William Wiley v. State of Tennessee
We granted the applications for permission to appeal filed by the State of Tennessee and the petitioner to determine 1) whether State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999), which clarified the analysis for determining lesser-included offenses, created a new constitutional rule that must be applied retroactively to post-conviction cases, 2) whether the petitioner was entitled to post-conviction relief under the DNA Relief Act, and 3) whether the petitioner was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals granted a new trial as to the petitioner's felony murder conviction because the jury had not been charged on the lesser-included offense of second degree murder but denied post-conviction relief as to the petitioner's conviction for especially aggravated robbery. After due consideration, we conclude 1) that State v. Burns did not create a new constitutional rule that must be retroactively applied to post-conviction cases, 2) that the petitioner was not entitled to a new trial or other relief based on DNA results, and 3) that the petitioner was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial on felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Larrie Maclin AND State of Tennessee v. Michael Lebron Anderson
We granted permission to appeal these cases and then consolidated them to determine a question common to both: whether the admission at trial of an unavailable witness’s “excited utterance” to law enforcement officers at the crime scene violated the defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him. We conclude that—depending on the particular facts of a case—an excited utterance can be “testimonial.” If the statement is determined to be “testimonial,” then under Sixth Amendment analysis as outlined in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and under Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, which guarantees the defendant’s right to “meet the witnesses face to face,” it is inadmissible unless the witness was unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. If the statement is not testimonial, then admissibility is governed by the standards of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). We reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals in State v.Maclin and dismiss charges against the defendant for reckless aggravated assault; we affirm the lower court’s conviction in State v. Anderson of the defendant for burglary of a building other than a habitation. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Kerry C. Lyons v. Gregory M. Lyons
The trial court determined a material change of circumstances had occurred which warranted modification of the parties’ child visitation scheduled. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Catherine Layman v. Vanguard Contractors, et al.
The plaintiff sought workers' compensation benefits for both cognitive impairment and a disfiguring scar resulting from a work-related accident. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff did not suffer cognitive impairment as a result of the accident. With regard to the benefits for disfigurement, the trial court erred in calculating benefits as an award to the body as a whole pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F) (1999). Injuries for disfigurement are instead governed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(E) (1999), which limits the benefits for disfigurement to 200 weeks. Because the plaintiff's disfigurement may not be classified as an injury to the body as a whole, the trial court erred in limiting the award to two and one-half times the impairment rating as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1) (1999). After an independent review of the evidence, we conclude that the evidence supports a vocational disability of 20% due to the disfigurement. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is affirmed as modified, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Steven Griffin v. State of Tennessee
We accepted review of this cause under the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11, in order to address a question of first impression: whether the right to DNA analysis created by the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 may be waived by implication. Because the clear language of this Act provides that a petition for analysis may be filed at any time, we hold that the filing of such a petition is not subject to implied waiver. This holding, however, affects only eligibility to file the petition; the requirements set forth in the Act must be met before relief may be granted. Accordingly, and for the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings pursuant to this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Kaitlyn Calaway, ex. rel. Kathleen Calaway v. Jodi Schucker, M.D. - Dissenting
JANICE M. HOLDER, J., with whom E. RILEY ANDERSON, J., joins, dissenting |
Supreme Court | ||
Kaitlyn Calaway ex rel. and Kathleen Calaway v. Jodi Schucker, M.D.
Pursuant to Rule 23, we accepted four certified questions of law from the United States District |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Kaitlyn Calaway, ex rel. and Kathleen Calaway v. Jodi Schucker, M.D.
