SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Lipscomb vs. Doe
W1997-00132-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey

State vs. Keough
W1997-00201-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty

State vs. Fitz
W1997-00186-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III

State vs. Blackstock
E1994-00004-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Stephen M. Bevil

State of Tennessee v. Eric Flemming
M1997-0073-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

We granted the appeal in this case to decide (1) whether fists and feet are deadly weapons
under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(5)(B); and (2) whether the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on criminal responsibility for facilitation of especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery was reversible error. We conclude that fists and feet are not deadly weapons under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(5)(B). In addition, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on facilitation of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Permission to Appeal; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed
 

Federated Insurance Company v. Francis I. Lethcoe, et al.
E1997-00048-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Earl H. Henley

This is an appeal from the Chancery Court for McMinn County which, pursuant to Tennessee Rule
of Civil Procedure 60.02(5), modified a judgment that was previously entered in accord with a
settlement agreement between the parties. The appellants appealed and contended that the trial court improperly modified the judgment and reduced the benefits they were to receive according to the agreement. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and the appellants filed a motion for full review by this Court to determine whether a party can seek modification of a workers’ compensation judgment for a fixed sum to be paid periodically almost two years after entry of judgment. We hold that where a party agrees to settle a workers’ compensation claim, and the trial court approves the settlement, the settling party is generally not entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 60.02(5). Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals panel and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Momon vs. State
E1996-00007-SC-R11-PC

Momon vs. State
E1996-00007-SC-R11-PC

American Justice Ins. Reciprocal vs. Hutchison, et al
M1999-00672-SC-R23-CQ
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III

Ahern (Pierotti) vs. Ahern
W1997-00233-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey

State vs. Sledge
W1994-00005-SC-R11-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Mccartie

Staples vs. CBL & Associates, et al
E1997-00033-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III

Staples vs. CBL & Associates, et al
E1997-00033-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III

Bryant vs. HCA Health Services of TN
M1998-00770-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz

Robert Glen Coe v. State of Tennessee
M1999-01313-SC-DPE-PD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.

In Heck van Tran v. State,1 a majority of this Court established the protocol that an inmate sentenced to death must follow to assert a common law and constitutional challenge to his or her competence to be executed. In the context of a Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, I identified three components of the protocol which, when implemented, would each produce an unconstitutional result. Two are most significant: (1) use of the protocol would permit the execution of inmates who are, due to mental defect or disease, unable to consult with and assist their counsel; and (2) use of the protocol would deprive inmates of the right to have the ultimate issue–-competence to be executed-- determined by a jury of their peers.

W1999-01313-SC-DPE-PD
W1999-01313-SC-DPE-PD

Gleaves vs. Checker Cab Transit
M1997-00183-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.

McCoy vs. T.T.C. Illinois Inc.
E1999-01378-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III

Smith vs. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co.
E1998-00306-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III

McConnell vs. State
M1997-00163-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker

State vs. Walker
M1996-00046-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: James L. Weatherford

Norton vs. McCaskill
W1997-00151-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III

State of Tennessee v. Charles Damien Darden
M1996-00044-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert B. Wedemeyer

We granted this appeal to decide (1) whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over criminal charges that were not addressed in juvenile court during the transfer hearing; and (2) whether the amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1- 159(d) (Supp. 1999), generally eliminating the requirement for an acceptance hearing, is unconstitutional. After examining the record and considering the arguments of the parties and applicable law, we conclude that the circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction over the criminal charges transferred from juvenile court as well as over the additional charges found in the grand jury’s indictment. In addition, we conclude that the General Assembly did not act unconstitutionally in eliminating the requirement for an acceptance hearing. Accordingly, for the reasons herein, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Donald P. Spicer v. State of Tennessee
W1996-00042-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

In this appeal, we address several issues related to the consolidation and severance of multiple sexual abuse offenses pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 8, 13, and 14. More specifically, these issues are: (1) whether the appellant properly preserved his right to a severance of offenses under Rule 14(b)(1) by objecting to a pre-trial motion for consolidation; if so, (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by improperly consolidating two indictments alleging child rape and aggravated sexual battery in a single trial; and if so, (3) whether that abuse of discretion affirmatively appears to have affected the outcome of the trial. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the appellant properly preserved his right to a severance of offenses and that the trial court abused its discretion by consolidating both indictments in a single trial. Because we also hold that the trial court’s abuse of discretion affirmatively appears to have affected the outcome of the trial, we vacate the appellant’s conviction and sentence and remand this case to the Shelby County Criminal Court for a new trial. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part as modified and reversed in part.

Harry Clark March and Trudi Janette Marsh, Susan R. Limor, Trustee v. Fleet Mortgage Group and Bank United
398-04816-KL3-7)
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolph A. Birch, Jr.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee,1 this Court accepted certification of the following question from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee: Whether the omission of the official notary seal in the acknowledgment on
a Tennessee deed of trust as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-22-110, renders the instrument “null and void as to . . . subsequent creditors . . . or bona fide purchasers . . . without notice” as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-26-103. After careful consideration, we conclude that the official seal of the acknowledging notary public must be affixed to a deed of trust if that instrument is to constitute notice to subsequent creditors or bona fide purchasers. Because the deed of trust before us did not bear the official notary seal, it does not constitute notice to subsequent creditors and bona fide purchasers without notice.