SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

State of Tennessee v. William Henry Barney
01S01-9802-CR-00033
Authoring Judge: Justice Aldolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

The defendant, William Henry Barney, was convicted of eleven counts of rape of a child and seven counts of aggravated sexual battery. He is currently serving a total effective sentence of eighty years. Upon the Court of Criminal Appeals’s affirmance of these judgments, the defendant filed an application for permission to appeal to this Court. We granted the application in order to determine whether the language of the indictment was  sufficient under State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997), and to determine whether the multiple convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery violate the constitutional principles of due process or double jeopardy. We conclude that the indictment is sufficient under Hill. In addition, we conclude that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, multiple convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery are justified and do not violate the constitutional principles of due process or double jeopardy.

Robby McCurry v. Container Corp. of America, a Division of Jefferson Smurfit Corporation
03S01-9705-CH-00050
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam

The appellee, Robby McCurry, filed a second motion to rehear on December 28, 1998, petitioning this Court to reconsider our decision in the above styled case. The appellee filed this petition without first seeking permission from this Court as prescribed in Rule 39(f) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, the motion is not well taken.

State of Tennessee v. Kristina Schindler
03S01-9804-CR-00040
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

We granted this appeal to address whether a trial court can consider prior grants of diversion or previously expunged offenses in determining a defendant's suitability for diversion. In the case now before us, the trial court denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion because the defendant had previously been placed on diversion on two different occasions. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the defendant's application for judicial diversion. Upon review, we hold that evidence of prior diversions may be considered in determining whether a defendant is a suitable candidate for diversion.

Helms vs. Dept. of Safety
01S01-9709-CH-00185
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Jordan vs. Baptist Three Rivers Hospital
01S01-9706-CV-00142

Anderson vs. Moran Foods
02S01-9610-CH-00093

State vs. Pettus
01S01-9709-CC-00202
Trial Court Judge: John H. Gasaway, III

Wilson vs. Wilson
01S01-9807-CV-00130

State vs. Vaughn Mixon
02S01-9804-CC-00034

Seals vs. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg Co., Inc. and 2nd Injury Fund
03S01-9704-CH-00044

Seals vs. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg Co., Inc. and 2nd Injury Fund
03S01-9704-CH-00044

Wayne Eldred Hill v. CNA Insurance and Larry Brinton, Jr. Director Chancellor of the Division of Worker's Compensation Fund, Tennessee Department of Labor
03S01-9608-CH-00086
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Frederick K. McDonald

In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court determined that Wayne Eldred Hill, the employee, was permanently and totally disabled. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a), the court apportioned 10 percent of the award to the employer and 90 percent of the award to the Second Injury Fund. The case was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e). The Appeals Panel modified the award by apportioning 65 percent to the employer and 35 percent to the Second Injury Fund pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(b).

Wayne Eldred Hill v. CNA Insurance and Larry Brinton, Jr., Director of the Division of Workers Compensation, Tennessee Dept of Labor - Concurring
03S01-9608-CH-00086
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder

I concur in the majority's holding that this case falls within the purview of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a). I, however, continue to adhere to my dissent in Bomely v. Mid-America Corp., 970 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. 1998), in which I concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a) is applicable when there is a subsequent injury and the employee is rendered permanently and totally disabled. Subsection (b), however, should apply only when the employee is still able to earn a wage or be gainfully employed but has received compensable vocational disabilities that exceed 100 percent or 400 weeks of compensation

Sanjines vs. Ortwein & Assoc.
03S01-9712-CV-00139

Sanjines vs. Ortwein & Assoc.
03S01-9712-CV-00139

Wilson vs. Wilson
01S01-9807-CV-00130

Robert L. DeLaney v. Brook Thompson, et al.
01S01-9808-CH-00144
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Ames Davis, Special Supreme Court
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

In this case, we are invited to decide whether the Tennessee Plan for election of appellate judges, codified as Title 17, Chapter 4 of the Tennessee Code Annotated, is unconstitutional for a variety of reasons, but most particularly because it contemplates “retention elections” for incumbent appellate judges. In general, the Tennessee Plan provides that an incumbent appellate judge may run for reelection unopposed on the ballot, provided the incumbent’s retention has been recommended by the judicial evaluation commission; the judge will be retained in office if a majority of those voting in the election for that judge’s seat vote for such retention. Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-4- 115(d)(1)(1994). It is the duty of all courts, including the Supreme Court, to pass on a constitutional question only when it is absolutely necessary for the determination of thecase and of the rights of parties to the litigation. Glasgow v. Fox, 214 Tenn. 656, 666-667, 383 S.W. 2d 9, 13-14 (1964). See also, Jackson v. Davis, 530 F. Supp. 2, 4 n. 1 (E.D. Tenn.), aff’d, 667 F. 2d 1026 (6th Cir. 1981). We hold that it is not necessary to address the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan in this case, because it is not applicable to the facts of this case. For that reason, the Court of Appeals erred in holding the Tennessee Plan constitutional, just as the trial judge erred in holding the Plan unconstitutional. We reach this conclusion because the express provisions of the Tennessee Plan render it inapplicable to the election for which defendant Brook Thompson, State Coordinator of Elections, refused to accept a qualifying petition submitted by the plaintiff, Robert L. DeLaney.

Walker vs. Saturn Corp.
01S01-9703-CV-00048

Walker vs. Saturn Corp.
01S01-9703-CV-00048

Est. of Ruth Garrett vs. St. Thomas Hospital
01S01-9710-CV-00218

Est. of Ruth Garrett vs. St. Thomas Hospital
01S01-9710-CV-00218

Alcazar vs. Hayes
03S01-9804-CV-00035

State vs. Bobby Blackmon
01S01-9709-CR-00187

State vs. Bobby Blackmon
01S01-9709-CR-00187

Wilson vs. Wilson
01S01-9807-CV-00130