Jasmine Ali v. Eric Fisher, et al
We granted this appeal to determine whether an owner who negligently entrusted his car to another may be held vicariously liable for the driver's negligence in the operation of the car. The trial court submitted the case to the jury for allocation of fault on comparative fault principles, and the jury found the owner twenty percent (20%) at fault and the driver eighty percent (80%) at fault. The trial court later amended the judgment by holding that the owner-entrustor was vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver-entrustee and thus liable for all of the compensatory and punitive damages. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in concluding that the owner-entrustor was vicariously liable for the driver-entrustee's actions and reinstated the initial judgment. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that an owner-entrustor's liability for negligent entrustment does not result in vicarious liability for the negligence of the driver-entrustee and that the trial court erred in holding the owner-entrustor liable for all the damages. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Gdongalay P. Berry - Concurring and Dissenting
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Gdongalay P. Berry
A jury convicted the defendant, Gdongalay P. Berry, of two counts of premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery, for the murders, kidnappings and robberies of DeAngelo Lee and Gregory Ewing.1 Following a capital sentencing hearing, the jury found three aggravating circumstances in each murder: (1) that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies other than the present charge, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person;2 (2) that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; and (3) that the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit robbery or kidnapping. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (6), (7) (1996). The jury also found that these aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the jury imposed sentences of death for each of the murder convictions. As to the remaining felony convictions, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a violent offender, and imposed an effective fifty-year sentence, to run consecutively to the death penalty.3 The defendant appealed, challenging both his convictions and the sentences of death. After fully considering the issues raised by the defendant, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Eva Mae Jefferies v. McKee Foods
In this workers' compensation case, the employer, McKee Foods Corporation, has appealed the trial court's award of 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole to the employee, Eva Mae Jefferies. The trial court's award of benefits was based on a medical impairment rating calculated under the Fifth Edition of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment ("AMA Guidelines"), which was in effect at the time of trial. The employer's appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to a decision by the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel. The employer contends in this Court that the trial court should have applied a medical impairment rating calculated under the Fourth Edition of the AMA Guidelines because the Fourth Edition was the edition in effect when the employee reached maximum medical improvement. Thus, the sole question for this Court is whether the trial court erred in awarding benefits using a medical impairment rating calculated under the Fifth Edition of the AMA Guidelines. After carefully examining the record and the relevant authorities, we find that in determining the extent of the employee's vocational disability, the trial court should have used a medical impairment rating calculated under the Fourth Edition of the AMA Guidelines. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Tom Albert et al. v Pat Frye, et al.
The issue in this case is whether the defendant’s notice of appeal was timely filed. The Court of Appeals held that it was not. We disagree. Under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04, the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal was tolled until the trial court issued its decision on the defendant’s post-trial motion to alter or amend. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals to consider the merits of the defendant’s appeal. |
Robertson | Supreme Court | |
Michelle Sullivan, by and through Her Conservator, Brenda Hightower v. Edwards Oil Company
We granted this appeal to define "nursing services" as used in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(1) and to determine whether the caretaking services that an injured employee's mother provides are nursing services for which the Workers' Compensation Law mandates the employer compensate her. The trial court found that the mother had failed to carry her burden of proof on the issue of whether she was entitled to compensation. The trial court concluded that the plain meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204 contemplates only professional nursing services ordered by the attending physician, and that the mother is not a professional nurse providing professional nursing services. The employee appealed, arguing that the statute provides compensation for a broader range of caretaking services. The appeal was argued before the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3), but the appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to the Panel issuing its decision, and oral argument was heard by the full Court. We hold that in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(1), "nursing services" refers to the services of a professional nurse. Because the mother providing caretaking services here is not a professional nurse, the Workers' Compensation Law does not require the employer to compensate the mother for her services. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's denial of compensation for her services. The question of whether the Workers' Compensation Law should provide compensation when a family member provides care for an injured worker is an issue that must be addressed by the Legislature. |
Maury | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Pierce
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the trial court erred in considering the results of the defendant sex offender's polygraph examination when denying the defendant's request for probation. The polygraph examination was administered as part of the risk assessment report that is mandated by statute for all sex offenders seeking probation. Because polygraph examinations are inherently unreliable, we hold that trial courts may not consider polygraph examination results or any portion of a risk assessment report that relies upon polygraph examination results when imposing sentences. However, even excluding the polygraph examination results, the record in this case supports the denial of probation. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part and modified in part. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
Pete Honsa v. Tombigbee Transport Corp. et al. AND Eddie Gene Brown v. Tombigbee Transport Corp. AND William B. Stevenson v. Transway, Inc., et al.
