SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Charmaine West, et al vs. Media General Convergence, Inc., et al
M2001-00141-SC-R23-CQ
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, this Court accepted certification of the following question from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee:

State vs. Michael D. Simmons
M1999-00099-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
Appellant, Michael Dewayne Simmons, pled guilty to felony theft of property and aggravated robbery but reserved for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i) the following certified question of law: whether the defendant was denied his federal and state constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Simmons had not been deprived of his speedy trial right. We granted Simmons' application for permission to appeal to determine whether a speedy trial violation occurred in this case where the only prejudice allegedly resulting from the delay is the defendant's lost possibility of concurrent sentencing with a sentence imposed for a prior unrelated offense. Because the delay of twenty-three months was not egregious, the reason for the delay was negligence or administrative oversight, and the only prejudice alleged is the lost possibility of serving a concurrent sentence, we conclude that the defendant's right to a speedy trial has not been violated. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss.

Johnie N. Gibson vs. Douglas Trant, et al
M1999-00390-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Wheeler A. Rosenbalm

Johnie N. Gibson vs. Douglas Trant, et al
M1999-00390-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Wheeler A. Rosenbalm

Eddie Limbaugh, Executor vs. Coffee Med. Center
M1999-01181-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins

Eddie Limbaugh, Executor vs. Coffee Med. Center
M1999-01181-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins

Estate of Julie Amos, et al. v. Vanderbilt University, et al.
M1999-00998-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
We granted appeal in this case to determine whether the special proof requirements of Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996), extend to all negligence claims in which damages for emotional distress are sought as an item of compensatory damages. We hold that the special proof requirements of Camper apply only to "stand-alone" claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress. We further hold that Vanderbilt University Medical Center owed a duty to warn Julie Amos of her potential exposure to HIV so that she might take appropriate measures to protect third parties. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment in this case.

City of Chattanooga v. Kevin Davis
E2000-00664-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer

State of Tennessee v. Curtis Jason Ely And State of Tennessee v. Laconia Lamar Bowers
E1998-00099-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott

And No. E1998-00099-SC-R11-CD

This is a consolidated appeal from the defendants’ convictions in the Criminal Courts of  Anderson County and Knox County, respectively.  Defendant Ely was originally charged with one count of premeditated murder and one count of felony murder; defendant Bowers was charged with two counts of felony murder. In Ely’s case, the State nolle prossed the premeditated murder count upon the conclusion of the proof, and the trial court refused to instruct any lesser-included offenses to felony murder. He was convicted as charged of felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In defendant Bowers’s case, the trial court dismissed the charges of felony murder at the conclusion of the proof and, over his objection, instructed the jury on the lesser offenses of second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide. Bowers was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Ely argued that the offenses of second degree murder, reckless homicide, criminally negligent homicide, facilitation of felony murder, and accessory after the fact to felony murder were all lesser-included offenses of felony murder and should have been instructed. A majority of the intermediate court held that accessory after the fact was not a lesserincluded offense of felony murder. However, assuming that the other lesser offenses were included, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that no error occurred because the evidence did not -2- support an inference of guilt of any of the other lesser offenses. In his direct appeal, Bowers argued that second degree murder was not a lesser-included offense of felony murder and should not have been charged. The intermediate court held that second degree murder was a lesser-included offense of felony murder and that it was properly instructed in his case.

We granted review in this consolidated appeal to determine several issues: (1) whether there are any lesser-included offenses to felony murder; (2) if there are no lesser-included offenses, whether the conviction in Bowers’s case is therefore invalid; (3) if there are lesser-included offenses, whether failure to instruct such offenses was error in Ely’s case; and (4) whether any such error was harmless.  We also take the opportunity in this case to clarify the harmless error standard, which has been the subject of some confusion since our decision in State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 104-06 (Tenn. 1998). We conclude that the offenses of second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide are lesser-included offenses of felony murder, and therefore, instruction on these offenses in Bowers’s case was not error. In Ely’s case, we find that some evidence exists that reasonable minds could accept as to several lesser-included offenses, and therefore, the failure to instruct such offenses was error. Because we conclude that such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse Ely’s conviction and remand his case for a new trial.

