State of Tennessee v. Kelly Michael Pickett
We granted the appeal in each of these cases to determine the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1003 (2003), which prohibits the possession of child pornography. Initially, the statute is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. Secondly, we hold that because the charges against Pickett were multiplicitous, only one conviction is permissible under the circumstances of that case. In consequence, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in each case is affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Patti Zakour v. Ut Medical Group, Inc., & Scott Craig, M.D.
The issue we review in this case is whether the defendants exercised peremptory challenges during jury selection based on race and/or gender in a discriminatory manner contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Batson v. Kentucky. The Defendants used six of their seven peremptory challenges to strike women from the jury panel, including the only African-Americans who were seated in the jury box. In response to the Plaintiff’s race-based Batson challenge, the Defendants responded that one of the African-American women was dismissed because she had difficulty remembering the verdict in a previous civil jury case in which she had served as a juror and because she had a family history of cancer. As to the Plaintiff’s gender-based Batson objection, the Defendants responded that the women were excused based on “experience and body mechanics.” The trial court overruled the Plaintiff’s objections and the trial proceeded. Following a defense verdict, the Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. After careful review of the record and applicable authorities, we hold that the Defendants’ stated reasons for exercising peremptory challenges to strike the African-Americans and women from the jury panel were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Batson v. Kentucky. Because the trial court erred in overruling the Plaintiff’s Batson objections, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial. |
Tipton | Supreme Court | |
Diane Jordan, et al. v. Knox County, Tennessee, et al.
In this expedited appeal, the primary issue presented for review is whether Knox County, Tennessee, has a valid governmental charter. A secondary issue is whether a term limits amendment to the county charter should be applied and, if so, to which of the elected county officials. We hold that while Knox County failed to comply with the enabling legislation for instituting a charter form of government, since September 1, 1990, Knox County has been governed under a de facto charter with a county mayor, county commissioners, and other de facto officers. For the reasons set out in this opinion, it is our conclusion that the term limits amendment meets due process guidelines and applies to all elected Knox County Government officials except for the court clerks and the school board member, each of whom is protected by either the state constitution or statute. The judgment of the Knox County Chancery Court, which invalidated both the charter and the amendment, is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. - Concurring and Dissenting
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Dennis Reid, Jr.
The defendant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was convicted of three counts of premeditated murder, three counts of felony murder, one count of attempted murder, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged each of the felony murder convictions with the corresponding premeditated murder convictions. The jury sentenced the defendant to death based upon four aggravating circumstances, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (6), (7), (12) (Supp. 1996), and further found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(g)(1) (Supp. 1996). We hold that (1) the trial court did not err by finding the defendant competent to stand trial; (2) the trial court did not err by admitting the testimony of the defendant’s former employer; (3) the trial court did not err by denying the motion to limit proof regarding the defendant’s financial condition; (4) the trial court did not err by refusing to recuse itself from the case; (5) the trial court did not err by allowing the State to introduce evidence of the murders at the Captain D’s restaurant to establish the “mass murder” aggravating circumstance; and (6) the defendant’s sentences of death are not invalid under the mandatory review criteria of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1). As to the remaining issues, we agree with the conclusions reached by the Court of Criminal Appeals. The relevant portions of its opinion are appended. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Shaun Hoover v. State of Tennessee
We granted permission to appeal in this habeas corpus case to consider the legality of a sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement. The agreed sentence exceeds the maximum available term in the offender Range but does not exceed the maximum punishment authorized for the offense. For the reasons explained herein, we conclude that the plea-bargained sentence is legal. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed. |
Lauderdale | Supreme Court | |
Linda Smallwood, et al., v. Jessica Mann