The issue raised in these three workers’ compensation cases, consolidated for appeal, is whether the defendant is the employer of the plaintiffs and thus responsible for providing workers’ compensation insurance coverage for them. In each case, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We hold that under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-106(1)(A), the defendant is not, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs’ employer so as to subject the defendant to liability under the Workers’ Compensation Law. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hardin | Supreme Court | |
James Walter Young v. Nashville Electric Service
In this workers’ compensation appeal, the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel (“Appeals Panel”) affirmed the trial court’s judgment, finding that the employee failed to carry his burden of proof as to causation. The employee has filed a motion for review pursuant to Section 50- 6-225(e)(5)(B), Tennessee Code Annotated (Supp. 2003). That statute requires that a motion for review be filed within fifteen days of the issuance of the Appeals Panel’s decision. We hold that the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for review is jurisdictional and that the Court therefore is without jurisdiction to consider a motion that is not timely filed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Larry Benton v. The Vanderbilt University
We granted this appeal to determine whether a third-party beneficiary who seeks to enforce a contract between a hospital and an insurance carrier may be bound by an arbitration provision in the contract. The trial court denied the hospital’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the thirdparty beneficiary was not a party to the contract between the hospital and the insurance carrier. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the arbitration provision could be enforced against the third- party beneficiary in this case. After reviewing the record and authority, we conclude that an arbitration provision in a contract is enforceable against a third-party beneficiary who has filed a cause of action seeking to enforce the contract. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Larry Benton v. The Vanderbilt University - Dissenting
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
James Galloway v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
We granted review in this workers’ compensation appeal to determine whether an employee who was less than age 60 on the date of injury, but who reached maximum medical improvement and permanent total disability status after age 60, is entitled to a minimum of 260 weeks of benefits under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2003). The Chancellor determined that because the employee was less than 60 years of age when the injury occurred, he was entitled to permanent total disability benefits for only 232 weeks until he was eligible for full benefits under the Social Security Act. The employee’s appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel hearing argument and issuing its decision. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the Chancellor properly construed the statute in awarding the employee 232 weeks of permanent total disability benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i). We therefore affirm the Chancellor’s judgment. |
Dyer | Supreme Court | |
Michael W. Carpenter v. State of Tennessee
We granted review to determine whether the revocation of a community corrections sentence may be challenged in a post-conviction petition on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court found that the petitioner could not collaterally attack the revocation of his community corrections sentence in a post-conviction proceeding and dismissed the post-conviction petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that a petitioner may challenge the revocation of a community corrections sentence in a post-conviction proceeding and that the trial court erred in dismissing the petitioner's post-conviction petition. We therefore affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Joseph and Jean Gonzalez v. State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services; In the Matter of A.J.H.
In this interlocutory appeal, we consider whether and under what circumstances grandparents may intervene in proceedings brought to terminate the parent-child relationship. In this case, the grandparents filed a motion in the juvenile court to intervene in a termination of parental rights proceeding. The juvenile court denied the motion, and the grandparents moved for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. The trial court granted the motion. Following the Court of Appeals' denial of the grandparents' application for permission to appeal, they filed an application for permission to appeal to this Court; we granted the application. After a thorough review of the record and relevant legal authority, we conclude that the motion filed in juvenile court seeking intervention in the termination of parental rights case is to be analyzed under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Using this analysis, we find no error and affirm the denial of the motion to intervene. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Arthur M. Bohanan v. City of Knoxville
The employee, a retired police officer, filed suit seeking workers' compensation benefits. He alleged that his job duties caused him to develop hypertension resulting in permanent partial disability. The employee relies on the statutory presumption of causation for law enforcement officers found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 7-51-201(a)(1), and concedes that if the employer has rebutted the presumption, there is insufficient evidence establishing a causal relationship between his hypertension and his employment. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable legal principles, we conclude that the City of Knoxville has rebutted the statutory presumption of causation, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tracy Lorenzo Goodwin, alias Lawanda Carter
This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County which convicted the defendant, Tracy Goodwin, of two counts of reckless aggravated assault, one count of felony reckless endangerment, and one count of criminally negligent homicide. The issues before us are whether the evidence is sufficient to uphold the convictions, whether the trial court erred in failing to sever the aggravated assault charges from the reckless endangerment and criminally negligent homicide charges, whether the separate convictions for felony reckless endangerment and criminally negligent homicide violate the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, and whether the sentences were excessive. We find that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for reckless aggravated assault because as defined by the statute, reckless aggravated assault requires proof of bodily injury, and no such proof was offered at trial. We find sufficient evidence to support the remaining convictions of felony reckless endangerment and criminally negligent homicide. We further find, with respect to the remaining convictions, that the trial court did not err in failing to sever the trials, the separate convictions do not violate double jeopardy protections, and the sentencing was not excessive. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part. We remand the case for a new trial on charges of assault as lesserincluded offenses of aggravated assault. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom, a/k/a Otis Smith
