SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Mcarthur Davis v. Komatsu America Industries
M2000-01373-SC-R-23-CQ

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
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State of Tennessee v. Guy William Rush
E1998-00592-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck

Guy William Rush was indicted and tried for one count of attempt to commit second degree murder and one count of aggravated assault. On the attempted second degree murder count, the trial court instructed the jury on a number of lesser-included offenses, including attempted voluntary manslaughter; intentional or knowing aggravated assault accompanied by serious bodily injury; reckless aggravated assault accompanied by serious bodily injury; and assault accompanied by bodily injury. The jury convicted Rush of the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault. Rush appealed, challenging the trial court's instructions on lesser-included offenses, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Applying the lesser-included offense test established in State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999), we conclude that neither reckless aggravated assault nor felony reckless endangerment are lesser-included offenses of attempted second degree murder. We conclude, however, that the offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment is a lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder and that the trial court erred in failing to so instruct the jury. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the cause for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.

Dorothy G. Mackie, Widow of James V. Mackie v. Young Sales Corporation
M1998-00590-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam

Young Sales Corporation, through counsel, has filed a petition to rehear this Court’s opinion released on March 1, 2001. We have reviewed the arguments raised in the petition and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the petition to rehear is denied.

Dexter L. Williams vs. State
E1999-00871-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young

Dexter L. Williams vs. State
E1999-00871-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

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Kenneth Weston vs. State
E1998-02620-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Baumgartner
We granted review in this cause to determine whether the trial court exceeded the authority granted upon remand when it permitted Kenneth Lee Weston to amend his post-conviction petition and when it ruled on the amended petition. Because we find that the trial court was without authority to allow the amendment, we vacate all orders pertaining to the amended petition and remand the cause to the Court of Criminal Appeals for a first-tier review of the trial court's denial of the original unamended petition for post-conviction relief.

State vs. Gerald H. Shaffer
E1998-00106-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Baumgartner
The Criminal Court for Knox County found that Gerald H. Shaffer had violated the terms of his probation and, on this finding, revoked it. Shaffer appealed and contended that the trial court did not have the authority to revoke probation and that the trial court abused its discretion by basing revocation on new grounds alleged in an amendment to the revocation warrant. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed and held that the trial court had the authority to revoke probation and did not abuse its discretion. Because we conclude that the trial court had the authority to revoke Shaffer's probation and did not abuse its discretion in basing the probation revocation on additional grounds alleged in the amendment, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

State of Tennessee v. Robert L. Mallard
1999-00003-SC-R11-CD
Trial Court Judge: J. S. Daniel

Robert Fahey vs. Fabien Eldridge & Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc.
M1999-00500-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Clara W. Byrd
The primary issue presented in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the defendants waived all issues on appeal by failing to specifically state these issues in their motions for a new trial as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(e). The defendants were found liable by a jury for the assault and battery of the plaintiff, and they were ordered to pay compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $1.75 million. The defendants filed motions for a new trial, which were denied by the trial court, in part, because the alleged errors were not specifically enumerated. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the alleged errors were not stated with sufficient specificity in the motions so as to preserve them for appeal, and it dismissed all issues before it. The defendants then requested permission to appeal to this Court. We hold that the defendants' motions for a new trial did set forth several issues for review in compliance with Rule 3(e), and we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for a determination of these issues on their merits.

State vs. Torrey Frazier
E2000-01364-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: E. Eugene Eblen
A Roane County grand jury indicted the defendant on one count of first degree premeditated murder. Following a jury trial, he stood convicted of second degree murder. For this offense he received a twenty-two year sentence as a violent offender. After unsuccessfully pursuing a motion for a new trial, the defendant brings the present appeal to this Court raising four issues. More specifically, he avers that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a tech-nine weapon not associated with the offense; (3) the trial court erred in permitting the State to question a defense witness concerning a pending statutory rape charge; and (4) the trial court erred by sentencing the defendant to twenty-two years. Upon review of these issues, we find that all lack merit or constitute harmless error. We, thus, affirm the conviction and sentence.

Robert Cunningham, Jr., et al,. vs. Shelton Security Service, Inc., et al.
M1998-00023-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol McCoy

In this workers’ compensation case, the estate of the employee, Robert W. Cunningham, Sr., has appealed from a chancery court judgment dismissing a claim for death benefits filed against the employer, Shelton Security Service, Inc. The employee, who worked as a security guard for the employer, died of heart failure while performing his duties at a store. At the close of the employee’s proof, the trial court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss on the basis that the emotional stress experienced by the employee the night of his death was not extraordinary or unusual for a security guard. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of law, found that there was sufficient evidence of causation to warrant a trial and, thus, reversed the trial court’s dismissal. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion for full Court review of the Panel’s decision. We granted the motion for review to consider whether the trial court erred in dismissing the employee’s claim on the basis that his heart failure did not arise out of the employment because it was not caused by a mental or emotional stimulus of an unusual or abnormal nature, beyond what is typically encountered by one in his occupation. After carefully examining the record and considering the relevant authorities, we agree with the Panel and reverse the trial court’s judgment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel Affirmed; Judgment of the Trial Court Reversed and Case RemandedE. RILEY ANDERSON, C.J.,

Dorothy G. Mackie, et al. v. Young Sales Corporation, et al.
M1998-00590-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in awarding temporary total benefits and death benefits based on the maximum weekly wage where the employee did not earn any wages in the 52 weeks prior to being diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma. On appeal, the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel concluded that the trial court erred in awarding benefits based on the maximum weekly wage because the employee was voluntarily retired at the time of his diagnosis, and that benefits were to be based on the minimum weekly wage. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that an employee's voluntary retirement does not preclude workers' compensation benefits for an injury arising out of and in the course of employment and that the trial court properly awarded benefits based on the maximum weekly rate under the facts of this case.

