Elizabeth Sams Tuetken v. Lance Edward Tuetken
We granted appeal in this case to determine the trial court's scope of review of the parties' arbitration award. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the parties entered into binding arbitration governed by the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act ("TUAA") and reaffirm our holding in Pugh's Lawn Landscape Co., Inc v. Jaycon Development Corp., No. W2008-01366-SC-R11-CV, S.W.3d , (Tenn. 2010), that the judicial review of an arbitration award is confined to the grounds enumerated in the TUAA. The provision in the parties' arbitration agreement modifying the trial court's scope of review therefore is invalid, and the invalidity of this provision is a mutual mistake justifying rescission of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. Because our holding necessitates additional proceedings on remand, we further hold that parenting issues may not be submitted to binding arbitration in Tennessee because such arbitration eliminates the trial court's determination of the children's best interests. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the judgment of the trial court, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ralph Byrd Cooper, Jr.
The defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated rape and his sentence as a repeat violent offender. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant's conviction and that the trial court did not err in relying on a certified judgment of another state's court to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is a repeat violent offender pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-120. We conclude, however, that the State failed to comply with the notice requirements set forth in section 40-35-120(i)(2) and that the defendant's sentence as a repeat violent offender therefore constitutes plain error. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. |
Anderson | Supreme Court | |
Gerry G. Kinsler v. Berkline, LLC - Concurring
I concur in the judgment affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals because genuine issues of material fact exist precluding summary judgment for the employer. I write separately to reiterate my belief, set forth in my partial concurrence and dissent in Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., Inc., No. M2007-02530-SC-R11-CV, — S.W.3d — (Tenn. 2010), that the framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), need not be abrogated because it is compatible with the summary judgment procedures as set forth in the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008). As the facts of this case illustrate, the McDonnell Douglas framework applied along with Hannan at the summary judgment phase enables an orderly evaluation of the evidence. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
Gerry G. Kinsler v. Berkline, LLC
The employer discharged the employee three days after he rejected an offer to settle his workers' compensation claim, and the employee brought a retaliatory discharge action against the employer. The trial court granted the employer summary judgment, which the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
Gary M. Gossett v. Tractor Supply Company - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in part II of the majority opinion, holding that the reporting of an illegal activity is not an essential element of an employee’s claim of retaliatory discharge for refusing to participate in an illegal activity, and, as I explain subsequently, I ultimately concur in the judgment denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Nonetheless, I write separately to dissent from the majority’s decision in part I to dispense with the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), at the summary judgment stage in all employment discrimination and retaliation cases. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Gary M. Gossett v. Tractor Supply Company
The employee brought an action for common law retaliatory discharge against his employer for refusal to participate in an allegedly illegal activity. The employer moved for summary judgment, presenting evidence of a legitimate reason for the employee's discharge pursuant to the framework announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The employer also argued that summary judgment was warranted pursuant to Collins v. AmSouth Bank, 241 S.W.3d 879 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), because the undisputed facts showed that the employee did not report the alleged illegality. The trial court granted summary judgment, which the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the McDonnell Douglas framework is inapplicable at the summary judgment stage because it is incompatible with Tennessee summary judgment jurisprudence. We also hold that an employee alleging retaliatory discharge for refusal to participate in an illegal activity need not report the illegality. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Candace Mullins v. State of Tennessee
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the Tennessee Claims Commission had subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim against the State of Tennessee arising from the death of a young child who had been removed from his mother's home and placed in the custody of the mother's aunt by order of the juvenile court. The child and his two brothers were removed from their mother's care because of her use of cocaine. At the mother's request and after an investigation, the Department of Children's Services recommended to the juvenile court that custody of the children be awarded to the mother's aunt. Less than a month after the court entered the order of custody, the mother reported concerns about the children's well-being to the Department. A case worker investigated the aunt's home and found no basis to remove the children. Ten days later, one of the children, a five-year-old boy, died from extensive injuries allegedly inflicted by the aunt's nineteen-year-old daughter who lived in the home. The child's mother filed a wrongful death claim against the State alleging negligence on the part of the Department. The Claims Commissioner denied the claim, finding that the Claims Commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(E) (1999 & Supp. 2009) and that, in any event, the mother had failed to prove negligence by the Department. We hold that the Claims Commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim because the child was not in the care, custody, and control of the State. |
Putnam | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Joel Richard Schmeiderer
