v. Oaktree Health and Rehabilitation Center LLC d/b/a Christian Care Centers of Memphis et al.
Tennessee’s Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 34-6-201 to -218, includes a provision for limited statutory immunity from civil liability, under certain conditions, for health care providers who rely in good faith on health care decisions made by an apparent agent on a principal’s behalf. Id. § -208. Tennessee’s Health Care Decisions Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 68-11-1801 to -1815, includes a similar provision for limited statutory immunity from civil liability, under certain conditions, for health care providers who comply in good faith with health care decisions made by an apparent agent on a principal’s behalf. Id. § -1810. The health care decision in this case is the execution of an arbitration agreement with admission to a nursing home. The agreement was signed by an agent under a durable power of attorney for health care executed several years earlier. After the resident’s death, his estate filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the nursing home on negligence theories. On appeal from the trial court’s denial of the defendant nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration, we hold that the nursing home does not meet the requirements for limited statutory immunity from civil liability under either the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act or the Health Care Decisions Act. Consequently, the trial court did not err in considering evidence on whether the principal had the requisite mental capacity to execute the durable power of attorney for health care. We overrule the holding on the immunity provision in the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-6-208, in Owens v. National Health Corporation, 263 S.W.3d 876, 889 n.4 (Tenn. 2007), to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. We affirm the trial court, reverse the Court of Appeals, and remand to the Court of Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Ben C. Adams v. Buchanan D. Dunavant et al v. Watson Burns PLLC et al
Before his election to the bench, the probate judge in this interpleader action served as an |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Ben C. Adams v. Buchanan D. Dunavant et al v. Watson Burns PLLC et al.
Before his election to the bench, the probate judge in this interpleader action served as an |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Dennis Harold Ultsch v. HTI Memorial Hospital Corporation (Concur)
This case presents a simple issue: Whether the Tennessee Health Care Liability |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Dennis Harold Ultsch v. HTI Memorial Hospital Corporation (Dissent)
This appeal presents issues similar to those in Ultsch v. HTI Memorial Hospital |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Beverly Gardner v. Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital (Dissent)
This appeal presents issues similar to those in Ultsch v. HTI Memorial Hospital |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Dennis Harold Ultsch v. HTI Memorial Hospital Corporation
“When there is a conflict between the common law and a statute, the provision of the statute must prevail.” Graves v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 148 S.W. 239, 242 (Tenn. 1912). That longstanding rule is the key to resolving this case, which pits a common-law rule governing vicarious liability claims against certain procedural provisions of Tennessee’s Health Care Liability Act. The defendant in this case moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims under the common-law rule. The trial court granted that motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed after concluding that application of the common-law rule would conflict with the Act. We agree that the Act necessarily implies an intent to abrogate the common-law rule in the circumstances of this case and affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Beverly Gardner v. Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital
“When there is a conflict between the common law and a statute, the provision of the statute must prevail.” Graves v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 148 S.W. 239, 242 (Tenn. 1912). That longstanding rule is the key to resolving this case, which pits a common-law rule governing vicarious liability claims against certain procedural provisions of Tennessee’s Health Care Liability Act. The defendant in this case moved for summary judgment under the common-law rule. The trial court granted that motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed after concluding that application of the common-law rule would conflict with the Act. We agree that the Act necessarily implies an intent to abrogate the common-law rule in the circumstances of this case and affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Beverly Gardner v. Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital (Concur)
This case presents a simple issue: Whether the Tennessee Health Care Liability |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Dashun Shackleford
This appeal concerns the criminal gang-enhancement statute, Tennessee Code Annotated |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Gerald D. Waggoner, Jr. v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
A Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel found that a Shelby County |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Jessie Dotson v. State of Tennessee
This appeal involves a capital post-conviction petitioner’s expert funding requests under |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
In Re: James Ralph Hickman, Jr., BPR #020125
In this case, we consider the appropriate discipline for Tennessee attorney James Ralph Hickman, Jr. The Board of Professional Responsibility filed a petition for discipline against Hickman alleging that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct while representing an estate in probate proceedings. A hearing panel of the Board adjudicated the petition and recommended a one-year suspension, with “at least” ninety days served as an active suspension and the rest on probation. Any violation of the conditions of probation would result in “reversion to active suspension.” The hearing panel also directed Hickman to obtain a practice monitor during the probationary period, complete fifteen additional hours of estate-management continuing legal education (“CLE”) and three additional hours of ethics CLE, and pay the costs of the matter. Neither Hickman nor the Board appealed. The Board petitioned this Court for an order enforcing the hearing panel’s judgment. Exercising our authority under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 15.4, we determined that the punishment imposed by the hearing panel appeared too lenient and proposed to increase it. After carefully considering the entire record, “with a view to attaining uniformity of punishment throughout the State and appropriateness of punishment under the circumstances of each particular case,” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(b), we affirm the hearing panel’s one-year suspension but modify the judgment to impose six months of active suspension followed by six months on probation. We also clarify that the period of probation imposed should be fixed rather than indefinite and that violation of a condition of probation does not automatically result in reversion of the probationary period to active suspension. We affirm the decision of the hearing panel in all other respects. |
Sevier | Supreme Court | |
Ernest Falls et al. v. Mark Goins et al.
