SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Helms vs. Dept. of Safety
01S01-9709-CH-00185
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Jordan vs. Baptist Three Rivers Hospital
01S01-9706-CV-00142

Anderson vs. Moran Foods
02S01-9610-CH-00093

State vs. Pettus
01S01-9709-CC-00202
Trial Court Judge: John H. Gasaway, III

Wilson vs. Wilson
01S01-9807-CV-00130

State vs. Vaughn Mixon
02S01-9804-CC-00034

Seals vs. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg Co., Inc. and 2nd Injury Fund
03S01-9704-CH-00044

Seals vs. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg Co., Inc. and 2nd Injury Fund
03S01-9704-CH-00044

Wayne Eldred Hill v. CNA Insurance and Larry Brinton, Jr. Director Chancellor of the Division of Worker's Compensation Fund, Tennessee Department of Labor
03S01-9608-CH-00086
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Frederick K. McDonald

In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court determined that Wayne Eldred Hill, the employee, was permanently and totally disabled. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a), the court apportioned 10 percent of the award to the employer and 90 percent of the award to the Second Injury Fund. The case was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e). The Appeals Panel modified the award by apportioning 65 percent to the employer and 35 percent to the Second Injury Fund pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(b).

Wayne Eldred Hill v. CNA Insurance and Larry Brinton, Jr., Director of the Division of Workers Compensation, Tennessee Dept of Labor - Concurring
03S01-9608-CH-00086
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder

I concur in the majority's holding that this case falls within the purview of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a). I, however, continue to adhere to my dissent in Bomely v. Mid-America Corp., 970 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. 1998), in which I concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a) is applicable when there is a subsequent injury and the employee is rendered permanently and totally disabled. Subsection (b), however, should apply only when the employee is still able to earn a wage or be gainfully employed but has received compensable vocational disabilities that exceed 100 percent or 400 weeks of compensation

Sanjines vs. Ortwein & Assoc.
03S01-9712-CV-00139

Sanjines vs. Ortwein & Assoc.
03S01-9712-CV-00139

Wilson vs. Wilson
01S01-9807-CV-00130

Robert L. DeLaney v. Brook Thompson, et al.
01S01-9808-CH-00144
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Ames Davis, Special Supreme Court
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

In this case, we are invited to decide whether the Tennessee Plan for election of appellate judges, codified as Title 17, Chapter 4 of the Tennessee Code Annotated, is unconstitutional for a variety of reasons, but most particularly because it contemplates “retention elections” for incumbent appellate judges. In general, the Tennessee Plan provides that an incumbent appellate judge may run for reelection unopposed on the ballot, provided the incumbent’s retention has been recommended by the judicial evaluation commission; the judge will be retained in office if a majority of those voting in the election for that judge’s seat vote for such retention. Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-4- 115(d)(1)(1994). It is the duty of all courts, including the Supreme Court, to pass on a constitutional question only when it is absolutely necessary for the determination of thecase and of the rights of parties to the litigation. Glasgow v. Fox, 214 Tenn. 656, 666-667, 383 S.W. 2d 9, 13-14 (1964). See also, Jackson v. Davis, 530 F. Supp. 2, 4 n. 1 (E.D. Tenn.), aff’d, 667 F. 2d 1026 (6th Cir. 1981). We hold that it is not necessary to address the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan in this case, because it is not applicable to the facts of this case. For that reason, the Court of Appeals erred in holding the Tennessee Plan constitutional, just as the trial judge erred in holding the Plan unconstitutional. We reach this conclusion because the express provisions of the Tennessee Plan render it inapplicable to the election for which defendant Brook Thompson, State Coordinator of Elections, refused to accept a qualifying petition submitted by the plaintiff, Robert L. DeLaney.

Walker vs. Saturn Corp.
01S01-9703-CV-00048

Walker vs. Saturn Corp.
01S01-9703-CV-00048

Est. of Ruth Garrett vs. St. Thomas Hospital
01S01-9710-CV-00218

Est. of Ruth Garrett vs. St. Thomas Hospital
01S01-9710-CV-00218

Alcazar vs. Hayes
03S01-9804-CV-00035

State vs. Bobby Blackmon
01S01-9709-CR-00187

State vs. Bobby Blackmon
01S01-9709-CR-00187

Wilson vs. Wilson
01S01-9807-CV-00130

Edmund George Zagorski v. State of Tennessee
01S01-9711-CC-00240
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

We granted this post-conviction appeal to determine whether there is ineffective assistance of counsel where, at the express instruction of a competent and fully informed defendant, defense counsel does not investigate or present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital trial. For the reasons provided herein, we hold that there is not.

Billy R. Phillips v. Tennessee Technological University, State of Tennessee
01S01-9708-BC-00173
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Commissioner W.R. Baker

We granted this appeal to address whether the State may be liable for discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) in a workers' compensation case. We hold that the State may only be taxed for costs expressly permitted by either the Tennessee claims commission statute or the Workers' Compensation Act.

Billy R. Phillips v. State of Tennessee v. Tennessee Technological University, State of Tennessee
01S01-9708-BC-00173
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Commissioner W.R. Baker

We granted this appeal to address whether the State may be liable for discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) in a workers' compensation case. We hold that the State may only be taxed for costs expressly permitted by either the Tennessee claims commission statute or the Workers' Compensation Act.