Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
An abuse of discretion in denying pretrial diversion should be found only when the record
shows an absence of any substantial evidence supporting the district attorney general’s decision.
State v. Pinkham, 955 S.W.2d 956, 960 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Hammersley, 650 S.W.2d 352, 356
(Tenn. 1983). When the reasons cited by the district attorney general are sufficient to support the
denial of pretrial diversion, I would hold that there is no abuse of discretion in the district attorney
general’s failure to make specific reference to every non-statutory, judicially-imposed factor. I
continue to adhere to my separate opinion in State v. Curry, 988 S.W.2d 153 (Tenn. 1999), and
therefore must respectfully dissent.
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey
At the outset, I recognize that the facts and evidence surrounding the heinous murder of Shannon Sanderson are certainly indicative of guilt on the part of the defendant, Gerald Powers. Indeed, even without the disputed testimony of the defendant’s wife, the evidence implicating Mr. Powers is convincing, if not overwhelming. However, I am unwilling to affirm a criminal conviction based upon a flawed interpretation of the marital communication privilege as codified in Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-1-201(b) (Supp. 1998). In my opinion, the statutory marital communications privilege codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-1-201(b) should have resulted in the exclusion of the defendant’s wife’s testimony relating to the defendant’s confidential communications. Because I am of the opinion that reversible error occurred in this respect, I respectfully dissent.
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck
The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether Tennessee law recognizes a co-perpetrator rule which bars the defendant's convictions for criminally negligent homicide on the basis that the victims were co-participants in the drag race. After fully and carefully considering the record in this case in light of the relevant authorities, we conclude that no rule of Tennessee law bars the defendant's convictions for criminally negligent homicide as a matter of law. We hold that causation in criminal cases generally is a question of fact for a properly instructed jury, that a victim's contributory negligence is not a complete defense but may be considered in determining whether or not the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of death, and that a jury's determination of the causation issue will be reviewed on appeal under the familiar sufficiency of the evidence standard and not disturbed so long as the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's determination. Because the trial court in this case failed to provide the jury with an instruction on proximate causation, an essential element of the offense, and because the jury was erroneously provided an instruction as to criminal responsibility, a theory that the State now concedes is inapplicable, the defendant's convictions for criminally negligent homicide must be reversed.
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker and Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: John P. Colton, Jr.
With its decision today, a majority of this Court has effectively permitted a defendant, who was sentenced to death in 1989 for the brutal execution of a 74-year-old grandmother, an opportunity to escape the ultimate punishment for his actions solely because he has managed to obtain a lower score on a revised I.Q. test than he was previously able to do. Before today, the Constitution of this State has never been held to provide blanket capital immunity to a class of persons based only on the fact of low intellectual ability and deficits in adaptive behavior. Instead, the Constitution has barred such executions only when the defendant’s mental condition displaces the following capacities: (1) the cognitive capacity to appreciate that certain action will lead to the death of others; (2) the moral capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of murder; or (3) the volitional capacity to behave in a lawful manner.
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge John P. Colton, Jr.
We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court and the Court of CriminalAppeals erred by denying the petitioner’s motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. In hismotion, the petitioner asserted that new evidence establishes that he is mentally retarded and,therefore, ineligible for the death penalty under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203, which prohibits theexecutionof the mentally retarded. The petitioner also argued on appeal that the Eighth Amendmentto the United States Constitution and article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit the execution of mentally retarded individuals.
