State vs. Maurice Shaw W1998-00503-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
We granted this appeal to decide two issues: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice and to support the defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver and (2) whether the defendant was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence was sufficient to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice and to support the defendant's conviction and that the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we affirm the result reached by the Court of Criminal Appeals upon the separate grounds stated herein.
Tipton
Supreme Court
In the Matter of All Assessments, Review of Ad Valorum M1998-00243-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
This Court granted the applications for permission to appeal submitted on behalf of the Tennessee Board of Equalization and certain public utility companies. The purpose of our grant was to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the Board of Equalization had exceeded its authority in granting a reduction in the assessed value of certain centrally-assessed public utility tangible personal property for tax year 1998. We hold that the Board of Equalization does have the legal authority, as part of the equalization process, to reduce the appraised value (and the assessed value) of centrally-assessed public utility property. Such a reduction is an appropriate remedy where the reduction causes the appraised value of such centrally-assessed personal property within each local tax jurisdiction to bear the same ratio to fair market value as obtains for the personal property within such local jurisdiction that is appraised and assessed by local taxing authorities. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the Tennessee Board of Equalization for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Davidson
Supreme Court
Willie Jean Johnson vs. James Johnson W1999-01232-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers
The parties' marital dissolution agreement ("MDA") divided Mr. Johnson's "military retirement benefits" to provide one half of those benefits to Ms. Johnson. After the final decree was entered, Mr. Johnson unilaterally waived a portion of his military retired pay to receive the same amount in non-taxable disability benefits. The payment of Ms. Johnson's share of the military retired pay was reduced accordingly. Ms. Johnson requested a modification of the MDA to provide for alimony in an amount equal to the reduction. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals denied the requested relief, relying on Gilliland v. Stanley, No. 3258, 1997 WL 180587 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 16, 1997). We interpret the petition to modify as a petition to enforce the divorce decree. We hold that when an MDA divides military retirement benefits, the non-military spouse obtains a vested interest in his or her portion of those benefits as of the date of the court's decree. Any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the non-military spouse's vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce incorporating the MDA. The case is remanded to the trial court for enforcement of the decree.
Shelby
Supreme Court
State vs. Timothy Walton W1998-00329-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: R. Lee Moore Jr.
Dyer
Supreme Court
Memphis Housing Authority vs. Tara Thompson W1998-00108-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Robert A. Lanier
The appellee, Memphis Housing Authority brought this unlawful detainer action seeking to evict the appellant, tenant Tara Thompson, after drugs were discovered on the father of her child while he was inside her apartment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the appellee, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the lease agreement imposes strict liability upon the appellant for the drug-related criminal activity of her "guests and other persons under her control." We granted permission to appeal to consider the appropriate standard that applies when a public housing authority seeks to evict a tenant for drug-related criminal activity. This is an issue of first impression in Tennessee. After due consideration, we hold that the lease agreement imposes strict liability for drug-related criminal activity engaged in by the tenant or any household member but permits eviction for the drug related criminal activity of "guests and other persons under [the tenant's] control"only if the tenant knew or should have known of the drug-related criminal activity and failed to take reasonable steps to halt or prevent the illegal activity. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for reconsideration of the appellee's motion for summary judgment under the legal standard announced herein.
Shelby
Supreme Court
State vs. Timothy Walton W1998-00329-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: R. Lee Moore Jr.
Dyer
Supreme Court
Don Culbreath vs. First Tennessee Bank W1998-00426-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
Don L. Culbreath (Culbreath) filed suit against Community First Bank (Community First) seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Culbreath alleged that Community First fraudulently refused to pay Culbreath the proceeds of a new $150,000 loan that had been agreed upon by a bank officer and Culbreath and for which Culbreath had signed a demand note and deed of trust. Instead, the bank used the deed of trust to serve as additional collateral for Culbreath's existing indebtedness to the bank. Prior to trial, Community First merged with First Tennessee Bank, N.A. (First Tennessee), and First Tennessee was substituted for Community First as the defendant in the case. The trial court found in favor of Culbreath and awarded $209,156 in compensatory damages. After a bifurcated hearing on the issue of punitive damages, the court awarded Culbreath an additional $9,000,000 in punitive damages. First Tennessee argues on appeal that as a successor corporation it should not be liable for punitive damages arising from Community First's actions. We hold that First Tennessee is liable for the compensatory damages awarded by the trial court and that it is also liable for punitive damages arising out of Community First's pre-merger conduct. However, we remand this case to the trial court for reassessment of punitive damages based upon the factors outlined in Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992).
Shelby
Supreme Court
State vs. Derrick Sayles W1998-00425-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Arthur T. Bennett
Shelby County -Derrick Sayles was convicted of second degree murder. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial on the ground that the trial court had erred in refusing to allow Sayles's counsel to probe the circumstances surrounding the bond reduction and the charge reduction accorded to the State's principal witness immediately after his testimony. The State appealed. We hold that the trial court erred when it refused to allow Sayles's counsel to probe the circumstances surrounding benefits granted to the witness after his testimony; Sayles's right to confrontation was therefore violated. We cannot hold that this violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This cause is therefore remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to allow Sayles's counsel to probe the circumstances resulting in the bond reduction and the charge reduction, both of which were granted after the witness had testified. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part and this cause is remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing.
