SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Ira H. Murphy v. Board of Professional Responsibility
02S01-9503-CH-00031
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John Hill Chisholm

The issue raised by this appeal is whether the petitioner, a disbarred attorney, has satisfied the requirements for reinstatement of his license to practice law contained in Rule 9, § 19.3, Rules of the Supreme Court, by clear and convincing proof. A Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility concluded that the petitioner had failed to carry the burden of proof for reinstatement. The Chancery Court, however, reviewed the Hearing Panel decision and held the petitioner was entitled to "conditional reinstatement" of his license to practice law.
 

State of Tennessee v. Brian Keith Kimbro
02S01-9503-CR-00028
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

We review this cause in order to address an issue of first impression: whether attempt to commit felony-murder exists as an offense in Tennessee. We conclude that it does not and affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals reversing the appellee's conviction.

Charles M. Cary, Jr. v. Cathy Ann Cary
02S01-9505-CV-00035
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

We granted this appeal to determine whether a provision in an antenuptial agreement by which a prospective spouse waives alimony is void because it violates public policy. The trial court held that such a provision in an antenuptial agreement, which waived alimony, was valid and enforceable and, therefore, denied the spouse’s application for alimony. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, holding that the waiver of alimony provision was void as against public policy, and remanded to the trial court to consider whether to award alimony.

State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom AKA Otis Smith - Concurring/Dissenting
02-S-01-9502-CR-00014
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson

I fully concur in the majority’s decision affirming the conviction in this case.  I also agree with the majority that the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence as mitigation the testimony of Dr. John Hutson was error which requires a reversal and a remand for re-sentencing. However, I dissent from the majority’s analysis of the constitutionality and sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstance, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), as amended in 1989.

State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom - Concurring/Dissenting
02S01-9502-CR-00014
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson

I fully concur in the majority’s decision affirming the conviction in this case. I also agree with the majority that the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence as mitigation the testimony of Dr. John Hutson was error which requires a reversal and a remand for re-sentencing. However, I dissent from the majority’s analysis of the constitutionality and sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstance, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), as amended in 1989.

State of Tennesee v. Mario Lamont Wilson
02S01-9505-CC-00045
Authoring Judge: Justice Penny J. White
Trial Court Judge: Judge John Franklin Murchison

A jury convicted defendant, Mario Lamont Wilson, of three counts of aggravated assault and of felony reckless endangerment and possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to commit a felony. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Wilson’s felony reckless endangerment conviction and sentence, but reversed and dismissed the convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a deadly weapon. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it dismissed Wilson’s convictions for aggravated assault.1 Although we conclude that Wilson’s convictions for aggravated assault may not stand, we do not adopt entirely the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Rather, we affirm the dismissal of the aggravated assault charges because the evidence is insufficient to prove that Wilson intentionally and knowingly caused another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury.

Christopher v. Sockwell
01S01-9408-CV-00090

02S01-9501-CR-00007
02S01-9501-CR-00007

02S01-9505-CR-00037
02S01-9505-CR-00037

02S01-9502-CV-00020
02S01-9502-CV-00020

01S01-9507-CC-00104
01S01-9507-CC-00104
Trial Court Judge: James E. Walton

02S01-9508-CV-00069
02S01-9508-CV-00069
Trial Court Judge: James M. Tharpe

02S01-9601-CV-00134
02S01-9601-CV-00134
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown

03S01-9502-CH-00018
03S01-9502-CH-00018

03S01-9410-CR-00106
03S01-9410-CR-00106

03S01-9501-CH-00008
03S01-9501-CH-00008

03S01-9502-CV-00015
03S01-9502-CV-00015

01S01-9503-CC-00035
01S01-9503-CC-00035

03S01-9410-CR-00106
03S01-9410-CR-00106
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer

03S01-9508-CC-00096
03S01-9508-CC-00096
Trial Court Judge: Leon C. Burns, Jr.

03S01-9508-CC-00096
03S01-9508-CC-00096
Trial Court Judge: Leon C. Burns, Jr.

State of Tennesse v. Terry Wood -Dissenting
01S01-9501-CC-00015
Authoring Judge: Justice Reid
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald P. Harris

I concur in the dissent of Justice White.

Wanda Cruise v. City of Columbia - Concurring
01S01-9508-CV-00132
Authoring Judge: Justice Penny J. White
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe C. Loser

In this property confiscation case, the Court must decide whether a direct  appeal was timely and whether the Governmental Tort Liability Act's1 twelve-month statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-20-305(b) applies to bar plaintiff's claim for damage to and loss of personal property seized by police officers employed by defendant, the City of Columbia. For the reasons explained below, we hold that the appeal was timely and that plaintiff's claim is controlled by the three-year statute of limitations contained in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-105 and is, therefore, not barred.

Fannie Tuggle and Hoyt Tuggle v. Allright Parking Systems, Inc.
02-S-01-9501-CV-00009
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kay S. Robilio

We granted this appeal to determine whether a party with a derivative claim - loss of consortium - is entitled to challenges under the peremptory jury challenge statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-3-105.

We conclude that the clear and unambiguous language of the jury challenge statute provides additional peremptory challenges to a party with a derivative claim,1 and that a new trial is required because the denial of that statutory right constitutes prejudice to the judicial process. In the interest of judicial economy, since a new trial is required, we have also decided that under comparative fault principles, the recovery of a spouse claiming loss of consortium will be reduced in proportion to or barred by the fault of the physically injured spouse. We, therefore, affirm the Court of  Appeals’ decision reversing and remanding for a new trial.

Can Do, Inc. Pension and Profit Sharing Plan and Successor Plans, Indiv. and as a Trustee for Georgoe W. Holder, Jr., v, Manier, Herod, Hollabaugh& Smith, C. Kinian Cosner, Jr. and H. Rowan Leathers, III
01S01-9501-CH-00013
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin Gilcrease

This case presents a question of first impression in Tennessee: whether or not a legal malpractice claim is assignable. We have determined that soundpublic policy reasons militate against allowing assignment of legal malpractice actions. We, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals and dismiss the complaint.