SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Richard Thomas Bogan v. Doris Mae Bogan - Dissenting
E1998-00060-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. HOlder
Trial Court Judge: Judge John S. Mclellan, III

The majority holds that Mr. Bogan’s ability to provide support has been significantly reduced based solely upon a unilateral, voluntary decision to retire. If Mr. Bogan currently is unable to pay Ms. Bogan the alimony she was awarded at the time of the divorce, it is only because Mr. Bogan became dissatisfied with his job and voluntarily decided to leave. His employment was not terminated or in danger of termination. Mr. Bogan decided to retire despite his existing obligation to his former wife. I therefore cannot agree with the majority’s decision to reduce Ms. Bogan’s alimony and must respectfully dissent.

Sullivan Supreme Court

Fred Dean a/k/a Omawali Ashanti Shabazz vs. State
E1998-00135-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck
We granted this appeal to determine whether the petitioner properly raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding when it was based upon the failure of defense counsel to object to or appeal the trial court's erroneous range of punishment instruction to the jury on the offense of attempted second degree murder. We conclude (1) that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was properly raised in the post-conviction proceeding and (2) that defense counsel's failure to object to or appeal the erroneous jury instruction fell below the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and was prejudicial to the petitioner. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Sullivan Supreme Court

Southern Constructors, Inc. vs. Loudon Co. Bd. of Education
E2000-02577-SC-S09-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Frank V. Williams, III
The issue in this case is whether a county board of education has the authority to arbitrate a dispute arising out of a school construction contract. After the parties completed arbitration, the plaintiff filed suit to vacate the award, arguing that the defendant, a county board of education, lacked the statutory authority to agree to arbitration. The defendant unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, and it sought interlocutory appeal with the trial court's permission. The intermediate court, however, denied the interlocutory appeal, finding that the trial court's decision was consistent with prior cases from the Eastern Section Court of Appeals. We granted permission to appeal and hold that the rule of strict construction of local governmental powers should be retained. We also hold, though, that the power to arbitrate construction contract disputes is fairly implied from the express authority to enter into construction contracts. We therefore reverse the trial court's denial of summary judgment and dismiss the case.

Loudon Supreme Court

State of Tennessee vs. Clifford Peele
E1999-00907-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Arden L. Hill
We granted appeal to determine (1) if Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b) permits the appeal of a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea; and (2) whether a Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f) motion to set aside a guilty plea filed prior to the time the judgment becomes final tolls the time for filing an appeal to permit the trial court to rule on the motion. We hold (1) that a denial of a motion to set aside a guilty plea may be appealed pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b); and (2) that a trial court retains jurisdiction to rule on a motion to set aside a guilty plea if the motion is filed prior to the date the judgment becomes final. Accordingly, the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the intermediate appellate court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Carter Supreme Court

William Andrew Dixon v. Flora J. Holland, Warden and William Andrew Dixon v. Donal Campbell, Commissioner of TDOC
M1999-02494-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth Norman

We granted review in these consolidated cases to determine (1) whether William Andrew Dixon’s sentence under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2603 (1975) is void and thus subject to habeas corpus relief; and (2) whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236(c) (1997) applies to Dixon’s sentence. We hold that Dixon’s sentence is void and grant habeas corpus relief. We further hold that Dixon is entitled to any sentence reduction credits earned from 1988 until 1998. Our grant of habeas corpus relief pretermits the remaining issues raised by Dixon.1 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the criminal court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 2Both convictions stem from the abduction of Jodie Gaines in 1978. Dixon originally pled guilty to both counts in exchange for consecutive sentences of thirty-five ye ars for the kidnapping for ransom and five years for the commission of a felony by use of a firearm. Dixon’s guilty pleas were vacated during post-conviction relief proceedings, and he was then tried by a jury. 3Dixon received a sentence of five years for the commission of a felony by use of a firearm. This sentence, however, is not at issue in the present appeal. 4The Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) originally calculated Dixon’s sentence without parole. When the TDOC later computerized inmate records, Dixon’s sentence was inadvertently classified as life with possibility of parole. Section 41-21-236(c)(3) of the Tennessee Code Annotated provides that “[a]ny person who committed a felony . . . prior to December 11, 1985, may become eligible for the sentence reduction credits . . . by signing a written waiver waiving the right to serve the sentence under the law in effect at the time the crime was committed.” (1985). Because of the computer error, Dixon was perm itted to receive sentence reduction credits. -2- Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Reversed; Case Remanded.
 

Davidson Supreme Court

State vs. Michael Honeycutt
M1998-00245-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Cheryl A. Blackburn
Michael Shane Honeycutt was convicted of aggravated child abuse; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. Honeycutt contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to employ a theory of defense seeking to establish the child's mother as the perpetrator. We hold that trial counsel's performance was deficient in this regard and that this deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the case. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is therefore reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

Davidson Supreme Court

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Supreme Court

Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc., et al vs. Concord EFS, Inc., et al
M1999-02560-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Cornelia A. Clark
The plaintiffs, who are or independent truck drivers and their representatives, claim they are intended third-party beneficiaries of certain contracts between Flying J, Inc., Pilot Corporation, and EFS National Bank, Inc. The plaintiffs contend that Flying J, Inc. and Pilot Corporation breached their contracts with EFS National Bank, Inc. by improperly imposing surcharges on diesel fuel purchased with certain credit cards. For the alleged breaches, the plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief. After thorough consideration and due deliberation, we conclude that the plaintiffs are not intended third-party beneficiaries of the contracts and thus have no standing to sue. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Williamson Supreme Court

State vs. Larry Allen Hicks
E1999-00957-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer

Hamilton Supreme Court

State vs. Larry Allen Hicks
E1999-00957-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer

