State vs. Coley M1997-00116-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Donald P. Harris
Williamson
Supreme Court
State of Tennessee v. Guy Binette E1998-00236-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rebecca J. Stern
This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County, which overruled the defendant’s
motion to suppress all evidence obtained by the State after the defendant was stopped by a police
officer on suspicion of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant. The defendant entered a
conditional plea of guilty and reserved for appeal as a dispositive question of law the issue of the
lawfulness of the stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The
defendant thereafter sought, and this Court granted, permission to appeal on the following issue: whether reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, existed to authorize a stop of the defendant’s vehicle. Having reviewed the record in this case, we hold that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that the police officer acted with reasonable suspicion when he stopped the defendant. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, the
conviction as entered by the trial court is vacated, and the charge of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant is dismissed. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Reversed; Case Dismissed
I respectfully dissent. There is no need to adopt a new standard to review the videotaped evidence presented in this case. I would hold that an application of the standard of review
traditionally applied in Tennessee establishes that the officer in this case had reasonable suspicion to stop Binette.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately to state the basis for my
concurrence. In McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992), we adopted a modified system of comparative fault in which parties contributing to the plaintiff’s injuries were to be held liable only to the extent of their relative percentages of fault. Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1996), highlighted the problems inherent in the application of McIntyre to workers who sustained employment-related injuries and who filed tort actions against persons other than their employers. These workers found themselves in a unique situation. They were subject to both the tort system’s doctrine of comparative fault adopted by this Court and the workers’ compensation system’s doctrine of no-fault recovery created by the legislature.
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County which allowed a jury, in an action alleging malpractice, to allocate fault to resident physicians who were immune from suit. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that the trial court should not have permitted the jury to apportion fault to the residents because they were immune. We then granted this appeal to decide whether the trial court erred in allowing nonparties who were immune from suit to appear on a jury verdict form. After examining the record, considering the arguments of the parties and amicus curiae, and analyzing the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing the immune nonparties to appear on the jury verdict form. Accordingly, for the reasons herein, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.
The majority departs from settled principles of law in holding that a jury may allocate fault to an immune nonparty. In so doing, it refuses to apply and overrules the application in this case of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s unanimous decision just four years ago in Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1996), that a jury may not allocate fault to an immune nonparty because the immune nonparty owes no duty to the plaintiff and therefore the plaintiff has no cause of action against the immune nonparty.
State vs. Hooper M1997-00031-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace
The single issue in this appeal is whether the proof introduced at the sentencing hearing is sufficient to support a denial of probation based solely upon the need for deterrence. The Court of Criminal Appeals initially affirmed the sentence and held that proof of deterrence was not needed because drug use and possession cases are "deterrable per se." Upon the defendant's petition to rehear, however, the intermediate court reversed itself, holding that a "per se" rule of deterrence is inconsistent with the holding of this Court in State vs. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991). The State appealed to this Court. For the reasons given herein, we hold that the proof in this case is sufficient to justify denial of probation on the sole ground of deterrence. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals granting an alternative sentence is reversed, and the defendant's original term of incarceration is reinstated.
Humphreys
Supreme Court
Stephenson vs. Carlton E1998-00202-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Lynn W. Brown
We granted this appeal to determine whether the appellant's sentence of life without parole for first- degree murder was an illegal sentence and, if so, whether the appellant was entitled to habeas corpus relief. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We conclude, and the State concedes, that the sentence of life without parole was not a statutorily authorized punishment at the time the appellant committed the offense of first-degree murder and that the illegal sentence was properly challenged in a habeas corpus petition. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Johnson
Supreme Court
State vs. Wilson E1996-00006-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court for Blount County, where Brandon Wilson, the defendant, pleaded guilty to seven counts of delivery of cocaine and to three counts (merged by the trial court into one count) of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. Wilson appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals contending, inter alia, that his indictments were legally insufficient and that the trial court erred in accepting the guilty plea because it was not voluntarily entered. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and reversed Wilson's convictions on all counts. We hold that the seven indictments for delivery of cocaine are sufficient; Wilson's convictions on these indictments are, therefore, reinstated. Additionally, because the issue concerning the voluntariness of Wilson's plea was not properly before the intermediate appellate court, we reinstate the conviction for possession of cocaine. This reinstatement is without prejudice to Wilson's right to file a petition for post-conviction relief within the appropriate time.
We granted this appeal to determine: 1) whether private school tuition constitutes an extraordinary educational expense under the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines; and 2) whether the noncustodial parent should be required to pay those expenses in addition to child support based upon the percentage of net income of the noncustodial parent. We hold that pursuant to the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines private school tuition is an "extraordinary educational expense." We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals requiring the total amount of private school tuition to be paid by the obligor-father. We hold, however, that in appropriate cases a court may apportion the amount of tuition between the parties.