In this capital case, the defendant, Joel Richard Schmeiderer, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder in connection with the strangling death of a fellow inmate. The jury imposed a sentence of death for the murder based on two aggravating circumstances. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On automatic appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1), we designated the following issues for oral argument: 1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a second continuance; 2) whether this denial of a continuance violated the defendant's constitutional right to present mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase; 3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce into evidence and argue a non-statutory aggravating circumstance during the sentencing phase; 4) whether the prosecutor's closing argument during the sentencing phase constituted plain error mandating reversal; and 5) whether the sentence of death is disproportionate or invalid under the mandatory review of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1). Having carefully reviewed the record and relevant legal authority, we conclude that none of the errors alleged by the defendant warrant relief. With respect to issues not herein specifically addressed, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Relevant portions of that opinion are published hereafter as an appendix. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Maury | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Curtis Lee Majors
We accepted this case to determine whether, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16- 503(a)(1), the proof required to convict the defendant of tampering with evidence is sufficient where the "thing" destroyed during the course of an investigation is not specifically identified. On the facts of this case, we hold that the evidence is sufficient. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Sheryl Ann Marshall, Jessica Pickett, and Monica Butler
Three tenants of the Gallatin Housing Authority were indicted under the theft of services statute, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-14-104, for failing to report to the housing authority earnings that would have increased their rent. On the tenants' motion, the trial court dismissed the indictments, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Applying the canon of statutory construction ejusdem generis, we hold that the definition of services in section 39-11-106(a)(35) does not include public housing. We therefore affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
B & B Enterprises of Wilson County, LLC, et al. v. City of Lebanon, et al.
This appeal involves the application of the one-year statute of limitations in Tenn. Code Ann._ 29-16-124 (2000) to a temporary regulatory taking claim. The developer of a residential subdivision in Wilson County filed suit in the Circuit Court for Wilson County against the City of Lebanon and others alleging that the city's planning commission had denied it all economically beneficial use of its property by wrongfully refusing to approve the final plans for two phases of its subdivision. The City moved for a summary judgment on the ground that the statute of limitations in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 29-16-124 had expired before the developer filed suit. The developer responded that the limitations period was tolled while it sought judicial review of the planning commission's decision. The trial court held that the developer's lawsuit was timely because the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the entry of the Court of Appeals' opinion invalidating the planning commission's action. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals granted the City's application for an interlocutory appeal in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The Court of Appeals thereafter reversed the trial court and determined that the developer's lawsuit was not timely because the statute of limitations began to run when the planning commission declined to approve the final subdivision plans. B & B Enters. of Wilson Cnty., LLC v. City of Lebanon, No. M2008- 00572-COA-R9-CV, 2009 WL 130188 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2009). We granted the developer's application for permission to appeal and now affirm the Court of Appeals. |
Wilson | Supreme Court | |
Estate of Joyce Bell et al. v. Shelby County Health Care Corporation d/b/a The Regional Medical Center
The Shelby County Healthcare Corporation (“The Med”) has filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 39 petition for rehearing requesting this Court to reconsider our opinion in Estate of Bell v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2010 WL 2539644 (Tenn. 2010). In that opinion, we found that the application of the Act of May 21, 2003, ch. 321, 2003 Tenn. Pub. Acts 650 (“2003 Act”) to the claims of the estate of Joyce Bell and her infant son, Jonathan Bell, violated Article I, Section 20 of the Tennessee Constitution. We have determined that the arguments advanced by The Med in its petition do not merit a reconsideration of our earlier opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Gray'S Disposal Company, Inc., et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson County, et al.
This appeal involves the application of a decision by the United States Supreme Court to legal issues in a matter pending before a state trial court after being remanded by a state appellate court. In 1998, a group of commercial waste haulers filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County challenging the validity of a flow control ordinance enacted by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. The trial court granted the Metropolitan Government's motion for summary judgment. However, in 2002, the Court of Appeals, relying on a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, reversed the trial court with regard to part of the application of the ordinance and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Gray's Disposal Co. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, Davidson Cnty., 122 S.W.3d 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). While the case was pending in the trial court, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision contrary to the Sixth Circuit's decision relied upon by the Tennessee Court of Appeals. The trial court declined to follow the United States Supreme Court's intervening decision. The Court of Appeals, relying on the law of the case doctrine and equitable principles, affirmed. Gray's Disposal Co. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, Davidson Cnty., No. M2007-00528-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 454183 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2009). We granted the Metropolitan Government's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We have determined that Tennessee's courts are not free to disregard applicable intervening changes in federal constitutional law announced by the United States Supreme Court while a case is pending on remand. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Don Nichols v. Jack Cooper Transport Company, Inc. et al.