Larry Howard, M.D. vs. Cornerstone Medical Associates, P.C.
E2000-01659-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown, III
In this workers' compensation case, the employee sustained injuries in an automobile accident while traveling to one of two nursing homes at which he worked as medical director pursuant to his employment contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, finding that the employee's injuries did not occur in the course of his employment. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed the trial court's decision, held that the injuries were compensable, and remanded the case for a determination of benefits. We disagree with the Panel's recommendation and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Randall Webber, Jr., et al vs. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co.
E1999-01909-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
Anderson County -The sole issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff ratified an insurance policy that provided uninsured motorist coverage in amounts less than the policy's coverage for bodily injury liability. The plaintiff argued in the trial court that he did not authorize the lesser limits of uninsured motorist coverage contained in the contract and that the court should construe the policy to provide for coverage equivalent to the liability provided for bodily injury. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff had ratified, and was bound by, the coverage limits as expressed in the contract. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that an issue of fact existed as to whether the plaintiff intended to ratify the lower uninsured motorist coverage limits. We granted permission to appeal and hold that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendant. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

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John David Terry vs. State
M1999-00191-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker

John Clinard, et al vs. Roger Blackwood, et al
M1998-00555-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz

John Clinard, et al vs. Roger Blackwood, et al
M1998-00555-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz

John Clinard, et al vs. Roger Blackwood, et al
M1998-00555-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz

Danny House vs. State
M1998-00464-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman

Danny House vs. State
M1998-00464-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman

Andrew Fahrner vs. SW Manufacturing, Inc.
M1999-00021-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull

Andrew Fahrner vs. SW Manufacturing, Inc.
M1999-00021-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull

Jerry Murray vs. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
W2000-00137-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: W. Michael Maloan
The sole issue presented for review is whether the defendant, at the time of the plaintiff's accident, was the plaintiff's statutory employer as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-113, and therefore liable for workers' compensation benefits. The defendant contracted with the plaintiff's employer for the painting of overhead air ducts in its plant. Subsequently, the plaintiff was injured when he fell from one of these ducts. The trial court determined that the degree of control exercised by the defendant established the defendant as a statutory employer pursuant to the Act. The defendant appealed. The appeal was argued before the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e), but was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to the Panel issuing its decision. On appeal, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, holding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the defendant is a statutory employer and that therefore, the defendant is not liable for compensation benefits.

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State of Tennessee v. Edward Lorenzo Samuels
M1999-01821-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

After revoking the defendant's community corrections sentence, the trial court increased the length of the defendant's sentence from six to eight years and ordered that the sentence be served consecutively to a sentence in an unrelated case. Although the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, we granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals for consideration of our decision in State v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 941 (Tenn. 1999). The Court of Criminal Appeals again affirmed the trial court's judgment. After considering the record, we conclude that upon revoking the community corrections sentence, the trial court held a proper sentencing hearing and did not err either in increasing the length of the defendant's sentence or in ordering that the sentence be served consecutively. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

State of Tennessee v. Kai ("Guy") Nielsen and Betty Nielsen
E1998-00525-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arden L. Hill

We granted this appeal to determine whether a superseding indictment issued after the statute of limitations has elapsed must allege that the prosecution was timely commenced within the statutory period. After the trial court refused to dismiss the indictment, the defendants were tried and convicted of theft of property over $10,000. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the superseding indictment, which was issued after the statute of limitations had elapsed, did not have to allege facts showing that the prosecution was timely commenced with a prior presentment.

Bobby R. George v. Building Materials Corp. of America, et al.
M1999-00449-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carol L. Soloman

In this workers' compensation case, the trial court awarded Bobby R. George 90% permanent partial disability for loss of hearing in both ears. Mr. George's employer, Building Materials Corporation of America d/b/a GAF Materials Corporation ("GAF"), filed a post-judgment motion for leave to amend its answer to allege a statute of limitations defense. The trial court denied the motion. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel ("the Panel") reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to amend the answer and remanded the case for further proceedings on the statute of limitations defense. The Panel also reduced the award to 50% permanent partial disability should the statute of limitations defense be unsuccessful on remand. We disagree with the Panel's recommendation and affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects.