State of Tennessee v. Kacy Dewayne Cannon - Concurring
I concur in the result reached by the majority, particularly the excellent analysis pertaining to the confrontation clauses of the federal and state constitutions; however, I would have affirmed that portion of the opinion by the Court of Criminal Appeals holding that the article of clothing containing semen identified as that of the defendant was properly admitted as evidence, despite any weakness in the chain of custody. In my view, the majority places an inordinate degree of emphasis on the initial link in the chain and falls short of affording the trial judge adequate deference under our limited scope of review. Because, however, other evidence offered by the State violated constitutional principles, and the errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I agree that a new trial is warranted. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre Dotson
The Defendant, Andre Dotson, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of robbery. On direct appeal of right, the Court of Criminal Appeals modified one robbery conviction to theft based upon insufficient evidence of the element of fear on the part of a victim, but otherwise affirmed. We granted permission to appeal in order to consider several issues, including those related to the consolidation of the four indictments in a single trial. We hold that (1) the consolidation of the four charges constituted reversible error; (2) while the trial court did not abuse its discretion by severing the two indictments against a co-defendant, that would have been unnecessary had the Defendant been afforded separate trials; (3) the co-defendant’s statements to police did not fall under the “against interest” exception to the hearsay rule and were properly excluded as evidence; and (4) the evidence at trial was sufficient to establish fear on the part of one of the victims, an essential element for the offense of robbery. Because the trial court erroneously refused to order separate trials on each of the four indictments and the error cannot be classified as harmless, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the Defendant is granted new trials on each indictment. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Judge Brooks
This case involves the applicability of the forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception. We hold that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception requires a showing that a defendant’s actions were intended, at least in part, to prevent a witness from testifying. The prosecution in this case failed to prove that a motive for the murder was to make the victim unavailable as a witness. Admission of her hearsay statements, therefore, violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6). We further conclude that the error affected the result of the trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for a new trial. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Lisa Dawn Green, et al. v. Vicki Renee Johnson, et al.
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether an uninsured motorist carrier may reduce amounts owed under an uninsured motorist provision by the amount of settlement proceeds an insured receives from a non-motorist defendant. Because the uninsured motorist statutes, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections 56-7-1201 to -1206, unambiguously allow an uninsured motorist carrier to limit its liability by “the sum of the limits collectible under all liability and/or primary uninsured motorist insurance polices, bonds, and securities applicable to the bodily injury or death of the insured,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1201(d), and to receive an offset or credit for “the total amount of damages collected by the insured from all parties alleged to be liable for the bodily injury or death of the insured,” id. §1206(i), we conclude that the uninsured motorist carrier in this case is entitled to an offset for the monies the insured received from the non-motorist defendants. Accordingly, we affirm the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority d/b/a Erlanger Health System v. Bradley County, Tennessee, et al.
Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, conducting its operations as Erlanger Health System, filed suit against Bradley County for the medical expenses of a suspect injured in a shooting at a bar in Cleveland. The trial court awarded judgment for a part of the claim, and the Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, affirmed. We granted review under Rule 11 of Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure in order to construe the statute governing the obligation of counties to pay the medical expenses of a prisoner confined in a jail or otherwise in police custody. Because the statute does not extend the obligation of the county to these circumstances, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the complaint is dismissed. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Dale Rimmer
The Defendant, Michael Rimmer, was convicted of one count of premeditated murder, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of theft of property. In the penalty phase of the trial, the jury imposed a sentence of death for the first degree murder. On appeal as of right, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions, reversed the sentence of death, and remanded to the trial court for a second sentencing hearing. State v. Rimmer (Rimmer I), No. W1999-00637-CCA-R3-DD, 2001WL 567960 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 25, 2001). At the conclusion of that proceeding, a different jury imposed the death penalty based upon one statutory aggravating circumstance, i.e. that the defendant had a previous conviction for a felony with statutory elements involving violence to the person. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2) (1997). As required for the imposition of a sentence of death, the jury also concluded that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. This sentence was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. State v. Rimmer (Rimmer II), No. W2004-02240-CCA-R3-DD, 2006 WL 3731206 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec.15, 2006). Our review is mandatory. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1) (2006). Upon careful review of the entire record, we hold as follows: (1) although the trial court erred during the sentencing hearing by excluding evidence solely on the grounds of hearsay, the evidence was either introduced through other means or lacking in relevance or reliability, so the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) for a waiver of his right to testify to have been valid, a defendant need not state on the record that he was informed by counsel of our ruling in State v. Cazes, 875 .W.2d 253, 266 (Tenn. 1994); (3) the jury instruction defining reasonable doubt does not offend due process; (4) references by defense counsel and a defense witness that the defendant previously had been on “death row” did not, under these circumstances, entitle the defendant to a new sentencing hearing; and (5) the sentence of death satisfies the proportionality guidelines. As to the remaining issues, we agree with the conclusions reached by the Court of Criminal Appeals. The relevant portions of the opinion are appended. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, affirmed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Bill Walker et al. v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc.
