SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

State of Tennessee v. John Michael Bane
W1997-02158-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge John P. Colton, Jr.

The defendant, John Michael Bane, was convicted of felony murder in the perpetration of a
robbery for an offense committed in November of 1988. The jury originally imposed a sentence of
death after it found that evidence of two aggravating circumstances – (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind and (2) the murder was committed during the perpetration of a felony – outweighed evidence of any mitigating factors. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(5), (7) (1982). On appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction, but remanded for a new sentencing hearing because the jury’s application of the felony murder aggravating circumstance duplicated the offense of felony murder in violation of article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. See State v. Bane, 853 S.W.2d 483 (Tenn. 1993). After a new sentencing hearing, the jury again imposed a sentence of death after it found that evidence of two aggravating circumstances – (1) the murder was “especially atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture and depravity of mind” and (2) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another –
outweighed evidence of any mitigating factors. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(5), (6) (1982).

State of Tennessee v. John Michael Bane - Concurring/Dissenting
W1997-02158-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch
Trial Court Judge: Judge John P. Colton, Jr.

I concur in the majority decision to affirm the conviction in this case. I continue to believe,
however, that the comparative proportionality review protocol embraced by the majority is
inadequate and fails to satisfy this Court’s duty, mandated by statute,1 to ensure that no death
sentence will be upheld unless it is proportionate to sentences imposed upon comparable defendants in similar cases. Because the protocol fails to provide convincing assurance that this defendant’s death sentence is proportionate, I cannot join the majority decision to impose the death penalty in this case.

Dorothy Wilkins v. The Kellog Company
M1999-00676-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge John R. McCarroll, Jr.

This workers’ compensation case presents the question of how a “temporary partial disability”
benefits award, as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(2), is calculated. The trial court held that an award is calculated based on the employee’s “average weekly wage,” which is the measure of benefits for the other categories of disability listed in the Workers’ Compensation Law (“temporary total disability,” “permanent total disability,” and “permanent partial disability”). The employer appealed this decision to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel. The case was transferred to the full Supreme Court before the Panel handed down its decision. We now reverse the trial court and hold that the express terms of the statute indicate that a temporary partial disability award has a unique method of calculation, based on “the difference between the wage of the worker at the time of the injury and the wage such worker is able to earn in such worker’s partially disabled condition.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(2). This method does not include the average weekly wage definition. Under the correct calculation, the plaintiff in this case is not entitled to any temporary partial disability benefits. The award of $3,258.20 is accordingly reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court. Appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e); Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed and Remanded.
 

Dorothy Wilkins v. The Kellog Company - Dissenting
M1999-00676-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge John R. McCarroll, Jr.

The majority holds that the difference between pre- and post-injury wages for an employee whose weekly wage fell from $1,433.82 to $860.80 is $0. This holding, in my view, contravenes legislative intent, creates the potential for abuse of the benefit scheme, and muddles benefit calculation. In order to more effectively promote the Worker’s Compensation Act’s intended objectives and clarify benefit calculation, I would define “wage” in the temporary partial disability provision to mean “average weekly wage,” not “hourly rate of pay.” Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Vadalene Brewer v. Michael Dunn Center et al.
E2000-01298-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Frank V. Williams, III

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the plaintiff had sustained an injury to her left shoulder in the course and scope of her employment that resulted in 54 percent permanent partial disability. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

Travis Watt v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., et al.
W2000-00104-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris

Travis Watt v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., et al.
W2000-00104-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris

State vs. Miles Mateyko
M1998-00275-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: W. Charles Lee
The defendant was charged and convicted of child abuse through neglect in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15-401(a). The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, finding that the State did not establish that the defendant's children suffered any actual, deleterious effect or harm from the neglect. However, the intermediate court found that the defendant was guilty of attempted child abuse through neglect, and it remanded the case for resentencing. The State requested permission to appeal to this Court, and we hold that section 39-15-401(a) does require proof of an actual, deleterious effect or harm to the child's health and welfare and that the mere risk of harm is insufficient to support a conviction. We also hold that in those cases in which no such actual, deleterious effect or harm is shown, a defendant may be convicted of attempted child abuse through neglect under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-12-101, provided that the State is successful in making the required showing. Because the record in this case contains conflicting evidence as to the required intent necessary for the attempted crime, we remand this case to the Lincoln County Circuit Court for a new trial on the lesser-included offense of attempted child abuse through neglect. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Cora Cantrell, et al vs. Knox County Bd of Ed. et al
E1999-01557-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Harold Wimberly
The issue in this appeal is whether non-certified, non-tenured teacher aides have under state law a reasonable expectation of continued employment beyond the term of their written contracts such that they are entitled to back pay and benefits beyond the expiration of their contract period. We conclude that teacher aides do not have a reasonable expectation of continued employment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.

