Demetra Lyree Parker v. Warren County Utility District
We granted review to address the standard for an employer's liability in supervisor sexual harassment cases under the Tennessee Human Rights Act following the recent United States Supreme Court's decisions in Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998). Upon review, we adopt a standard consistent with Ellerth and Faragher and hold that an employer is vicariously liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor. An employer, however, may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages when no tangible employment action has been taken. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as modified. |
Warren | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey D. Hunter
We granted this appeal by Jeffrey D. Hunter, the appellant, in order to address issues pertinent to a trial court’s authority during probation revocation proceedings. For the reasons provided herein, we hold that when a trial court has determined that a probation violation has occurred, it possesses the authority to: (1) order incarceration; (2) order the original probationary period to commence anew; or (3) extend the remaining period of probation for as much as an additional two years. We further conclude that a defendant is not entitled to credit on his or her sentence of incarceration for any time served on probation prior to probation revocation and reinstatement of the original sentence. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Pat Bondurant
In this appeal, the defendant, Pat Bondurant, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and arson. Upon finding that the State had proven two statutory. The jury found the following two aggravating circumstances: (1) “[t]he defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, which involve the use or threat of violence to the person;” and (2) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved to rture or de pravity of m ind.” Ten n. Code Ann. § 39 -2-203( i)(2) and (5 ) (1982). These statutory aggravating circumstances were redefined in 1989 and are currently codified at Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-204(i)(2) and (5) (1998 Sup p.). 2Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-206(a)(1) (1997 R epl.). |
Maury | Supreme Court | |
Virginia Graf Waddey v. Ira Clinton Waddey, Jr.
We granted this appeal to determine whether a party receiving periodic alimony may obtain a modification or extension of alimony when: 1) a termination date was agreed to by the parties in their property settlement agreement; and 2) the petition to modify was filed after the termination date but prior to the expiration of thirty days. We hold that the alimony was not modifiable after one of the contingencies listed in the property settlement agreement occurred. We affirm the Court of Appeals, but we base our decision upon other grounds |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Hawkins vs. Hart
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Supreme Court | ||
Hathaway vs. First Family Financial Svcs.
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Supreme Court | ||
Concrete Spaces vs. Sender
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Schering Plough Healthcare vs. State Bd. of Equalization
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Cleek vs. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
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Madison | Supreme Court | |
Ramsey vs. Town of Oliver Springs
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Supreme Court | ||
McIlvain vs. Russell Stover Candies
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Supreme Court | ||
Sullivan vs. Baptist Memorial Hospital
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Supreme Court | ||
Long vs. Tri-Con Industries
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Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Wayne Edison
We granted this Tenn. R. App. P. 11 appeal to determine the appropriate standard of review of a trial court’s decision to admit a breath-alcohol test result under State v. Sensing, 843 |
Jefferson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Ray Middlebrooks
This case is before us for automatic review of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ |
Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. James R. Lemacks
We granted this appeal by the State of Tennessee to address the issue of jury unanimity in cases where the State relies on alternative theories of guilt to convict an accused under a single count indictment. In this case, the appellee, James Lemacks, was charged with driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI). The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict the appellee of DUI based upon evidence that he operated his automobile while intoxicated or that he was criminally responsible for allowing his friend, Clinton Sanchez, to drive the automobile while intoxicated. The jury returned a general verdict convicting the appellee of DUI. |
Humphreys | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James R. Lemacks - Dissenting
Because the opinion filed by the Court of Criminal Appeals states the view I take, I respectfully dissent from the view held by the majority of my colleagues and would adopt the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Humphreys | Supreme Court | |
Hawkins vs. Hart
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Supreme Court | ||
Marcus vs. Marcus
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Supreme Court | ||
Guliano vs. Cleo
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Buggs
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Supreme Court | ||
Strouth vs. State
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Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
Strouth vs. State
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Brown
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Supreme Court | ||
Morris vs. State
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Supreme Court |