We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal in this case to determine whether a class action may be certified in a claim brought under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), Tennessee Code Annotated sections 47-18-101S125 (2001), or in a claim for common law misrepresentation and fraud. The plaintiff, on his own behalf and on behalf of similarly situated individuals, filed a complaint against Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., challenging sales transactions in which buyers were charged “dealer incurred costs” as part of the purchase price. The complaint alleged class action claims for, among other things, Tennessee Consumer Protection Act violations and common law misrepresentation and fraud. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the class certification of the TCPA, misrepresentation and fraud claims. The court granted the defendant’s motion for a Rule 9 interlocutory appeal and to stay discovery. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for a Rule 9 appeal on the basis that we would soon be addressing the same issues in a different case.1 We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal when the issue remained unresolved. Upon thorough review of the record and the legal issues presented, we hold that class certification is unavailable under the TCPA and that class certification was not appropriate in the plaintiff’s claims for common law fraud and misrepresentation due to the individual nature of those claims. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Dorothy Owens, as Conservator of Mary Francis King, an incapcitated person, et al. v. National Health Corporation, et al.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPELLEES’ PETITION TO REHEAR The appellees, NHC/OP, L.P., National Health Realty, Inc., NHC, Inc., a/k/a NHC, Inc., Tennessee, and National Health Corporation, have filed a petition to rehear the opinion of this Court filed on November 8, 2007. By order of January 4, 2008, appellant, Dorothy Owens, was ordered to file a response to the petition to rehear. Appellant’s response was filed on January 16, 2008. In their petition, the appellees allege that the Court improperly allowed discovery as to the principal’s competence to sign the power of attorney. Upon due consideration, the Court concludes that appellees’ petition to rehear is well-taken as to this issue and should therefore be granted. The petition to rehear is denied as to the remainder of the issues . It appearing to the Court from appellees’ Petition to Rehear and appellant’s response that footnote 4 of its Opinion filed November 8, 2007, should be modified, IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the attached Opinion be and the same is hereby substituted for that Opinion filed in this cause on November 8, 2007, without change to this Court’s judgment entered contemporaneously with the filing of the original Opinion on November 8, 2007, and without the further taxing of costs. PER CURIAM |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. R. D. S. - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur in the majority’s analysis of the alleged Miranda violations in Parts I and II (A). I respectfully dissent, however, as to the majority’s conclusions in Part II (B) concerning the motion to suppress the evidence discovered in R.D.S’s truck. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. R. D. S. - Concurring/Dissenting Correction
R.D.S. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. R. D. S.
This appeal arises out of a finding of delinquency following a denial of a motion to suppress |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
J. O. House v. Estate of J. K. Edmondson - Dissenting
I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err by approving the special litigation committee’s report. For a variety of reasons, however, I must respectfully dissent with regard to the holding that a minority shareholder suing on behalf of a for-profit corporation can never recover attorney fees under the common fund doctrine. First, I do not believe that failure of the General Assembly to include the common fund doctrine in the Tennessee Business Corporation Act (“TBCA”) abrogates our holding in Grant v. Lookout Mountain Co., 28 S.W. 90 (Tenn. 1894). Secondly, the common fund doctrine is not analogous to Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-17-401(d), which authorizes an award of attorney fees against the opposing party. Finally, from a policy standpoint, the application of the common fund doctrine to shareholder derivative suits is desirable to promote corporate accountability. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
J. O. House v. Estate of J. K. Edmondson
A minority shareholder in a closely held Tennessee corporation filed a derivative suit claiming that the company’s majority shareholder, who also served as the corporation’s president and chairman of its board of directors, misappropriated corporate funds. The minority shareholder also filed an individual claim against the majority shareholder alleging that he breached a pre-incorporation agreement in which the majority shareholder agreed to offer available stock to the corporation and other shareholders before purchasing the stock himself. A litigation committee appointed by the corporation to investigate the allegations against the majority shareholder found merit to the charges. The litigation committee recommended to the corporation that the company either settle the derivative claim or proceed with the litigation if the majority shareholder was unwilling to resolve the lawsuit in accordance with terms proposed by the committee. The trial court found that the litigation committee’s findings and recommendations were in the corporation’s best interests and that, once a settlement was reached, the derivative suit would be dismissed. The trial court also granted summary judgment to the majority shareholder on the individual breach of contract claim and denied the minority shareholder’s request for attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s acceptance of the litigation committee’s report and the denial of attorney’s fees to the minority shareholder, but reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the majority shareholder on the breach of contract claim. We accepted review to determine: (1) whether a plaintiff in a shareholder’s derivative suit brought on behalf of a for-profit corporation may recover attorney’s fees; and (2) whether the trial court was correct in adopting the findings of the litigation committee’s report. We hold that Tennessee law does not authorize an award of attorney’s fees to a plaintiff in a shareholder’s derivative suit brought on behalf of a for-profit corporation. We also hold that the trial court did not err in approving the sufficiently independent, thoroughly researched report of the litigation committee. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to those issues is affirmed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Susan Marie Gilliam Campbell
We granted review to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support dual convictions of criminally negligent homicide and facilitating escape. Because the defendant, who was charged with the care of the five-year-old victim, took him swimming at a lake without notifying his parents, drank beer and used marijuana, and dared the victim into the water and then failed to supervise his activities, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of criminally negligent homicide. Because the defendant, after discovering the disappearance of the victim, discouraged immediate contact with the authorities so that her son, a fugitive from justice, could avoid the police, the evidence was also sufficient to support the conviction of facilitating escape. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Hawkins | Supreme Court | |