Charmaine West, et al vs. Media General Convergence, Inc., et al
M2001-00141-SC-R23-CQ
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, this Court accepted certification of the following question from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee:

State vs. Michael D. Simmons
M1999-00099-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
Appellant, Michael Dewayne Simmons, pled guilty to felony theft of property and aggravated robbery but reserved for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i) the following certified question of law: whether the defendant was denied his federal and state constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Simmons had not been deprived of his speedy trial right. We granted Simmons' application for permission to appeal to determine whether a speedy trial violation occurred in this case where the only prejudice allegedly resulting from the delay is the defendant's lost possibility of concurrent sentencing with a sentence imposed for a prior unrelated offense. Because the delay of twenty-three months was not egregious, the reason for the delay was negligence or administrative oversight, and the only prejudice alleged is the lost possibility of serving a concurrent sentence, we conclude that the defendant's right to a speedy trial has not been violated. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss.

Estate of Julie Amos, et al. v. Vanderbilt University, et al.
M1999-00998-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
We granted appeal in this case to determine whether the special proof requirements of Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996), extend to all negligence claims in which damages for emotional distress are sought as an item of compensatory damages. We hold that the special proof requirements of Camper apply only to "stand-alone" claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress. We further hold that Vanderbilt University Medical Center owed a duty to warn Julie Amos of her potential exposure to HIV so that she might take appropriate measures to protect third parties. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment in this case.

Eddie Limbaugh, Executor vs. Coffee Med. Center
M1999-01181-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins

Eddie Limbaugh, Executor vs. Coffee Med. Center
M1999-01181-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins

Johnie N. Gibson vs. Douglas Trant, et al
M1999-00390-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Wheeler A. Rosenbalm

Johnie N. Gibson vs. Douglas Trant, et al
M1999-00390-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Wheeler A. Rosenbalm

City of Chattanooga v. Kevin Davis
E2000-00664-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer

State of Tennessee v. Curtis Jason Ely And State of Tennessee v. Laconia Lamar Bowers
E1998-00099-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott

And No. E1998-00099-SC-R11-CD

This is a consolidated appeal from the defendants’ convictions in the Criminal Courts of  Anderson County and Knox County, respectively.  Defendant Ely was originally charged with one count of premeditated murder and one count of felony murder; defendant Bowers was charged with two counts of felony murder. In Ely’s case, the State nolle prossed the premeditated murder count upon the conclusion of the proof, and the trial court refused to instruct any lesser-included offenses to felony murder. He was convicted as charged of felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In defendant Bowers’s case, the trial court dismissed the charges of felony murder at the conclusion of the proof and, over his objection, instructed the jury on the lesser offenses of second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide. Bowers was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Ely argued that the offenses of second degree murder, reckless homicide, criminally negligent homicide, facilitation of felony murder, and accessory after the fact to felony murder were all lesser-included offenses of felony murder and should have been instructed. A majority of the intermediate court held that accessory after the fact was not a lesserincluded offense of felony murder. However, assuming that the other lesser offenses were included, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that no error occurred because the evidence did not -2- support an inference of guilt of any of the other lesser offenses. In his direct appeal, Bowers argued that second degree murder was not a lesser-included offense of felony murder and should not have been charged. The intermediate court held that second degree murder was a lesser-included offense of felony murder and that it was properly instructed in his case.

We granted review in this consolidated appeal to determine several issues: (1) whether there are any lesser-included offenses to felony murder; (2) if there are no lesser-included offenses, whether the conviction in Bowers’s case is therefore invalid; (3) if there are lesser-included offenses, whether failure to instruct such offenses was error in Ely’s case; and (4) whether any such error was harmless.  We also take the opportunity in this case to clarify the harmless error standard, which has been the subject of some confusion since our decision in State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 104-06 (Tenn. 1998). We conclude that the offenses of second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide are lesser-included offenses of felony murder, and therefore, instruction on these offenses in Bowers’s case was not error. In Ely’s case, we find that some evidence exists that reasonable minds could accept as to several lesser-included offenses, and therefore, the failure to instruct such offenses was error. Because we conclude that such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse Ely’s conviction and remand his case for a new trial.