In this appeal, we consider the interplay and applicability of two statutes that relate to suffrage rights of Tennessee residents previously convicted of infamous crimes in other states. Although the Tennessee Constitution recognizes the importance of the right of its residents to vote, the Constitution also allows the General Assembly to restrict the right of a person to vote “upon a conviction by a jury of some infamous crime, previously ascertained and declared by law, and judgment thereon by court of competent jurisdiction.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 5. Ernest Falls, a resident of Tennessee since 2018, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in Virginia in 1986, an infamous crime under the laws of Tennessee. In 2020, Mr. Falls was granted clemency in Virginia by then-Governor Ralph Northam. The grant of clemency reinstated Mr. Falls’ rights of citizenship in Virginia, including his right to vote. Subsequently, Mr. Falls attempted to register to vote in Grainger County, Tennessee, in June of 2020. The Grainger County Election Commission denied his restoration of voting rights request and cited “Incomplete/Insufficient Document(s)” as the reasoning for the denial. Mr. Falls and a co-plaintiff, who was left off the voter rolls under similar circumstances, filed a lawsuit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-19-143(3) requires the state to re-enfranchise persons convicted of out-of-state infamous crimes as soon as said persons are “pardoned or restored to the rights of citizenship by the governor or other appropriate authority of such other state.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3) (2014). Respondents, three public employees sued in their official capacity, countered that Mr. Falls also is required to comply with requirements set forth in another statutory provision, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-202, which requires that persons convicted of infamous crimes pay outstanding court costs, restitution, and child support obligations before they can be re-enfranchised. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202 (2018). The Chancery Court granted summary judgment in favor of the three state officials, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment with Mr. Falls acting as the sole remaining plaintiff. Like the Court of Appeals, we affirm the grant of summary judgment and conclude that, in order to regain the right of suffrage in Tennessee, Mr. Falls and other similarly situated individuals must comply with both section 2-19-143(3) and the additional requirements set forth in section 40-29-202. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Ernest Falls et al. v. Mark Goins et al. (Dissent)
Ernest Falls’ right to vote is guaranteed under the Tennessee Constitution. Tenn. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Summers Cavin
The primary issue presented is whether a criminal restitution order is a final and appealable |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Summers Cavin (Concur)
I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals, and I agree with much of the majority opinion’s analysis, including its determination that the trial court did not err in ordering Johnny Cavin to pay restitution. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the restitution order here was final and appealable, but I reach that conclusion by way of a slightly different analysis. I write separately to explain how my reasoning differs from that of the majority. While the majority asks whether the trial court’s judgment satisfied the statutory requirements for restitution orders, I would focus instead on whether the record shows that the trial court thought it was finished with the case. In my view, the restitution order here was final because nothing in the record or on the face of the order suggests that the trial court believed there was more to be done, not because it did everything it was supposed to do. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Gevedon
A trial court ordered a defendant to pay a set amount of criminal restitution but did not |
Giles | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Gevedon (Concur)
I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals, and I agree with much of the majority opinion’s analysis, including its determination that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider Joseph Gevedon’s ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution.1 I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the restitution order here was final and appealable, but I reach that conclusion by way of a slightly different analysis. I write separately to explain how my reasoning differs from that of the majority. While the majority asks whether the trial court’s judgment satisfied the statutory requirements for restitution orders, I would focus instead on whether the record shows that the trial court thought it was finished with the case. In my view, the restitution order here was final because nothing in the record or on the face of the order suggests that the trial court had any intention of setting the time for payment, not because the trial court did everything it was supposed to do. |
Giles | Supreme Court | |
Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. v. Division of Tenncare et al.