Randy L. May v. Howard W. Carlton - Dissenting
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the portion of the 1981 judgment declaring Randy L. May infamous is contrary to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2712 (1975) (amended 1981).1 However, I cannot concur with the Court’s dramatic expansion of the application of the “great and efficacious” writ of habeas corpus in this case. Until today, it had been well settled that the writ did not apply to collateral consequences of a criminal conviction or to circumstances that did not involve imprisonment or a “restraint of liberty” as that concept had been understood at common law. Rather than recognizing a brand new classification of collateral consequences in order to provide Mr. May relief, this Court should simply leave Mr. May to pursue his other, well-established plain, adequate, and speedy remedies. |
Johnson | Supreme Court | |
Randy L. May v. Howard W. Carlton
Incident to a conviction for first degree murder, the petitioner was declared infamous, a status which involves the loss of rights of citizenship, including the right to vote. At the time of the offense, homicide was not listed as an infamous crime under the statute. We granted permission to appeal to determine whether the judgment could be corrected through the writ of habeas corpus. Because the illegal disenfranchisement of the petitioner qualifies as a “restraint on liberty,” a threshold requirement under our statute, we grant limited habeas corpus relief but uphold the underlying conviction and the term of incarceration. The opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for modification of the judgment. |
Johnson | Supreme Court | |
Timothy Wade Keyt v. Nanci Suzanne Keyt - Dissenting
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Putnam | Supreme Court | |
Timothy Wade Keyt v. Nanci Suzanne Keyt
We granted the application for permission to appeal in this divorce case to address two issues presented by Husband: (1) whether the increase, if any, in value of his separately-owned stock interest in the family-owned company for which he worked qualifies a marital property; and if so, (2) whether the chancellor correctly assessed the increase in value. Because we find that Husband’s employment with the company in which he owned stock did not substantially contribute to the preservation and appreciation of the stock, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Putnam | Supreme Court | |
Health Cost Controls, Inc. v. Ronald Gifford
This case comes before us on an appeal of the trial court’s finding that the injured party was not |
Weakley | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Edwin Gomez, et al.
This matter is before us upon remand by the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of that Court’s decision in Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S.__, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007). In our |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Nora Elizabeth Kilby Moore v. Ronnie Dale Moore
We granted permission to appeal to determine whether income from a nonrecurring capital gain may be considered in determining a parent’s gross income for purposes of modifying child support. We hold that income from an isolated or “one-time” capital gain must be included in calculating gross income and that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition to modify child support. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for calculation of child support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed; Case Remanded |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Nora Elizabeth Kilby Moore v. Ronnie Dale Moore
We granted permission to appeal to determine whether income from a nonrecurring capital gain may be considered in determining a parent’s gross income for purposes of modifying child support. We hold that income from an isolated or “one-time” capital gain must be included in calculating gross income and that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition to modify child support. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for calculation of child support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed; Case Remanded |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Jerry T. Troup, Jr. v. Fischer Steel Corporation
The plaintiff in this case suffered an on-the-job injury and filed a tort claim against the third-party defendant. We granted review to determine whether the third-party defendant is entitled to argue the comparative fault of a principal contractor who is an employer for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Law. We conclude that the third-party defendant may not argue the comparative fault of a principal contractor even if the principal contractor does not have a subrogation interest in the plaintiff’s recovery. The third-party defendant may, however, argue that the principal contractor was the sole cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries. We also conclude that the jury instruction provided by the trial court accurately and adequately explained the jury’s ability to consider whether the actions of the principal contractor were the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries. Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issues pretermitted by its opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth C. Dailey, III
The Defendant, Kenneth C. Dailey, III, pleaded guilty to second degree murder and reserved a certified question of law regarding the admissibility of his statements of confession to the crime. Disagreeing with the trial court, the prosecutor, and the defense that the question was dispositive of the case, the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal. We hold that, on the record before us, the certified question is dispositive of the case. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter to the Court of Criminal Appeals for its review of the certified question on its merits. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Simpson Strong-Tie Company v. Stewart, Estes & Donnell
We accepted a question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee to determine whether the absolute litigation privilege applies to what may be defamatory communications made by an attorney prior to a proposed judicial proceeding when the communications are directed at recipients unconnected with the proposed proceeding. We hold that an attorney is privileged to publish what may be defamatory information prior to a proposed judicial proceeding even when the communication is directed at recipients unconnected with the proposed proceeding. In order for the privilege to apply, (1) the communication must be made by an attorney acting in the capacity of counsel, (2) the communication must be related to the subject matter of the proposed litigation, (3) the proposed proceeding must be under serious consideration by the attorney acting in good faith, and (4) the attorney must have a client or identifiable prospective client at the time the communication is published. |
Supreme Court |