Hamilton Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Larry Allen Hicks
E1999-00957-SC-R11-CV
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer

Hamilton Supreme Court

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Supreme Court

Cutler-Hammer, a Division of Eaton Corp. v. Timothy L. Crabtree
E1998-00845-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Steven Bebb

We granted review in this cause to determine whether the trial court erred in finding Timothy L. Crabtree permanently and totally disabled as a result of mental and physical injuries sustained while working for Cutler-Hammer. Crabtree injured his back while working on a production line; then, during treatment for the back injury, he developed severe depression. The trial court found that Crabtree was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the combined effect of his mental and physical injuries. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel rejected this finding, concluding instead that Crabtree's mental disorder was not compensable because it was not connected to his back injury, which was compensable. On review, we conclude that Crabtree's mental disorder resulted from his physical injury. We hold, therefore, that Crabtree's mental disorder is compensable, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Bradley Supreme Court

State vs. Kermit Maurice Cozart
W1999-00022-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn
We granted review of this case to decide whether a trial court must instruct the jury based upon this Court's holding in State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991). We hold that the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury that it should determine whether the confinement, movement, or detention inherent in the kidnapping was essentially incidental to the accompanying robbery. Applying the principles first enunciated in Anthony, we further hold that the dual convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping in this case do not violate due process. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Henry Supreme Court

David Miller vs. State
E1998-00247-SC-R11-PD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Ray L. Jenkins
We granted petitioner, David Earl Miller's application for permission to appeal to determine whether this Court's decision in State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1992) created a new state constitutional rule regarding the elements of deliberation and premeditation. Petitioner claims that Brown created a new state constitutional rule and that the jury instructions given at his initial trial violated this rule by relieving the prosecution of its burden to prove the elements of premeditation and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the petitioner argues that his conviction of first-degree murder was not supported by sufficient proof. After due consideration, we conclude that Brown did not announce a new state constitutional rule, did not implicate any constitutional right, is not retroactive, and may not serve as the basis for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we conclude that the petitioner's complaint about the jury instructions given at his initial trial has been waived because it was not raised on direct appeal and that his complaint about the sufficiency of the evidence to support premeditation and deliberation was previously determined by this Court on direct appeal. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

Knox Supreme Court

State vs. Edward Coffee
M1998-00472-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: J. O. Bond
Edward D. Coffee was indicted for possession of certain controlled substances with intent to sell and possession of drug paraphernalia. Because the judicial commissioner failed to make and retain an exact copy of the original search warrant as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), the trial court suppressed the evidence recovered in the search and dismissed the indictment. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, and we now also affirm.

Wilson Supreme Court

Margaret Tobitt vs. Bridgestone/Fireston, Inc.
M2000-00279-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.

Warren Supreme Court

Margaret Tobitt vs. Bridgestone/Fireston, Inc.
M2000-00279-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.

Warren Supreme Court

Mattie L. Scales v. City of Oak Ridge, Et Al.
E2000-00499-WCM-CV
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.

Anderson Supreme Court

State vs. Robert Derrick Johnson
M1998-00546-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: William Charles Lee

Bedford Supreme Court

State vs. Robert Derrick Johnson
M1998-00546-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: William Charles Lee

Bedford Supreme Court

State vs. Timothy R. Bowles
M1997-00092-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
Timothy R. Bowles was convicted of aggravated rape, attempted rape, and robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions for the sexual offenses, but because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of theft, the intermediate court reversed the robbery conviction. We granted the State's application for review to determine whether the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the offense of theft constituted reversible error. We granted Bowles's application for review to decide: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for aggravated rape; and (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to submit the offense of sexual battery to the jury as a lesser-included offense of either aggravated rape or attempted rape. After thorough review and due consideration, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the aggravated rape conviction. We further hold that any error on the part of the trial court in failing to instruct the jury regarding the lesser-included offense of sexual battery was harmless. Regarding the robbery conviction, however, we hold that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of theft constitutes reversible error. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

Davidson Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Peter Allen Ross
W1999-00972-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles C. Mcginley

The appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia with intent to sell after officers discovered 53.5 grams of cocaine in his motel room. Prior to trial, he challenged the search of his motel room under the federal and state Constitutions, but the trial court denied his motion to suppress, finding that he possessed no reasonable expectation of privacy in the room after he disclaimed ownership of the room key. Following his conviction, the appellant urged the trial court to consider as a mitigating factor that his conduct did not cause or threaten serious bodily injury, but the trial court disagreed and sentenced the appellant to serve the maximum term in the range. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences, and we granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of the record and applicable legal authorities, we agree that the appellant relinquished his otherwise legitimate expectation of privacy in his motel room by disclaiming ownership of the key and by asserting that it belonged to another person. We also conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions on both charges. Finally, although the trial court should have considered the mitigating factor in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-113(1),  we conclude that the maximum sentence in the Range is nevertheless appropriate. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

Hardin Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Peter Allen Ross - Dissenting
W1999-00972-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles C. Mcginley

For denying that a key to a hotel room belonged to him, the defendant has been stripped of
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The majority
imposes this harsh result even in the face of obvious and undisputed evidence that the subject
premises were under the defendant’s exclusive and private control. Because I am unable to agree
that a refusal to incriminate one’s self in response to police inquiries should result in a loss of Fourth Amendment rights, I respectfully dissent.

Hardin Supreme Court

Wanda Carey Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Center, Inc., et al.
M1999-00346-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Burch

We granted review of this case to determine whether the holder of a certificate of need may be held liable for the healthcare facility operator's tortious acts. We hold that the Tennessee statutes and rules governing certificates of need impliedly impose a non-delegable duty upon the certificate of need holder to initiate operation of the healthcare facility. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reverse the trial court's judgment, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Cheatham Supreme Court