James G. Thomas, Jr., Brother and Next of Kin of Karen G. Thomas, Deceased v. Elizabeth Oldfield, M.D.
The plaintiff filed interrogatories and requests for production seeking information concerning the defendants’ liability insurance coverage. When the defendants objected to providing this information, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01. The trial court ruled that the information was subject to discovery pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02 and granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel and the defendants’ request for an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order, holding that information concerning the defendants’ liability insurance coverage was not discoverable under Rule 26.02. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
U.S. BANK, N.A., as Servicer for the Tennessee Housing Development Agency v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
The issue presented in this case is whether the commencement of foreclosure proceedings constitutes an increase in hazard for notice purposes under a standard mortgage clause in an insurance policy. The parties to this dispute are the bank that loaned funds to a homeowner for the purchase of a house and the insurance company that issued a personal fire and extended coverage insurance policy on the premises. After the homeowner became delinquent on her payments, the bank began foreclosure proceedings by notifying the homeowner of its intent to foreclose on the house. No notification of the foreclosure was given to the insurance company which insured the house against fire loss. Before the foreclosure process was complete, the homeowner filed for bankruptcy, which stayed the foreclosure proceedings. Thereafter, the house was destroyed by fire. The insurance company refused to pay the insurance proceeds to the bank on the theory that the commencement of foreclosure proceedings constituted an increase in hazard of which the bank was required to notify the insurance company under the policy. The bank filed suit against the insurance company for breach of contract, bad faith refusal to pay an insurance claim, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the bank, concluding that the bank’s failure to give the insurer notice of the foreclosure proceedings did not invalidate the insurance coverage. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the bank’s initiation of foreclosure proceedings amounted to an increase in hazard under the policy and the bank’s failure to provide notice precluded coverage. After careful review, we conclude that commencement of foreclosure proceedings does not constitute an increase in hazard under the terms of the insurance policy or the applicable statutory provisions, and therefore, no notice was required to be given to the insurance company. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Gibson | Supreme Court | |
James A. Dellinger v. State of Tennessee - Order
On August 13, 2008, James A. Dellinger, the petitioner, filed a Motion for Disclosure of Evidence Favorable to the Appellant Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland and the Federal and State Constitutions Regarding State Witness Charles Harlan. The State filed a response to the motion on August 22, 2008. This Court denied Dellinger’s motion in an order dated August 26, 2008. |
Blount | Supreme Court | |
James A. Dellinger v. State of Tennessee
We granted this appeal to decide an issue of first impression: whether a freestanding claim of actual innocence is cognizable in an initial petition for post-conviction relief under the Tennessee Post- Conviction Procedure Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-30-101 through -122. We have also chosen to discuss the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims and the burden of proof for prevailing on such claims. In 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction trial court denied his petition, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that: (1) a freestanding claim of actual innocence is not cognizable in an initial petition for post-conviction relief; (2) the post-conviction trial court applied the correct burden of proof to the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and (3) the petitioner was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. We hold that a claim of actual innocence based on new scientific evidence is cognizable in an initial petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ denial of relief, however, because the petitioner has not met his burden of proof to support such claim. We also hold that the post-conviction trial court applied the correct burden of proof to the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. To provide clarity in the law, however, we concurrently amend Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28 section 8(D)(1). Finally, we hold that the petitioner was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in all other respects. |
Blount | Supreme Court | |
Penny Foreman v. Automatic Systems, Inc.