Robert Taylor vs. Michelle Taylor Bowers
E1999-01774-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: G. Richard Johnson
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether or not incarceration is an available sanction under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11. We conclude that incarceration is not an available sanction under Rule 11 and therefore vacate that portion the trial court's order imposing a jail sentence as a Rule 11 sanction. We remand this case to the trial court to consider whether a Rule 11 sanction is warranted, and if so, for imposition of an appropriate Rule 11 sanction.

State vs. Scott Houston Nix
E1999-02715-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Ray L. Jenkins

Jehiel Fields vs. State
E1999-00915-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: R. Steven Bebb
The sole issue in this appeal is whether our decision in State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999), changed the standard by which appellate courts review denials of post-conviction relief based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals in this case affirmed the denial of the appellant's post-conviction petition, although it expressed concern that this Court inadvertently changed the standard of appellate review in Burns to require a de novo review of a trial court's factual findings regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. While we reaffirm that such claims are mixed questions of law and fact subject to de novo review, we emphasize that Burns did not change the standard of review in this context. Consistent with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, our language in Burns meant only that a trial court's findings of fact be reviewed de novo, with a presumption that those findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. A trial court's conclusions of law are also reviewed under a de novo standard, although the trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no deference or presumption of correctness on appeal. Because the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly applied the appropriate standard of review in this case, the judgment of that court is affirmed, and the appellant's petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed.

State v. Campbell
E2000-00373-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Lynn W. Brown

Ted F. Walker v. The Board of Professional
02338-SC-R3-BP
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey F. Stewart

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M2000-00372-SC-RL-RL
M2000-00372-SC-RL-RL

Erskine Leroy Johnson vs. State
W1997-00024-SC-R11-PD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: William H. Williams

The sole issue in this capital post-conviction appeal is whether the State improperly withheld material, exculpatory evidence at the appellee's capital sentencing hearing. The appellee was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to death in 1985, and in 1991, he filed a post-conviction petition alleging, among other things, that the State improperly withheld a police report that was discoverable under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The post-conviction court denied relief, but the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and vacated the capital sentence. Finding that the police report was exculpatory and material, the intermediate court held that a new sentencing hearing was constitutionally required. The State then appealed to this Court. For the reasons given herein, we hold that the State improperly withheld the police report, which was both "evidence favorable to the accused" and material as to the issue of sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals vacating the appellee's sentence, and we remand this case to the Shelby County Criminal Court for a new capital sentencing hearing.

State vs. King
E1998-00283-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer
We granted review to determine whether the trial court committed reversible error by conducting trial proceedings in violation of a common law rule that prohibits judicial functions on Sunday. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the defendants' convictions for second-degree murder and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court violated a common law rule prohibiting judicial functions on Sunday and that such proceedings were "absolutely void." We conclude that conducting judicial proceedings on Sunday does not violate the Tennessee Constitution or any state statute and that the justifications for the common law rule are no longer sufficiently persuasive to invalidate Sunday proceedings as a matter of law. We further hold that the issue of whether to conduct judicial functions on Sunday rests within the discretion of the trial court. In exercising this discretion, the trial court should be deferential to the preferences of the litigants, witnesses, jurors, and attorneys; must be mindful of the need for every participant in a trial proceeding to be prepared and rested; must respect and accommodate the genuinely-held religious view of any litigant, witness, juror or attorney; and must weigh all of these concerns against whatever pressing need or compelling interest may necessitate a Sunday proceeding. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion under the facts of this case and, therefore, affirm the result reached by the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals on the separate grounds stated herein.

State vs. Fields
E1998-00388-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: James E. Beckner
The issue raised on this appeal is whether the defendant's conviction of the Class C felony of facilitation of an illegal drug transaction within 200 yards of a school overcomes the presumption in favor of alternative sentencing so as to justify a sentence of confinement. The trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals found confinement necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense. We conclude that the evidence presented is insufficient to overcome the presumption of alternative sentencing. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the trial court to determine an appropriate alternative sentence.

Shelby Abbott, et al. v. Blount County, Tennessee, et al.
E2004-00637-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young
This Court granted permission to appeal in this case pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine whether summary judgment was appropriately granted by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the plaintiffs were made whole by the amounts paid by Blount County and the tortfeasors. As part of this determination, we find that issues of material fact also exist regarding whether Blount County has a right to reimbursement. Additionally, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Blount County waived its claim to subrogation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that summary judgment was inappropriate and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.