Article II of Tennessee’s Constitution vests legislative authority in the General Assembly. We have held, however, that the General Assembly may “grant an administrative agency the power to promulgate rules and regulations which have the effect of law in the agency’s area of operation.” Bean v. McWherter, 953 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tenn. 1997). The General Assembly frequently has done so. But it also established important guardrails for administrative agencies by enacting the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. One of those guardrails is the requirement that agencies engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking: a process that gives the public and other affected parties an opportunity to weigh in. Here, we consider whether a reimbursement cap imposed by TennCare is a “rule” within the meaning of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act that should have been promulgated through the notice-and-comment process. We hold that it is and reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al. - Concurring
I concur fully in the majority opinion. I write separately to highlight the flawed and impractical analysis in the concurring in judgment opinion, authored by Justice Campbell and joined by Justice Kirby. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al. - Concurring
I agree with the Court’s decision to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. But my agreement with the majority ends there. I would not adopt a new evidentiary privilege for expert witnesses because that privilege is not grounded in the Constitution, Tennessee’s statutes, the common law, or this Court’s Rules—the only permissible sources of a privilege under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 501. Although the trial court erred by excluding the expert opinions at issue in this case, that error was harmless and did not warrant reversal of the judgment below or a new trial. For that reason, I join in the Court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al. - Concurring
I am pleased to concur in Justice Campbell’s separate concurring opinion, concurring in the result of the majority opinion but not the reasoning. I write separately on particular problems with the majority’s reasoning, as well as far-reaching unintended consequences of this ill-defined new common-law privilege. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al.
This appeal primarily concerns the compulsion of a physician’s deposition testimony in a health care liability action. In 2014, a child was born via cesarean section and suffered permanent brain damage and severely debilitating injuries. By and through her next friend and mother Brittany Borngne (“Plaintiff”), the child sued the doctor who delivered her and the certified nurse midwife who was initially in charge of the birthing process, among other defendants. The trial court dismissed all claims of direct negligence against the defendant physician but allowed the plaintiff to proceed against the physician on a vicarious liability theory as the midwife’s supervising physician. However, during his deposition prior to trial, the physician refused to opine on the midwife’s performance outside of his presence. The trial court declined to require the physician to do so, and after a trial, the jury found in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, partially reversed the judgment. The intermediate court concluded, among other things, that the trial court committed reversible error in declining to order the physician to answer the questions at issue in his deposition and remanded for a new trial. After review, we hold that a defendant healthcare provider cannot be compelled to provide expert opinion testimony about another defendant provider’s standard of care or deviation from that standard. We therefore conclude that the trial court here properly declined to compel the defendant physician’s testimony. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
In Re Markus E.
In this appeal, we address the standards for severe child abuse as a ground for termination of parental rights. The statute defining severe child abuse includes “knowing” failure to protect a child from abuse or neglect likely to cause serious injury or death. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(22)(A)(i) (Supp. 2016). The statutes do not define “knowing.” We hold that, for severe child abuse, a person’s conduct is considered “knowing,” and a person is deemed to “knowingly” act or fail to act, when he actually knows of relevant facts, circumstances or information, or when he is either in deliberate ignorance of or in reckless disregard of such facts, circumstances, or information presented to him. Under this standard, the relevant facts, circumstances, or information would alert a reasonable parent to take affirmative action to protect the child. For deliberate ignorance, a parent can be found to have acted knowingly when he has specific reason to know the relevant facts, circumstances, or information but deliberately ignores them. For reckless disregard, if the parent has been presented with the relevant facts, circumstances, or information and recklessly disregards them, the parent’s failure to protect can be considered knowing. Here, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the parents of an infant who suffered over twenty rib fractures, in part for knowing failure to protect the child. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse, holding under the particular circumstances of this case that the proof in the record does not clearly and convincingly show that the parents’ failure to protect the child was “knowing.” |
Davidson | Supreme Court |