In this appeal, we determine the extent of Employee’s disability as a result of her June 24, 2004, work-related back injury. Prior to this work-related injury, Employee had been treated intermittently for back problems since 1995. The trial court determined that the June 24 injury caused only a temporary aggravation of Employee’s pre-existing condition and that this aggravation had resolved itself by September 7, 2004. On appeal, the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel agreed that Employee sustained only a temporary aggravation of her pre-existing condition. However, a majority of the Appeals Panel determined that Employee’s temporary aggravation had not reached maximum recovery until November 2, 2005, and thus, Employer should be responsible for Employee’s disability benefits and medical expenses until that time. Upon review of the record, we hold that the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we reverse the Appeals Panel and reinstate the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Lon Cloyd vs. Hartco Flooring Company
In this workers’ compensation appeal, we initially made a referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3). We then granted direct review. The employee filed suit for workers’ compensation benefits, claiming that he suffered a work-related injury to his wrist, which caused an aggravation of the underlying dormant arthritic condition in his right wrist. In response, the employer asserted that the employee’s arthritis was not causally related to his employment and argued that the severity of the pre-existing condition was not advanced by his work activities. The trial court awarded benefits, concluding that the employee had sustained a 36% permanent partial impairment to his right extremity and was entitled to future medical treatment and discretionary costs. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that the employee had sustained an injury that was causally related to his work activities and by ruling that the statute of limitations had not expired. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the judgment of the trial court, we affirm. |
Scott | Supreme Court | |
Lon Cloyd vs. Hartco Flooring Company - Concurring
I concur with the Court’s conclusion that Mr. Cloyd’s scapholunate dissociation with radiolunate osteoarthritis is a compensable workers’ compensation injury. Mr. Cloyd had the burden of proving that his work-related activities caused his disabling condition. This required him to present expert evidence of causation. Glisson v. Mohom Int’l, Inc./Campbell Ray, 185 S.W.3d 348, 354 (Tenn. 2006) (holding that except for the most obvious cases, employees must present expert medical evidence to establish that their injury was caused by their work-related activities). This evidence was provided by Dr. William Kennedy. |
Scott | Supreme Court | |
Clarence Trosper vs. Armstrong Wood Products, Inc. - Dissenting
The Court in this case has reversed the holding of the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel that Mr. Trosper failed to prove that his preexisting osteoarthritis was permanently worsened by work he performed in the winter of 1997-1998. Based on a selective review of the evidence, the Court has concluded that Mr. Trosper is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits because his work “advanced the severity” of his osteoarthritis. I respectfully disagree that Mr. Trosper has carried his burden of proof in this case. |
Scott | Supreme Court | |
Clarence Trosper vs. Armstrong Wood Products, Inc.
Following surgeries on both of his hands, the employee filed suit seeking workers’ compensation benefits on the theory that the repetitive nature of his work in the employer’s flooring business exacerbated a pre-existing, but dormant, arthritic condition. The trial court found that the employee’s work duties had worsened his osteoarthritis and awarded 40% permanent partial disability to each hand. The trial court also awarded temporary total disability benefits for the time during which the employee was recuperating from the surgeries and unable to work. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel reversed the trial court, holding that the employee’s condition was neither caused nor aggravated by the work he performed for the employer. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding of causation and the award of benefits, we reverse the decision of the Appeals Panel and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Scott | Supreme Court | |
Robert H. Waldschmidt v. Reassure America Life Insurance Co., et al.
This appeal involves a question of law concerning the interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-2303 (2008) certified by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The bankruptcy court has asked this Court to determine whether the issuer of a deceased debtor’s life insurance policy was exempted under Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-2303(d) from the statutory notice requirements for lapsed life insurance policies because the premium payments on the policy were being paid monthly. We hold that the plain language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-2303(d) exempts from the notice requirements in Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-2303(a) “any policies upon which premiums are payable monthly or at more frequent intervals.” Based on the undisputed facts, the premiums for the debtor’s life insurance policy were “payable monthly.” Therefore, the issuer of the policy was not required to give either the debtor or the trustee the notice required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-2303(a), and the policy lapsed in accordance with its terms before the debtor’s death. |
Supreme Court | ||
Tennie Martin, et.al. v. Southern Railway Company, et.al. - Concurring
I concur with the result reached by the Court. Based on the current appellate record, there exists a genuine factual issue regarding whether Conductor Danny Martin sounded the train’s whistle as the train approached the crossing as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-12-108(2) (2004). |
Anderson | Supreme Court | |
Tennie Martin, et.al. v. Southern Railway Company, et.al.
This case comes before us on an appeal of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Because the plaintiffs have established the existence of several genuine issues of material fact, we conclude that summary judgment is inappropriate. We further conclude that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of a defendant’s subsequent remedial measures. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Anderson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James Edgar White, Jr.