In this case, the paternal grandparents of a minor child whose parents were not married petitioned the Juvenile Court of Gibson County for an order of visitation for the father. After a hearing, the trial court granted the petition and entered an order awarding visitation to the grandparents conditioned on the father’s unavailability. We accepted review of this matter pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure in order to determine whether the trial court’s “conditional” order is governed by the statute allowing visitation rights to grandparents. Upon consideration, we have determined that the order entered by the trial court is, indeed, an order granting visitation to the grandparents and that the grandparents are not entitled to visitation under either the grandparents’ visitation statute or through an “assignment” of the father’s rights. Because section 36-6-306 of the Tennessee Code Annotated vests only the circuit and chancery courts with jurisdiction in grandparents’ visitation matters, the Juvenile Court of Gibson County had no authority to adjudicate the issue of grandparent visitation. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, the judgment of the juvenile court is reversed to the extent it awarded visitation to the grandparents, and the case is remanded to the juvenile court for dismissal. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed |
Gibson | Supreme Court | |
Cathy L. Chapman, et al. v. Rick J. Bearfield
We accepted this appeal to clarify whether experts testifying in legal malpractice cases must be familiar with a single, statewide professional standard of care or a standard of care for a particular locality within the state. Because we hold that a single, statewide professional standard of care exists for attorneys practicing in Tennessee, expert witnesses testifying in legal malpractice cases must be familiar with the statewide professional standard. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Washington | Supreme Court | |
Donald Fitzgerald v. BTR Sealing Systems North America-Tennessee Operations
This workers’ compensation action arose out of an employee’s motion to compel medical treatment. The employee had settled a workers’ compensation claim with his employer involving a work-related injury sustained in 1997. This settlement provided that the employer was responsible for future medical treatment. The employer refused to pay for recommended shoulder joint replacement surgery, arguing that the need for the surgery was not causally related to the initial injury. The trial court found that the need for the surgery was related to the initial injury and ordered the employer to provide for that treatment. The employer appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the employer and that the evidence did not support the finding that the need for surgery was causally related to the initial injury. We accepted review before the case was heard or considered by the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel. We hold that the trial court did not shift the burden of proof to the employer and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding of causation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Clinton Burns, III
We accepted this appeal to determine whether a juvenile charged with being delinquent by virtue of having committed an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult is entitled to a jury trial on appeal de novo to circuit court. We answer that question in the negative. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
James A. Vaughn v. State of Tennessee AND Rearno Vaughn v. State of Tennessee
We granted permission to appeal these post-conviction cases and then consolidated them to determine a question common to both: were the petitioners denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to object to an erroneous jury instruction regarding the release eligibility for a person convicted of first degree murder when there had been a recent change in the law. Both petitioners also raise additional arguments regarding whether their trial counsel were ineffective in other respects. The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the decision of the post-conviction court, holding that the petitioners were not denied their right to effective assistance of counsel. We reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals in part, holding that the petitioners were denied their right to effective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to object to erroneous jury instructions regarding release eligibility. We affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals on all other issues, holding that neither trial counsel was ineffective in any other aspect of their representation. Therefore, we reverse both petitioners’ convictions for first degree murder and remand for new trials on that charge alone. We affirm all remaining convictions. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
William L. Smith v. Virginia Lewis, Warden, et al.
We granted permission to appeal to determine the extent to which a judgment order containing a sentence for rape of a child which suggests the possibility of early release is void and subject to correction by writ of habeas corpus. On the facts of this case, we grant habeas corpus relief to the extent of vacating the illegal sentence but not to the extent of vacating the underlying conviction. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the Court of Criminal Appeals. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Bledsoe | Supreme Court | |
Jerry Wayne Lynch v. City of Jellico, et al. AND David A. Lozano v. Lincoln Memorial University, et. al.