Hamilton
Supreme Court
State vs. Jefferson M1997-00115-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
This case is before us upon a jury's resentencing of the defendant, James Thomas Jefferson, on his conviction for premeditated first degree murder. In the original appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. On remand, the defendant requested a new jury trial on the merits in addition to the already-ordered resentencing. The trial court denied the request for a new trial. After a new hearing, the jury fixed a sentence of life imprisonment. The defendant appealed of right, challenging the trial court's overruling of his motion for a new trial on the merits. Relying on the "law of the case" doctrine, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. We granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal and now hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals properly determined that the law of the case doctrine barred the trial court from granting Jefferson's motion for a new trial. The Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.
Davidson
Supreme Court
State vs. Swindle M1998-00362-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County, which convicted the defendant of two counts of facilitation of child rape and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on Class B misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery. After the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions, the defendant sought, and this Court granted, permission to appeal on the following issue: whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on Class B misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery. We hold that Class B misdemeanor assault is a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery and that it was error for the trial court not to instruct the jury accordingly. Nevertheless, having determined that such error was harmless, the defendant's convictions for aggravated sexual battery are affirmed.
Davidson
Supreme Court
Wyatt vs. State E1998-00097-SC-R11-CO
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Graham
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Bledsoe County Criminal Court, which denied the defendant's petition for habeas corpus relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition, rejecting the defendant's argument that his original indictment, which charged attempted first-degree murder by an "attempt to kill," was insufficient for failing to allege an overt act and thus failed to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. We granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal. We hold that the indictment in this case sufficiently alleges an act as required by the criminal attempt statute in stating that the defendant "did . . . attempt to kill" and that habeas corpus relief was thus properly denied. Accordingly, we affirm the lower courts' judgments.
Bledsoe
Supreme Court
Monceret vs. The Board of Professional Responsibility E1999-00545-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
This is an appeal from the Knox County Chancery Court, which affirmed a hearing panel's ruling that the appellant violated Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 8, DR 7-104(A)(1) by deposing a witness that he knew to be represented by counsel. We hold that the chancery court correctly determined that the term "party" used in DR 7-104(A)(1) is not limited to the named plaintiff or defendant in a lawsuit and may also include a witness who is represented by counsel. We further hold that the protection of the Rule cannot be waived by the party but only by the party's lawyer. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Logan vs. Winstead E1999-01056-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: John K. Wilson
This appeal arises from a prisoner's pro se action for legal malpractice against the attorney who represented him in criminal court on the charges underlying his sentence. The attorney filed a motion for summary judgment supported by an expert affidavit. The prisoner, relying upon Whisnant v. Byrd, 525 S.W.2d 152 (Tenn. 1975), filed a motion to hold the proceedings in abeyance until he was released from prison and able to appear in court. The trial court failed to rule on the motion for abeyance. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the attorney on the grounds that the prisoner had not offered an expert affidavit to rebut the attorney's proof. The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment. We granted review to determine under what circumstances an incarcerated plaintiff is entitled to have a civil action held in abeyance until he or she is released from custody.
Hawkins
Supreme Court
State vs. Ducker M1997-00074-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.
We granted review to determine (1) whether aggravated child abuse is a lesser-included offense of the charged offense of first degree murder for the reckless killing of a child; (2) whether the knowing mens rea of aggravated child abuse refers to the conduct of the defendant or to the result of that conduct; (3) whether the evidence supports the defendant's convictions; and (4) whether the defendant was properly convicted of Class A felonies when the trial court failed to charge the jury on the age element contained in the aggravated child abuse statute.
Warren
Supreme Court
State vs. Morris W1998-00679-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: John Franklin Murchison
Madison
Supreme Court
State vs. Henderson W1998-00342-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
Fayette
Supreme Court
State vs. Henderson W1998-00342-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County which convicted the defendant of premeditated first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial and argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for premeditated murder. The court overruled the motion, and the defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding that the defendant was the principal actor in causing the death of the victim. Nevertheless, the court found that his conviction could be sustained under a theory of criminal responsibility for premeditated murder because premeditated murder was a natural and probable consequence of aggravated robbery under the facts of the case. We then granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal. We hold that the natural and probable consequences rule can be used to sustain a defendant's conviction for first-degree premeditated murder based upon criminal responsibility for the conduct of a co-defendant. The jury, however, must be instructed on all elements of a charge of criminal responsibility, including the natural and probable consequences rule. Because the jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences rule, the defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
Shelby
Supreme Court
State vs. Nichols M1997-00260-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Thomas H. Shriver