We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish the identification of marijuana, an essential element of the offense, beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the substance was marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Devin Banks
This appeal involves a defendant who shot two persons during a robbery at the home of one of the |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Michael Hannah, et.al. v. Alltel Publishing Co.
The Court’s decision in this case alters summary judgment practice in Tennessee by dramatically changing the moving party’s burden of production. From henceforth, parties seeking a summary judgment in Tennessee’s courts will no longer be able to shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party by demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of a claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving party. This change in direction goes far beyond what is required to determine whether the summary judgment in this case was or was not appropriate. The Court’s decision will undermine, rather than enhance, the utility of summary judgment proceedings as opportunities to weed out frivolous lawsuits and to avoid the time and expense of unnecessary trials. |
Monroe | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Jonathan Harrison
This appeal involves the procedure for discovering the records of a clinical psychologist whom the defendant intends to call as an expert witness at a pretrial competency hearing in a criminal case. After the defendant filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Chester County requesting to be declared incompetent to stand trial, the State obtained a judicial subpoena under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-17- 123 (2006) directing the defendant’s psychologist to produce “[a]ny and all records” related to his examination of the defendant. The trial court declined to quash the subpoena but granted the defendant an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals. The intermediate appellate court held that the trial court erred by issuing a subpoena under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-17-123 but, characterizing the competency hearing as “in the nature of a civil proceeding,” ordered the production of the materials sought in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.02. State v. Harrison, No. W2006-00483-CCA-R9-CD, 2007 WL 906730, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2007). We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal to address the application of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.02 to pretrial competency hearings in criminal cases. We concur with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions that the trial court erred by granting the judicial subpoena and that the State is entitled to discover the report of the expert testifying for the defendant in the competency hearing. However, we have also determined that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.02 does not apply to pretrial competency hearings in criminal cases. Exercising our inherent supervisory authority over Tennessee’s judicial system, we adopt a temporary procedure for the disclosure and use of evidence relating to competency to stand trial in criminal cases. |
Chester | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee vs Phedrek Davis - Concurring
The specific question presented for our review is whether the acquittal-first jury instruction, in the context of the right to a complete charge on the count in the indictment as well as any and all lesser-included offenses supported by the evidence at trial, either is violative of our constitution or should be overruled for policy reasons. See State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999). The majority concludes that the instruction meets constitutional muster, and I am inclined to concur with that assessment; however, an acquittal-first instruction in Tennessee largely qualifies as legal fiction because the trial judge is required under our constitution to instruct on the primary charge and the full panoply of lesser-included offenses in advance of deliberations. That is, the jury, by being provided with the entirety of the instructions as appropriate, necessarily considers any lesser-included offenses before convening for deliberations. It is my belief, therefore, that as a matter of practicality and for sound policy reasons, Tennessee should retreat from acquittal-first and formally adopt an alternative instruction – one which fits within the framework of a criminal jury trial and which best conforms to specific provisions within our state constitution. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee vs Phedrek Davis
We granted the Defendant’s request for permission to appeal to address the propriety of jury instructions requiring the jury to reach a unanimous decision to acquit of a greater offense before considering a lesser-included offense. We hold that such jury instructions are proper and do not violate the Defendant’s right to trial by jury. We also hold that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences did not violate the Defendant’s federal Sixth Amendment rights. While the Defendant has raised several other issues, we have determined that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that they do not entitle the Defendant to relief. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Board of Professional Responsibility v. Edward I. Curry, III
This appeal involves a disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer that arises from a fee dispute. A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility suspended the lawyer for six months after determining (1) that he engaged in unprofessional conduct by placing an unauthorized endorsement on a settlement check and (2) that he had converted funds he had withdrawn from his trust account to pay his fee because he failed to return the funds after his client disputed his fee. The lawyer appealed to the Chancery Court for Shelby County. Based on the record of the proceeding before the hearing panel and additional evidence, the reviewing court reduced the six-month suspension to a public censure after determining that the hearing panel erred by concluding that the lawyer had converted his client’s funds and that he was obligated to return the funds after his client disputed his fee. Disciplinary Counsel appealed to this Court. We hold that a public censure is an appropriate remedy in this case. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Dennis Pylant v. State of Tennessee