The employee, who suffered two separate injuries during the course of his employment as a truck driver for the employer, settled his first claim for workers' compensation and filed suit on the second. Shortly after being laid off because of an unexpected work shortage, the employee elected to retire in order to maintain medical insurance coverage rather than face an indefinite furlough without pay or benefits coverage. When the trial court reconsidered the settlement and awarded benefits in excess of the lower statutory cap on the second claim, resolving the issues in favor of the employee, the employer appealed, and the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed. Because we have concluded that the employment relationship terminated when the employee was laid off, rather than when he subsequently retired, the employee was not meaningfully returned to work, and, therefore, qualifies for reconsideration of his first injury and is not subject to the lower cap on the second. The judgment of the Panel is reversed, and that of the trial court is reinstated. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
In Re Bernard T, et al.
This appeal involves a termination of rights proceeding under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113 (Supp. 2009) with regard to five children between the ages of twelve and seventeen. The Tennessee Department of Children's Services removed the children from the custody of their biological mother and the person thought to be their biological father and entered into a series of permanency plans with them for the next three and one-half years. Shortly after discovering that the putative father was not the biological father of two of the children, the Department filed a termination petition in the Shelby County Juvenile Court. The juvenile court entered an order on October 31, 2008, terminating both the biological mother's and the putative father's parental rights. The putative father appealed the juvenile court's decision to terminate his parental rights based on both Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(2)-(3) and Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv), (vi). While the Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's finding that grounds for termination of the putative father's rights existed, the court reversed the judgment terminating the putative father's rights based on the majority's conclusion that the Department had failed to prove that it had made reasonable efforts to assist the putative father to address the causes for termination under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(2)-(3). The majority also reversed the termination of the father's rights under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv), (vi) because the Department had failed to aid the putative father in establishing paternity. State, Dep't of Children's Servs. v. Tina T. (In re B.T.), No. W2008-02803-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 3681884 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2009). We granted the Department's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We have determined that the Department used reasonable efforts to assist the putative father to establish his parentage and to regain custody of his biological and legal children and that the juvenile court properly terminated the putative father's rights with regard to all five children. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Billie Gail Hall, As Surviving Spouse and Administratrix of The Estate of Billy R. Hall, Deceased v. Douglas B. Haynes, Jr., M.D., et al.
In this medical malpractice case, we are asked to determine whether various employees of a medical corporation were agents properly authorized by appointment to receive service of process on behalf of the corporation and/or one of its physician employees. We hold that none of the individuals who accepted service in this case were agents authorized by appointment to receive service of process on behalf of either the corporation or the individual physician. With specific reference to the attempted service of the amended complaint, we hold that the authority to sign for and receive certified mail does not, on its own, confer the authority to accept service of process. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Dyer | Supreme Court | |
Patricia Henderson v. SAIA, Inc. et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal was initially referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3). After oral argument was conducted before the Panel, but before the Panel filed its opinion, the case was transferred to the full Court in order to consider a request under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 to set aside a judgment approving a settlement. The trial court found no basis for setting aside the settlement under Rule 60.02. Neither do we. The judgment of the trial court upholding the parties’ settlement is affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Jeffery Aaron Lane v. State of Tennessee
We review this post-conviction case to determine the validity of defendant's guilty plea when the trial court did not specifically ask the defendant "How do you plead?" and he did not respond with the words, "Guilty" or "Not guilty." We hold that the defendant's guilty plea was valid because the facts and circumstances of the case show that the defendant intended to plead guilty, affirmatively admitted his guilt, stated that he was entering his plea voluntarily, and believed that he was pleading guilty. Accordingly, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty plea, and the guilty plea proceedings in this case substantially complied with the mandates of federal and state law. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and we remand for reinstatement of the defendant's conviction under the accepted plea agreement. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
Marcus Ward v. State of Tennessee
In this post-conviction case, the issue we review is whether the defendant's plea of guilty to aggravated sexual battery was knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily made when the trial court did not advise the defendant of the following consequences of his guilty plea: (1) mandatory registration as a sexual offender, and (2) a mandatory sentence of community supervision for life in addition to his incarceration. We hold that the trial court was not required to advise the defendant of the requirement of sex offender registration because it is a remedial and regulatory measure, and therefore a collateral consequence of the guilty plea. We further hold that the trial court was required to advise the defendant of the mandatory sentence of lifetime community supervision because it is a punitive and direct consequence of the guilty plea. Because the trial court failed to ensure that the defendant was informed of the lifetime supervision consequence, we hold that his guilty plea to aggravated sexual battery was not knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily entered. Accordingly, this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Estate of Joyce Bell et al. v. Shelby County Health Care Corporation d/b/a The Regional Medical Center