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
We granted appeal to determine 1) whether the defendants are entitled to a new trial based upon their claim that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence from four different sources, and 2) whether the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' claim for consortium damages and, if so, the proper remedy for that error. We hold that the four evidentiary issues are without merit. The defendants therefore are not entitled to a new trial. We further hold, pursuant to our decisions in Jordan v. Baptist Three Rivers Hospital, 984 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn. 1999), Hill v. City of Germantown, 31 S.W.3d 234 (Tenn. 2000), and Hancock v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Hospital Authority, 54 S.W.3d 234 (Tenn. 2001), that the plaintiffs may maintain a claim for loss of filial consortium. We remand this case for a trial on the issue of incidental damages, limited to loss of consortium.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23, this Court accepted certification of five questions of law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concerning Tennessee's law of corporations. For the reasons given herein, we answer that the corporate statutes in effect before January 1, 1988, apply to determine the rights and remedies available against a corporation dissolved before that date and that section 48-1-1013(a) (repealed) applies to limit Piper's liability for post-dissolution claims. We further answer that Piper Industries, Inc. did comply with the dissolution statutes in effect before January 1, 1988, which require provisions to ensure the final distribution of corporate assets, but which do not require a corporation to establish a reserve fund for contingent claims arising more than two years after the dissolution. Finally, we answer that while the trust fund doctrine has been previously applied in Tennessee to solvent corporations, its application in this case is necessarily limited by Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-1-1013(a) (repealed).
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
The issue presented in this case is whether a confidential relationship arises as a matter of law when an unrestricted power of attorney is executed but not exercised. The trial court held that a confidential relationship existed and that the resulting presumption of undue influence could only be rebutted by proof of independent advice to the decedent. Because there was no such proof, the trial court set aside the jury's verdict and found that the will was invalid. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that since the attorney-in-fact was unaware of the power of attorney at the time the decedent executed her will, there was not a confidential relationship between the attorney-in-fact and the decedent and, therefore, no presumption of undue influence. After a thorough review of the record and the relevant authority, we hold that a confidential relationship does not arise as a matter of law when an unrestricted power of attorney is executed without being exercised. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Roy Morgan
We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' wrongful death claim after concluding that the one-year statute of limitations was not tolled during the minority of the decedent's children or during the time the action was pending in federal district court before it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. After careful consideration, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In so holding, we reaffirm Jones v. Black, 539 S.W.2d 123 (Tenn. 1976), in which this Court held that the statute of limitations for a wrongful death claim is not tolled during the minority of the decedent's children. We also reaffirm the well-established rule of Tennessee law that general saving statutes do not apply to extend the time for filing an action under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act.
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Martha B. Brasfield
We granted this appeal to determine whether the Fayette County Chancery Court had jurisdiction to hear the issue of devisavit vel non in this case, and whether the law in Tennessee permits a voluntary dismissal without prejudice in a will contest. We conclude that the chancery court had jurisdiction to hear the will contest in this case, but that the appellant's voluntary dismissal was with prejudice, barring the filing of a second will contest. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers
We granted appeal to determine whether the vicarious liability of a private hospital may be based upon the acts or omissions of a state-employed physician resident. We hold that a private hospital may be vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior based solely upon the acts of a state-employed physician resident when the resident is acting as an agent of the hospital. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Kay S. Robilio
This appeal from a denial of summary judgment arises from a contract dispute between Planters Gin Company and Federal Compress & Warehouse Company, Inc. Federal Compress & Warehouse Company, Inc. leased warehouse space to Planters Gin Company. At issue is whether an indemnity clause holding Federal Compress & Warehouse Company, Inc. harmless for "any liability or loss" arising out of the "use of the premises" and requiring Planters Gin Company to carry insurance on the contents stored in the warehouse bars recovery against Federal Compress & Warehouse Company, Inc. for damages caused by negligence occurring in an adjacent storage compartment. We find the contract unambiguous and valid. Accordingly, we hold that the indemnity provision limiting Federal Compress & Warehouse Company, Inc.'s liability is enforceable and bars recovery under the facts of this case. The Court of Appeals's judgment against Federal Compress & Warehouse Company, Inc. is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