We accepted this appeal to determine whether the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioner Dennis Pylant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. In 2001, a jury convicted Petitioner of the first degree felony murder of two-year-old S.J.D. in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and this Court denied Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. At the hearing, Petitioner adduced testimony about self-incriminating statements made by the victim’s mother but which trial counsel did not present to the jury at trial. The post-conviction court struck this testimony as hearsay and denied Petitioner’s claim for relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court. We hold that the post-conviction court erred in striking the proffered testimony as hearsay. We also hold that, because the post-conviction court made no credibility findings with respect to the proffered witnesses, we are unable to reach the merits of Petitioner’s claim. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment in this case and remand for a new post-conviction hearing. |
Cheatham | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee vs. Tyson Lee Day - Dissenting
The State of Tennessee filed its Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application in this case to determine whether Tennessee recognizes the “community caretaking” exception to the requirement that police officers have at least reasonable suspicion when they make a traffic stop. I agree with the Court’s conclusion that we cannot address this question because it is beyond the scope of the legal issue certified to this Court in accordance with Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2). Rather than dismissing the appeal as being improvidently granted, the Court has decided to determine whether, under the essentially undisputed facts, Officer Jeff Tarkington acted reasonably when he stopped Tyson Lee Day’s automobile on May 16, 2004. The Court has decided that Officer Tarkington did not act reasonably. I cannot concur with this conclusion. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee vs. Tyson Lee Day
After unsuccessfully moving to suppress evidence resulting from the traffic stop that led to his arrest, the defendant, Tyson Lee Day, pleaded guilty to third offense driving under the influence and driving on a revoked license. The plea agreement provided for reservation of a certified question of law regarding whether the traffic stop was based on reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense had been or was about to be committed. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that at the time the officer initiated the traffic stop, he lacked reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court and, because the question was dispositive, dismissed the case. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to consider the question of whether the community caretaking rationale for traffic stops justified the stop in this case. After carefully examining the certified question, however, we conclude that the community caretaking issue was not included within the scope of the question reserved for review. Accordingly, our review extends solely to the issue preserved, i.e., whether the traffic stop was based on reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense had been or was about to be committed. We conclude that the facts do not support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
Michael Dwayne Edwards v. State of Tennessee, Wayne Brandon, Warden
We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in remanding this habeas corpus case to the trial court for a hearing on Michael Dwayne Edward’s claim that his sentence is illegal. After careful consideration we conclude that, even assuming the trial court erroneously classified Edwards as a persistent offender for sentencing, this non-jurisdictional error renders the judgment voidable, not void, and does not entitle Edwards to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court dismissing the habeas corpus petition. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
Michael Dwayne Edwards v. State of Tennessee, Wayne Brandon, Warden - Dissenting
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and must, therefore, respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Petitioner has failed to establish grounds for habeas corpus relief. Although the majority has performed an admirable analysis of the present cases on the subject, I am of the opinion that the various principles derived from these opinions are in conflict and, absent a reconciliation, the Petitioner is entitled to relief. Because the record of the proceedings demonstrates that after the jury verdict, the trial court directly contravened statute by imposing a Range III, persistent offender sentence, I would grant habeas corpus relief and remand to the sentencing court for the imposition of a Range II sentence. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
Diane Downs, individually and as natural parent of Ryan Cody Downs v. Mark Bush, et. al. - Concurring/Dissenting
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and must, therefore, respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Petitioner has failed to establish grounds for habeas corpus relief. Although the majority has performed an admirable analysis of the present cases on the subject, I am of the opinion that the various principles derived from these opinions are in conflict and, absent a reconciliation, the Petitioner is entitled to relief. Because the record of the proceedings demonstrates that after the jury verdict, the trial court directly contravened statute by imposing a Range III, persistent offender sentence, I would grant habeas corpus relief and remand to the sentencing court for the imposition of a Range II sentence. |
Davidson | Supreme Court |