In these consolidated workers’ compensation appeals, we are asked to decide the constitutionality of various provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Reform Act of 2004. Specifically at issue is whether the benefit review conference requirement embodied in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 50-6-203(a) (2005), 50-6-225(a)(1) (2005), and 50-6-239(b) (2005), violates the due process protections of the Tennessee or United States Constitutions, the separation of powers doctrine in article II, sections 1 and 2 of Tennessee’s Constitution, or the open courts doctrine found in article I, section 17, of the Tennessee Constitution. Additionally, we are asked to decide whether the method used to determine permanent partial disability benefits, namely the multiplier provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2005) used in conjunction with the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (“AMA Guides”), violates equal protection; due process; the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-21-101 (2005); and the Tennessee Handicap Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-50-103(a) (2002). The trial judge determined that each of these provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Reform Act of 2004–the benefit review conference, the multiplier, and use of the AMA Guides–is unconstitutional. After carefully considering the record and relevant authority, we conclude that the trial judge erred. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgments are reversed. |
Campbell | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Bruce Warren Scarborough AND State of Tennessee v. Mack T. Transou
We granted these appeals to determine whether the extraction of blood from a convicted and incarcerated felon for DNA analysis pursuant to Tennessee’s DNA collection statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-321 (2003), is constitutional under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. These three cases come before us upon Defendant Scarborough’s interlocutory appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and upon Defendant Transou’s direct appeals from his convictions in two separate cases. Transou also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions of rape and aggravated burglary in one of his cases and the sentences he received for those offenses. We conclude that the DNA collection statute is constitutional as applied here. We further hold that Transou consented to having his blood drawn; that the evidence is sufficient to support Transou’s convictions of rape and aggravated burglary; and that his sentences for those crimes are valid. The judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals in all three cases are affirmed. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Niccole A. Naifeh, et al. v. Valley Forge Life Insurance Company, et al.
We granted this appeal to determine (1) whether a life insurance policy purchased by the insured as part of a divorce decree had been terminated before the insured’s death; and (2) whether the insurer or the insurance agent was negligent in failing to prevent the policy from lapsing after the insured issued an oral stop payment order and failed to pay a monthly premium. The Chancery Court concluded that the policy had not been terminated, that the insurer and insurance agent were negligent, and that the proceeds of the policy were to be paid to the beneficiary. The Court of Appeals, reversing the Chancellor’s judgment, concluded that the policy had been backdated by agreement of the parties and had been terminated by the insured before his death. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the insurer and the insurance agent were not negligent because their actions were not a proximate cause of the damages. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the life insurance policy remained valid at the time of the insured’s death and that the beneficiary was entitled to the proceeds under the policy. However, we agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the insurer and the insurance agent were not negligent because there was no evidence that their acts were a proximate cause of the damages. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part for the reasons stated herein. |
Tipton | Supreme Court | |
Mary Warren Kesser v. Peter Hale Kesser
The parties entered into a marital dissolution agreement that included both a provision requiring the husband to pay a fixed amount of child support each month and a provision requiring the husband to pay 21% of bonuses and all other income as child support. After careful review, we conclude that the 21% provision is legally enforceable as part of the parties’ agreement and that the 21% provision merged into the final decree of divorce and therefore became subject to modification. Although the trial court found that a modification of both the fixed amount provision and the 21% provision was warranted, the trial court erred in failing to apply the applicable statute and the child support guidelines in effect as of the date of the hearing and in failing to consider the husband’s adoption of three children in modifying the 21% provision. The trial court properly refused to consider the husband’s capital losses in calculating child support due from his capital gains. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
David E. Clark v. Lowe's Home Centers, et al.
We granted this appeal to address whether a previous workers’ compensation award can be reconsidered under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) if the employee sustains subsequent work-related injuries for which he seeks compensation. Upon review, we hold that reconsideration of a prior award under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) is not precluded by a subsequent work-related injury for which the employee seeks compensation. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Jackson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Lee Marise
We granted permission to appeal in this case pursuant to Rule 11, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, to determine whether lay testimony of olfactory observations alone may support a conviction for possession of anhydrous ammonia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-433(a). We conclude that the burden of proving the nature and composition of anhydrous ammonia as it is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 43-11-303(a) cannot be met by adducing lay testimony of olfactory observations only. Because the evidence adduced in the case under submission did not include any evidence of the chemical composition of the substance, we conclude that it is insufficient to sustain the conviction for unlawful possession of anhydrous ammonia and reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals insofar as it affirmed this conviction. Accordingly, we dismiss the defendant’s conviction for possession of anhydrous ammonia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. |
Carroll | Supreme Court | |
Forrest L. Whaley And Margaret Ann Whaley v. Jim Ann Perkins, et al.