The principal issue in this case is whether an insurance carrier and an insured may be held vicariously liable for the alleged tortious actions of an attorney hired to defend the insured. The trial court held that the plaintiff's complaint stated a claim of vicarious liability against the defendant insured and his insurance carrier for abuse of process, inducement to breach express and implied contracts of confidentiality, inducement to breach a confidential relationship, and invasion of privacy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling with respect to the vicarious liability issue, though it dismissed the claims for inducement to breach a confidential relationship and invasion of privacy. The defendants then appealed to this Court, and we now hold that an insurer and an insured may be held vicariously liable for the tortious acts or omissions of an attorney hired to defend the insured, if the attorney's tortious actions were directed, commanded, or knowingly authorized by the insurer or by the insured. We further hold that the complaint in this case states a claim of vicarious liability against the insurer alone for abuse of process. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers
The plaintiff, a medical clinic, filed an action against the defendants alleging, among other things, tortious interference with business relationships and civil conspiracy. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of these claims, finding that the facts alleged in the complaint were sufficient to state claims upon which relief could be granted. This case is now before us to determine whether the trial court should have granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. We hold that the complaint in this case alleges sufficient facts to state a cause of action for tortious interference with business relationships. However, we dismiss the plaintiff's claim of civil conspiracy for failure to satisfy the plurality requirement necessary to establish an actionable conspiracy claim. Consequently, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. HOlder
Trial Court Judge: Judge John S. Mclellan, III
The majority holds that Mr. Bogan’s ability to provide support has been significantly reduced based solely upon a unilateral, voluntary decision to retire. If Mr. Bogan currently is unable to pay Ms. Bogan the alimony she was awarded at the time of the divorce, it is only because Mr. Bogan became dissatisfied with his job and voluntarily decided to leave. His employment was not terminated or in danger of termination. Mr. Bogan decided to retire despite his existing obligation to his former wife. I therefore cannot agree with the majority’s decision to reduce Ms. Bogan’s alimony and must respectfully dissent.
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John S. McLellan, III
The sole question in this appeal is whether an obligor’s retirement constitutes a substantial and material change in circumstances so as to permit modification of a spousal support obligation. The trial court held that the obligor’s retirement did constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that because the retirement was voluntary and foreseeable, the obligor could not seek modification of the original alimony award. We granted permission to appeal and hold that a bona fide retirement need only be objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances to constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances. In so holding, we reject, in the retirement context, the traditional test requiring an involuntary and unforeseeable change in circumstances to modify a support award. We further hold that the retirement in this case was objectively reasonable and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the support award. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s modification of the support award. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Application for Permission to Appeal; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Reversed
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John S. McLellan, III
I write separately in this case to address a single issue of paramount significance here: the decision to retire and just how much scrutiny it should receive in the factual context of the case under submission. Assuredly, I concur in the result reached by the majority, which reinstates the trial court’s reduction of Bogan’s support obligation. I disagree, however, with the breadth of the reasoning used to reach that result. In my view, the decision to retire, particularly among workers nearing the ends of their careers, is personal, private, and nearly sacrosanct. Thus, I am compelled to clarify that I would limit the majority analysis to those cases involving obligors who have not yet reached the age for Social Security eligibility, presently age 62. In cases involving obligors who decide to retire after age 62, I would not subject the retirement decision to analysis embraced by the majority
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck
We granted this appeal to determine whether the petitioner properly raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding when it was based upon the failure of defense counsel to object to or appeal the trial court's erroneous range of punishment instruction to the jury on the offense of attempted second degree murder. We conclude (1) that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was properly raised in the post-conviction proceeding and (2) that defense counsel's failure to object to or appeal the erroneous jury instruction fell below the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and was prejudicial to the petitioner. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Frank V. Williams, III
The issue in this case is whether a county board of education has the authority to arbitrate a dispute arising out of a school construction contract. After the parties completed arbitration, the plaintiff filed suit to vacate the award, arguing that the defendant, a county board of education, lacked the statutory authority to agree to arbitration. The defendant unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, and it sought interlocutory appeal with the trial court's permission. The intermediate court, however, denied the interlocutory appeal, finding that the trial court's decision was consistent with prior cases from the Eastern Section Court of Appeals. We granted permission to appeal and hold that the rule of strict construction of local governmental powers should be retained. We also hold, though, that the power to arbitrate construction contract disputes is fairly implied from the express authority to enter into construction contracts. We therefore reverse the trial court's denial of summary judgment and dismiss the case.