This appeal involves the application of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act to an action for damages filed against a defendant that was not covered by the Act when the injuryproducing events occurred. The defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment in the Circuit Court for Shelby County seeking the benefit of the claims and defenses available to government entities under the Act. The plaintiffs responded by challenging the constitutionality of legislation extending the coverage of the Act to the defendant on the ground that the legislation had been enacted after the plaintiffs had sustained their injuries. The trial court held that the Act applied to the defendant but granted the plaintiffs permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. We granted the plaintiffs' application for permission to appeal after the Court of Appeals declined to consider the case. We have determined that applying the substantive amendment to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act enacted after the injury-producing events occurred to the plaintiffs' damage claims violates the prohibition against retrospective laws in Article I, Section 20 of the Constitution of Tennessee. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ralphelle James
The defendant, a Range I offender, was found guilty of public intoxication, theft of property over $1,000, and aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of thirty days for the misdemeanor and four years for the felony theft; because the six-year sentence for aggravated burglary is to be served consecutively, the effective sentence is ten years. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. This Court granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal to consider the propriety of instructions to the jury permitting inferences of both theft and burglary from the possession of recently stolen property. A second issue is whether the trial court erred by failing to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of aggravated burglary for insufficient evidence. As his final issue, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to further examine a defense witness after jurors had submitted questions pursuant to rule. Because the instructions were proper, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict on the burglary charge, and the procedure utilized for juror questions was compliant with the rule, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Melissa Michelle Cox v. M. A. Primary and Urgent Care Clinic et al.
We granted permission to appeal in this case to address the standard of care that applies to a physician assistant in a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff sued for injuries she allegedly suffered as a result of physician assistant Michael Maddox's failure to diagnose her condition accurately. The plaintiff did not sue Maddox, but sued the clinic which he owned and in which he practiced and Dr. Austin Adams, Maddox's supervising physician. The defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment, supported by their testimony that (1) Maddox did not violate the standard of care applicable to physician assistants and (2) Dr. Adams did not violate the standard of care applicable to physicians. The plaintiff responded with her cardiologist's testimony that Maddox violated the standard of care applicable to primary care physicians. The cardiologist testified that he was not familiar with physician assistants or their supervision. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to establish that Maddox violated the professional standard of care applicable to him. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the standard of care applicable to physician assistants is the same as that applicable to physicians. We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that the standard of care applicable to physician assistants is distinct from that applicable to physicians. The trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants is reinstated, and the case is dismissed. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James Rae Lewter
A jury convicted the defendant of burglary and theft in connection with the break-in of a dental office. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the convictions, finding that the evidence, which included a white shirt bearing the defendant's DNA found at the crime scene, was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Upon further review by this Court, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand for further proceedings. |
Lincoln | Supreme Court | |
Timothy Darnell Flowers v. Board of Professional Responsibility
This appeal involves a disciplinary proceeding against a Memphis lawyer whose practice focuses on immigration law. Following a hearing, one of the Board of Professional Responsibility's hearing panels unanimously determined that the lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for one year and should be required to make restitution to three clients. The lawyer sought judicial review of the hearing panel's suspension of his license. Based on the record of the proceedings before the hearing panel, the Chancery Court for Shelby County determined that twenty-three of the twenty-six courses of conduct found by the hearing panel to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct were supported by substantial and material evidence and that the evidence supported the hearing panel's reliance on seven aggravating factors. Accordingly, the trial court determined that the suspension of the lawyer's license for one year was supported by the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (2005) and was not arbitrary and capricious. The lawyer appealed to this Court. We affirm the suspension of the lawyer's license to practice law for one year and the order directing him to make restitution to three of his clients. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Benjamin Brown
The defendant was convicted of aggravated child abuse and felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. The defendant appealed the felony murder conviction, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction. We granted permission to appeal and address the issue of whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of felony murder, which include second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to these lesser-included offenses, and accordingly, we reverse the felony murder conviction and remand the case for a new trial on the felony murder count. |
Shelby | Supreme Court |