Pursuant to Rule 23, we accepted four certified questions of law from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The third certified question is the central question of the four and is dispositive of the others: Is the three-year statute of repose for medical malpractice in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-116, which contains no exception for minority, tolled during a plaintiff’s minority? Our answer is that the three-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions is not tolled during the plaintiff’s minority. Giving effect to the plain language of the statute and finding no exception for minority among the two express exceptions in it—and cognizant of our constitutional role as interpreters, not makers, of the law—we hold that plaintiffs in their minority are bound by the three-year medical malpractice statute of repose. However, in order to avoid undue hardship to potential plaintiffs who have justly relied upon federal court and lower court precedents erroneously stating the opposite rule, the new rule we announce today is to apply prospectively only. Therefore, for cases commenced on or before December 9, 2005, we hold that the plaintiff’s minority tolls the medical malpractice statute of repose. For cases commenced after December 9, 2005, we hold that the plaintiff’s minority does not toll the medical malpractice statute of repose. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Sunil Kawatra v. Neelam Mantri Kawatra
This case involves a petition to relocate pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108 (2001). To determine whether the parties in a relocation case are spending substantially equal intervals of time with their child, the "time actually spent" with each parent should be computed in units of a day. The number of days to be credited to each parent should be based upon an examination of the residential schedule, additional time not reflected in the residential schedule, and adjustments for any violations to the residential schedule. To allocate a day for which both parents claim credit, the trial court should examine the hours that each parent actually spent with the child on that day, the activities in which each parent participated with the child, the resources that each parent expended on the child's behalf, and any other factor that the trial court considers to be relevant. After careful consideration of the record, we conclude that the parties were not spending substantially equal intervals of time with the child. Because the mother was spending a greater amount of time with the child, she should be permitted to relocate with the child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108(d) (2001). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as modified, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
Tommy D. Lanius v. Nashville Electric Service
Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we accepted this interlocutory appeal from the Chancery Court of Sumner County in which the defendant, Nashville Electric Service, seeks dismissal or, in the alternative, transfer of this workers' compensation case to Davidson County, its county of residence, on the grounds, inter alia, of sovereign immunity and the common law local venue rule. We hold that the defendant is subject to the venue provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act because it voluntarily entered into the workers' compensation system pursuant to an express grant of authority from the General Assembly, which thus effected a waiver of its sovereign immunity. We further hold that the specific venue provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act control venue and apply to the exclusion of the common law local venue rule. Accordingly, the defendant may be sued in the plaintiff's county of residence, Sumner County. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
Thomas Poston Studdard v. State of Tennessee
We granted permission to appeal in this case pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in vacating the defendant’s conviction. The defendant, Thomas Poston Studdard, was indicted for three counts of rape of a child. To this original indictment he entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the charge of incest and was sentenced to a term of eight years as a Range II multiple offender. Pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, he filed a motion seeking correction or reduction of his sentence. Following a hearing, the trial court overruled the motion, and he appealed. Without addressing the defendant’s stated concern, the Court of Criminal Appeals, ostensibly using the plain error doctrine, vacated the judgment of conviction on the grounds that incest is not a lesser included offense of child rape and because the record failed to reflect that the indictment had been amended. The intermediate court reinstated the original indictment and remanded the case. Because we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to accept the plea and because the criteria for plain error have not been met, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, reinstate the conviction for incest, and remand the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals for consideration of the defendant’s sentencing issues. |
Dyer | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Sheila Bobadilla & Benjamin Bobadilla
We accepted review of this cause under the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11, in order to address a question properly preserved and certified pursuant to the provisions of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 37(b)(2). The question, as certified, is: "Whether the search warrant and accompanying affidavit that led to the search of the defendant's residence violated the United States and Tennessee Constitutions as well as Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), so as to render all of the evidence seized pursuant thereto, illegal and inadmissible." In our painstaking review of the record, we have determined that the search warrant was not issued in accordance with the requirements of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically Rule 41(c). Thus, we are constrained to hold the search conducted pursuant to the warrant unreasonable and the evidence obtained as a result inadmissible. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, affirming the trial court's judgment on other grounds is reversed, and the indictment in this case is dismissed. |
Greene | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. David Scarbrough
We granted this interlocutory appeal prior to the defendant's retrial for felony murder to address the following issue: whether the defendant may contest his guilt as to the felony underlying the felony murder charge where the felony conviction for aggravated burglary was affirmed on direct appeal but the felony murder conviction was reversed. The trial court found that the defendant was prohibited from challenging his guilt as to the underlying felony of aggravated burglary because that conviction was final. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded, however, that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not prevent the defendant from contesting his guilt as to the underlying felony of aggravated burglary during the retrial for the charge of felony murder. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the use of collateral estoppel by the prosecution against the defendant to establish an essential element of the charged offense violates the right to trial by jury under article I, section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution. We further conclude, however, that the prosecution is permitted to introduce evidence of the prior conviction of aggravated burglary if the trial court determines that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment, and we remand to the trial court to hold the retrial consistent with the principles in this opinion. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. William Soller
We have before us the defendant's appeal in this case pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, and we granted the application in order to determine whether the trial court had authority, following imposition of an agreed sentence, to grant the defendant judicial diversion. Because judicial diversion was not included in the agreement, we conclude that the trial court lacked authority to alter the plea agreement. Additionally, once the judgments of "guilty" were entered, the trial court was precluded from granting judicial diversion because judicial diversion must be granted, if at all, "without entering a judgment of guilty." Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Sevier | Supreme Court | |
Eric Teter v. Republic Parking System, Inc.