The defendant, RichardOdom, was convicted of felonymurder and sentenced to death in 1992. This Court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal but remanded the case for a new sentencing proceeding. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 21, 33 (Tenn. 1996). After the new sentencing proceeding, a jury again imposed the death sentence after finding that the evidence of one aggravating circumstance, i.e., the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, the statutory elements of which involved the use of violence to the person, outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2) (1991). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence. After the appeal was automatically docketed in this Court, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206 (1991), we entered an order specifying five issues for oral argument.1 We now hold as follows: (1) the trial court committed reversible error by applying a 1998 amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c) and allowing the introduction of evidence regarding the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s prior felonies to support the aggravating circumstance in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(2); (2) the trial court did not err in admitting photographs of the victim in this case but did err in admitting photographs of the victim of a prior felony offense committed by the defendant; (3) the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for continuance to complete psychiatric or neuropsychological testing; (4) the death sentence was not invalid based on the failure of the indictment to charge the aggravating circumstance; and (5) the issue of whether the death penalty was excessive, arbitrary, or disproportionate in this case under the mandatory provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(A)-(D) need not be addressed at this time. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues and have included the relevant portions of that opinion in the appendix to this opinion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand for re-sentencing. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom, a/k/a Otis Smith - Dissenting
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Donna Kilgore v. NHC Healthcare
We granted this appeal to determine whether the Chancellor had jurisdiction to hear the employee's appeal after diagnostic tests ordered by her physician were denied by the employer's utilization review program. The Chancellor found that the diagnostic tests were reasonable and necessary and ordered that they be provided by the employer. The employer appealed, arguing that the Chancellor did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the employee's recourse was limited to review by the Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development's utilization review program. The appeal was argued before the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3), but the appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to the Panel issuing its decision. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the Chancellor had jurisdiction to consider the employee's appeal of the decision to deny diagnostic tests made by the employer's utilization review program. We therefore affirm the judgment. |
Sequatchie | Supreme Court | |
Johnny Phillips v. A&H Construction Company, Inc. and Evergreen National Indemnity
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the Chancellor erred in denying temporary total disability benefits because he concluded that injuries due to an idiopathic loss of consciousness are not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. We hold that an injury due to an idiopathic condition is compensable if an employment hazard causes or exacerbates the injuries. The accident arises out of employment if there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the resulting injury. This causal link must be between the employment and the injury, rather than between the employment and the idiopathic episode. We affirm the Chancellor's factual finding that Phillips's injuries occurred within the course of his employment. Thus, the judgment of the Chancellor is reversed in part, affirmed in part, and this case is remanded to the chancery court for reinstatement of temporary total disability benefits and further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Sally Qualls Mercer, et al., v. Vanderbilt University, Inc., et al.
We granted this appeal, in part, to determine whether fault was properly assessed against the patient in this medical malpractice action. We overrule Gray v. Ford Motor Co., 914 S.W.2d 464 (Tenn. 1996), and hold that fault may not be assessed against a patient in a medical malpractice action in which a patient’s negligent conduct provides only the occasion for the medical attention, care, or treatment which is the basis for the action. We also hold that the additional issues raised by the defendant are without merit. We therefore affirm the trial court’s post-trial ruling that the defendant is 100% at fault and is responsible for the full amount of damages found by the jury. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part; Jury Verdict Reinstated |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Sally Qualls Mercer, et al., v. Vanderbilt University, Inc., et al. - Dissenting
By overruling Gray v. Ford Motor Co., 914 S.W.2d 464 (Tenn. 1996), a decision released only eight years ago, the majority disregards the principle of stare decisis and undermines the fairness goal of our prior comparative fault decisions. Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s decision in this case. In addition, like the Court of Appeals, I believe the trial court erred by excluding evidence of Larry T. Qualls prior alcohol-related conduct and testimony of two defense witnesses and by commenting upon the credibility of a defense witness. Given the cumulative effect of these errors, Vanderbilt is entitled in my view to a new trial. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Cynthia Bratton v. Michael Bratton
We granted permission to appeal in this divorce proceeding to determine whether postnuptial agreements are contrary to public policy and if not, whether the postnuptial agreement entered into by the parties in this case is valid and enforceable. We hold that postnuptial agreements are not contrary to public policy so long as there is consideration for the agreement, it is knowledgeably entered into, and there is no evidence of fraud, coercion or duress. However, the agreement between the parties in this case is invalid because it lacks adequate consideration. We also granted the husband’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in awarding alimony in futuro instead of rehabilitative alimony. We hold that the trial court properly considered all of the relevant statutory factors and that its award of alimony does not amount to an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
Cynthia Bratton v. Michael Bratton - Concurring/Dissenting
JANICE M. HOLDER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the majority’s conclusion that postnuptial agreements are not contrary to public policy. I respectfully dissent, however, from that portion of the majority’s opinion concluding that the agreement at issue in the present case was not supported by adequate consideration. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
James Kelley v. Middle Tennessee Emergency Physicians
We granted review to determine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants in this medical malpractice lawsuit. The trial court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that, as a matter of law, no physician-patient relationship existed. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. After careful review of the record before us and the applicable authorities, we conclude that there are disputed issues of fact as to the existence of a physician-patient relationship, and we therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court |