The Plaintiffs purchased from two of the Defendants a home located on a two-acre parcel of land that had been part of a larger parcel. The Plaintiffs later discovered that the two-acre parcel had been illegally subdivided from the larger parcel, and they filed suit alleging breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, negligence per se, and breach of warranty of title. In addition to other damages, the Plaintiffs sought damages for emotional distress. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs and awarded $170,000 as compensatory damages and an additional $5,000 as punitive damages. The Court of Appeals held, in pertinent part, that the Plaintiffs’ claim for damages for emotional distress was barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions. We hold that the one-year personal injury statute of limitations does not apply to this case, and we therefore reverse that part of the intermediate court’s judgment. We affirm all other aspects of the intermediate court’s judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Marjorie M. Kirkpatrick v. Robert W. O'Neal
We took this case to address whether the child support obligation of a non-residential parent continues after the death of a residential parent when custody is awarded to another party. We conclude that a non-residential parent’s obligation to support a minor child continues until the child reaches majority, no matter who retains custody of the child. The duty of support is owed to the child and may be paid to a custodian on behalf of that child. Because parents owe child support regardless of the existence of a court order to that effect, third party custodians are entitled to retroactive child support from the date a child is legally placed in their custody. This action is affirmed as modified and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Leonard J. Young - Concurring and Dissenting
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Leonard J. Young
Defendant, Leonard J. Young, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and theft over $1,000 but less than $10,000. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1) (Supp. 1999), 39-13-305(a)(1) (1997), 39-14-103 (1997). The jury subsequently sentenced Defendant to death for the murder, applying three aggravating circumstances: (a) Defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person; (b) the offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of Defendant or another; and (c) the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by Defendant, while Defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, theft. See id. § 39-13- 204(i)(2), (6), (7) (Supp. 1999). The trial court sentenced Defendant as a career offender to sixty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and as a career offender to twelve years for the theft conviction. The trial court ordered all sentences to be served consecutively. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the death sentence. After the case was docketed in this Court, we entered an order identifying several issues for oral argument.1 We now hold as follows: (1) the evidence was sufficient to establish venue in Shelby County; (2) the death in the immediate family of the original trial judge constituted an “other disability” under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(a) such that appointment of a substitute judge was proper; (3) the trial court committed harmless error in allowing into evidence several photographs of the victim as a child; (4) the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction of first degree premeditated murder; (5) the trial court committed harmless error in admitting certain victim impact evidence; (6) the trial court committed harmless error in instructing the jury that Defendant’s 1999 Mississippi conviction of kidnapping was an offense, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person; and (7) the death sentence is valid under this Court’s mandatory review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1) (2003). We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues and attach as an appendix to this opinion the relevant portions of that court’s decision. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jessica Trotter And Andrew Sheriff
Through forgery and credit card fraud, defendants, Trotter and Sheriff, stole approximately half a million dollars from Trotter’s employer. After both defendants had pleaded guilty to theft of property over sixty thousand dollars, a Class B felony, the trial court imposed an eight-year sentence upon each defendant. The defendants applied for alternative sentencing; the trial court denied the application on the grounds of general deterrence and depreciation of the seriousness of the offense. On appeal, the intermediate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and imposed alternative sentences of twelve months incarceration, with the balance to be served on probation. We accepted the State’s petition for review of this cause under Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure in order to determine whether the intermediate court erred in reversing the trial court’s sentences of confinement and substituting alternative sentences. We conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in modifying the defendants’ sentences. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. v. State of Tennessee - Concurring and Dissenting
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
We granted interlocutory review in this post-conviction capital case to clarify the procedure for determining competency to proceed in a post-conviction action. For the reasons explained herein, we hold that the civil standard for mental incompetence adopted in State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459 (Tenn. 2001), applies to a competency determination during post-conviction proceedings. To trigger a hearing on competency, a petitioner must make a prima facie showing of incompetence by submission of affidavits, depositions, medical reports, or other credible evidence. A petitioner bears the burden of proving that he or she is incompetent by clear and convincing evidence. A finding of incompetence requires neither a stay of the post-conviction proceedings nor abeyance of individual issues. A trial court should appoint, if necessary, a “next friend” or guardian ad litem to pursue the action on behalf of the petitioner. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed as modified, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court |