State vs. Antonio Kendrick W1997-00157-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Arthur T. Bennett
We granted this appeal to determine whether the prosecution's failure to elect the particular offense of aggravated rape upon which it sought to convict the defendant constituted plain error and required a new trial. The main purpose of the election requirement is to preserve a defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict under the Tennessee Constitution. A majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction for one count of aggravated rape without examining the election issue. After reviewing the record and controlling authority, we conclude that the prosecution's failure to elect the particular offense upon which it sought to convict the defendant failed to preserve the defendant's rights under the Tennessee Constitution and constituted plain error. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
Shelby
Supreme Court
State vs. Vincent Sims W1998-00634-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey
Shelby
Supreme Court
State vs. Vincent Sims W1998-00634-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey
Shelby
Supreme Court
State vs. James P. Stout W1998-00079-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey
Shelby
Supreme Court
D&E Construction Co. vs. Robert J. Denley Co. W1998-00445-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
The contractor submitted to arbitration a contractual payment dispute with the project owner arising from a contract to build a subdivision in Collierville. The arbitrators found in favor of the contractor and included an award of attorney's fees. The trial court determined that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority in awarding attorney's fees and vacated the arbitration award. The Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating the entire award. We hold that when the arbitrators awarded attorney's fees, they exceeded their authority by awarding upon a matter not within the scope of the contract's arbitration provision. Therefore, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacate the award of attorney's fees.
Shelby
Supreme Court
Suzanne Burlew vs. Brad Burlew M1998-01177-SC-R11-CV
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
The issue in this divorce case concerns the type and amount of alimony that should be awarded to the Wife. The trial court awarded her $220,000 of alimony in solido to be paid out in decreasing amounts over eight years, and declined to award her rehabilitative alimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's in solido award but remanded the case to the trial court to award rehabilitative alimony of at least $1,000 per month for a reasonable period of time. Before this Court, the Husband/appellee argues that rehabilitative alimony is unnecessary and that the alimony in solido award is excessive. The Wife/appellant counters that the in solido award was not excessive; indeed, she argues that she should have been awarded alimony in futuro. We hold that the trial court properly awarded alimony in solido rather than alimony in futuro. We also hold that the trial court did not err in denying the Wife's request for rehabilitative alimony. Thus, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals.
State vs. Culbreath, et al W1999-01553-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty
Shelby
Supreme Court
Robert Cunningham, Jr.,e t al vs. Shelton Security Service, Inc., et al M1998-00023-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
In this workers' compensation case, the estate of the employee, Robert W. Cunningham, Sr., has appealed from a chancery court judgment dismissing a claim for death benefits filed against the employer, Shelton Security Service, Inc. The employee, who worked as a security guard for the employer, died of heart failure while performing his duties at a store. At the close of the employee's proof, the trial court granted the employer's motion to dismiss on the basis that the emotional stress experienced by the employee the night of his death was not extraordinary or unusual for a security guard. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of law, found that there was sufficient evidence of causation to warrant a trial and, thus, reversed the trial court's dismissal. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion for full Court review of the Panel's decision. We granted the motion for review to consider whether the trial court erred in dismissing the employee's claim on the basis that his heart failure did not arise out of the employment because it was not caused by a mental or emotional stimulus of an unusual or abnormal nature, beyond what is typically encountered by one in his occupation. After carefully examining the record and considering the relevant authorities, we agree with the Panel and reverse the trial court's judgment.
Davidson
Supreme Court
State vs. Coley M1997-00116-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Donald P. Harris
Williamson
Supreme Court
State vs. Coley M1997-00116-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Donald P. Harris
Williamson
Supreme Court
State of Tennessee v. Guy Binette E1998-00236-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rebecca J. Stern
This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County, which overruled the defendant’s
motion to suppress all evidence obtained by the State after the defendant was stopped by a police
officer on suspicion of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant. The defendant entered a
conditional plea of guilty and reserved for appeal as a dispositive question of law the issue of the
lawfulness of the stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The
defendant thereafter sought, and this Court granted, permission to appeal on the following issue: whether reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, existed to authorize a stop of the defendant’s vehicle. Having reviewed the record in this case, we hold that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that the police officer acted with reasonable suspicion when he stopped the defendant. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, the
conviction as entered by the trial court is vacated, and the charge of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant is dismissed. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Reversed; Case Dismissed
I respectfully dissent. There is no need to adopt a new standard to review the videotaped evidence presented in this case. I would hold that an application of the standard of review
traditionally applied in Tennessee establishes that the officer in this case had reasonable suspicion to stop Binette.
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County which allowed a jury, in an action alleging malpractice, to allocate fault to resident physicians who were immune from suit. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that the trial court should not have permitted the jury to apportion fault to the residents because they were immune. We then granted this appeal to decide whether the trial court erred in allowing nonparties who were immune from suit to appear on a jury verdict form. After examining the record, considering the arguments of the parties and amicus curiae, and analyzing the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing the immune nonparties to appear on the jury verdict form. Accordingly, for the reasons herein, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.
The majority departs from settled principles of law in holding that a jury may allocate fault to an immune nonparty. In so doing, it refuses to apply and overrules the application in this case of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s unanimous decision just four years ago in Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1996), that a jury may not allocate fault to an immune nonparty because the immune nonparty owes no duty to the plaintiff and therefore the plaintiff has no cause of action against the immune nonparty.