The dispute in this case arises out of an employment contract which provides severance pay for an employee who is terminated for reasons “other than gross misconduct, fraud, embezzlement, theft or voluntary termination.” The defendant employer ceased providing severance pay to the employee after the employer discovered that the employee had engaged in gross misconduct while still employed by the company. The employee sued for breach of contract, seeking the severance pay due under the contract; the employer responded that had it known previously of the gross misconduct, it would have fired the employee, thus absolving it of any duty to provide severance pay. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employee, after concluding that the employee had been involuntarily terminated, thus triggering the severance pay provision, and that there was no clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have fired the employee had it known of the gross misconduct. The employee was awarded $795,037.35, less thirty days severance pay already paid, plus prejudgment interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that after-acquired evidence of employee misconduct need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence in order to avoid liability in a breach of contract action, and because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employee would have been fired had the employer discovered the gross misconduct, we remand the case for trial. On the remaining issues raised by the employer, we affirm the Court of Appeals: the employee did not voluntarily resign from his position but was involuntarily terminated; the payment schedule found in the “Employment Protection Plan” regarding severance pay was incorporated into the employment contract; and the severance pay provisions did not constitute an illegal penalty. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Saylor v. Lakeway Trucking, Inc.
In this workers' compensation case, the employee sought benefits due to mental injuries that allegedly arose out of his contact with hazardous material in the course of his employment. We conclude that the record and the applicable law support the trial court's determination that the employee's mental injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment and that the employee is 100% permanently disabled with respect to his mental faculties. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
Charles Brown, et al. v. Crown Equipment Corporation
We granted appeal in this products liability action to determine whether the trial court erred in excluding as unreliable the testimony of the plaintiffs’ two expert witnesses, a mechanical engineer and a biomechanical engineer, and thereafter granting a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. We hold that the trial court erred in applying the nonexclusive list of reliability factors set out in McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997). These factors are not mandated in every case in which expert evidence is offered and should not be applied unless the factor or factors provide a reasonable measure of the expert’s methodology. We further conclude that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Phyllis A. Young v. Taylor-White, LLC
We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in awarding benefits to an employee injured while attending an employer-sponsored company picnic. After reviewing the evidence and applicable authority, we conclude that the employee's injury did not occur in the course of her employment and therefore is not compensable under the workers' compensation law. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment. |
Cocke | Supreme Court | |
Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman v. Phil Bredesen, et al.
We granted review to address several issues regarding the Tennessee Department of Correction's protocol for executing inmates who have been sentenced to death by lethal injection. After our review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the lethal injection protocol in Tennessee, which includes intravenous injections of sodium Pentothal, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride, (1) does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution, (2) does not violate due process provisions under the United States or Tennessee Constitutions, (3) does not deny access to the courts in violation of the United States or Tennessee Constitutions, (4) does not violate the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, (5) does not violate the Nonlivestock Animal Humane Death Act, (6) does not violate provisions governing the practice of medicine and provision of healthcare services, and (7) does not violate the Drug Control Act or Pharmacy Practice Act. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Angela Kamille Draper v. Larry H. Westerfield, et al.
In this appeal, we must determine: (1) whether the defendant, a doctor, is immune from liability pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-410(a) (1996) in connection with his review of a child abuse victim's medical records as requested by authorities investigating allegations of child abuse; (2) whether the defendant has a common law duty to report suspected child abuse; and (3) whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-401, et. seq. (1996) provides a private right of action for failure to report suspected child abuse. We conclude that immunity under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-410(a) is afforded only to those who actually report harm. Because the determination of whether the defendant reported harm involves a genuine issue of material fact, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on this issue. We further conclude that by reviewing the victim's medical records, the defendant undertook a duty to use reasonable care in reviewing the records and reporting his findings and conclusions to the investigators. Finally, we hold that because the plaintiff did not assert a private right of action pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-401, et. seq. in her complaint, the Court of Appeals erred in addressing the issue. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
Marie B. Jennings v. Sewell-Allen Piggly Wiggly, et al.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant in this premises liability action in which the plaintiff alleges that she slipped and fell on a substance located in the defendant’s supermarket. The plaintiff appealed. Because the appellate record in this case is inadequate to determine the basis for the appellee’s motion or the trial court’s judgment, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
In Re C.K.G., C.A.G., & C.L.G. - Dissenting
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Williamson | Supreme Court | |
In Re C.K.G., C.A.G., & C.L.G.
This controversy involves a maternity dispute. An unmarried, heterosexual couple had three children by obtaining eggs donated from an anonymous third-party female, fertilizing the eggs in vitro with the man’s sperm, and implanting the fertilized eggs in the woman’s uterus. The couple intended to rear the children together as father and mother. When the couple’s relationship deteriorated, the woman filed a parentage action seeking custody and child support. In response, the man claimed that the woman had no standing as a parent because, lacking genetic connection to the children, she failed to qualify as a parent under Tennessee’s parentage statutes. On this basis, the man sought sole and exclusive custody. Employing a broadly-framed test that looks to the parties’ pre-conception intent to determine maternity, both the juvenile court and the Court of Appeals held that the woman was the children’s legal mother. Alternatively, the Court of Appeals held that the man, based on his representations and conduct which induced detrimental reliance by the woman, is estopped to deny the woman’s status as mother. We vacate the adoption of the intent test by the court below and also vacate the holding of the Court of Appeals that the man is estopped to deny the woman’s maternal status. However, we affirm on separate grounds the holding of the courts below that the woman is the children’s legal mother with all the rights and responsibilities of parenthood. Our holding in this regard is based on the following factors: (1) prior to the children’s birth, both the woman as gestator and the man as the genetic father voluntarily demonstrated the bona fide intent that the woman would be the children’s legal mother and agreed that she would accept the legal responsibility as well as the legal rights of parenthood; (2) the woman became pregnant, carried to term, and gave birth to the children as her own; and (3) this case does not involve a controversy between a gestator and a female genetic progenitor where the genetic and gestative roles have been separated and distributed among two women, nor does this case involve a controversy between a traditional or gestational surrogate and a genetically-unrelated intended mother. Our holding today is tailored narrowly to the specific controversy now before us. Having concluded that the woman is the children’s legal mother, we also affirm in full the judgments of the juvenile court and Court of Appeals concerning comparative fitness, custody, child support, and visitation |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. David Kyle Gilley
We granted review of this interlocutory appeal to address the admissibility of prior acts of physical abuse committed by the defendant against the victim and others under Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. The trial court ruled prior to trial that the State's evidence of the defendant's prior acts was admissible in part and inadmissible in part. After granting an interlocutory appeal as requested by both the defendant and the State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that prior acts of physical abuse committed by a defendant against a victim are per se admissible at trial and that there is no longer a requirement for such a prior act to be relevant to a contested issue. After our review of the record and applicable authority, we hold (1) that the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in granting interlocutory review of the trial court's pretrial ruling on the admissibility of the evidence under Rule 404(b), and (2) that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that prior acts of physical abuse committed by a defendant against a victim are per se admissible at trial. As a result, the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Janice W. Purkey, et al. v. American Home Assurance d/b/a AIG Insurance, et al.
We accepted three questions certified to this Court from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee concerning whether provisions in automobile insurance liability policies that exclude coverage for bodily injury to household or family members of the insured are void as against Tennessee law or public policy. We conclude that such provisions are valid. |
Supreme Court |
