State vs. Antonio Kendrick W1997-00157-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Arthur T. Bennett
We granted this appeal to determine whether the prosecution's failure to elect the particular offense of aggravated rape upon which it sought to convict the defendant constituted plain error and required a new trial. The main purpose of the election requirement is to preserve a defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict under the Tennessee Constitution. A majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction for one count of aggravated rape without examining the election issue. After reviewing the record and controlling authority, we conclude that the prosecution's failure to elect the particular offense upon which it sought to convict the defendant failed to preserve the defendant's rights under the Tennessee Constitution and constituted plain error. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
Shelby
Supreme Court
State vs. James P. Stout W1998-00079-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey
Shelby
Supreme Court
D&E Construction Co. vs. Robert J. Denley Co. W1998-00445-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
The contractor submitted to arbitration a contractual payment dispute with the project owner arising from a contract to build a subdivision in Collierville. The arbitrators found in favor of the contractor and included an award of attorney's fees. The trial court determined that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority in awarding attorney's fees and vacated the arbitration award. The Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating the entire award. We hold that when the arbitrators awarded attorney's fees, they exceeded their authority by awarding upon a matter not within the scope of the contract's arbitration provision. Therefore, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacate the award of attorney's fees.
Shelby
Supreme Court
State vs. Vincent Sims W1998-00634-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey
Shelby
Supreme Court
State vs. Vincent Sims W1998-00634-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey
Suzanne Burlew vs. Brad Burlew M1998-01177-SC-R11-CV
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
The issue in this divorce case concerns the type and amount of alimony that should be awarded to the Wife. The trial court awarded her $220,000 of alimony in solido to be paid out in decreasing amounts over eight years, and declined to award her rehabilitative alimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's in solido award but remanded the case to the trial court to award rehabilitative alimony of at least $1,000 per month for a reasonable period of time. Before this Court, the Husband/appellee argues that rehabilitative alimony is unnecessary and that the alimony in solido award is excessive. The Wife/appellant counters that the in solido award was not excessive; indeed, she argues that she should have been awarded alimony in futuro. We hold that the trial court properly awarded alimony in solido rather than alimony in futuro. We also hold that the trial court did not err in denying the Wife's request for rehabilitative alimony. Thus, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals.
State vs. Culbreath, et al W1999-01553-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty
Shelby
Supreme Court
Robert Cunningham, Jr.,e t al vs. Shelton Security Service, Inc., et al M1998-00023-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
In this workers' compensation case, the estate of the employee, Robert W. Cunningham, Sr., has appealed from a chancery court judgment dismissing a claim for death benefits filed against the employer, Shelton Security Service, Inc. The employee, who worked as a security guard for the employer, died of heart failure while performing his duties at a store. At the close of the employee's proof, the trial court granted the employer's motion to dismiss on the basis that the emotional stress experienced by the employee the night of his death was not extraordinary or unusual for a security guard. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of law, found that there was sufficient evidence of causation to warrant a trial and, thus, reversed the trial court's dismissal. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion for full Court review of the Panel's decision. We granted the motion for review to consider whether the trial court erred in dismissing the employee's claim on the basis that his heart failure did not arise out of the employment because it was not caused by a mental or emotional stimulus of an unusual or abnormal nature, beyond what is typically encountered by one in his occupation. After carefully examining the record and considering the relevant authorities, we agree with the Panel and reverse the trial court's judgment.
Davidson
Supreme Court
State vs. Coley M1997-00116-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Donald P. Harris
Williamson
Supreme Court
State vs. Coley M1997-00116-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Donald P. Harris
Williamson
Supreme Court
State of Tennessee v. Guy Binette E1998-00236-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rebecca J. Stern
This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County, which overruled the defendant’s
motion to suppress all evidence obtained by the State after the defendant was stopped by a police
officer on suspicion of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant. The defendant entered a
conditional plea of guilty and reserved for appeal as a dispositive question of law the issue of the
lawfulness of the stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The
defendant thereafter sought, and this Court granted, permission to appeal on the following issue: whether reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, existed to authorize a stop of the defendant’s vehicle. Having reviewed the record in this case, we hold that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that the police officer acted with reasonable suspicion when he stopped the defendant. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, the
conviction as entered by the trial court is vacated, and the charge of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant is dismissed. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Reversed; Case Dismissed
I respectfully dissent. There is no need to adopt a new standard to review the videotaped evidence presented in this case. I would hold that an application of the standard of review
traditionally applied in Tennessee establishes that the officer in this case had reasonable suspicion to stop Binette.
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County which allowed a jury, in an action alleging malpractice, to allocate fault to resident physicians who were immune from suit. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that the trial court should not have permitted the jury to apportion fault to the residents because they were immune. We then granted this appeal to decide whether the trial court erred in allowing nonparties who were immune from suit to appear on a jury verdict form. After examining the record, considering the arguments of the parties and amicus curiae, and analyzing the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing the immune nonparties to appear on the jury verdict form. Accordingly, for the reasons herein, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.
The majority departs from settled principles of law in holding that a jury may allocate fault to an immune nonparty. In so doing, it refuses to apply and overrules the application in this case of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s unanimous decision just four years ago in Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1996), that a jury may not allocate fault to an immune nonparty because the immune nonparty owes no duty to the plaintiff and therefore the plaintiff has no cause of action against the immune nonparty.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately to state the basis for my
concurrence. In McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992), we adopted a modified system of comparative fault in which parties contributing to the plaintiff’s injuries were to be held liable only to the extent of their relative percentages of fault. Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1996), highlighted the problems inherent in the application of McIntyre to workers who sustained employment-related injuries and who filed tort actions against persons other than their employers. These workers found themselves in a unique situation. They were subject to both the tort system’s doctrine of comparative fault adopted by this Court and the workers’ compensation system’s doctrine of no-fault recovery created by the legislature.
Stephenson vs. Carlton E1998-00202-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Lynn W. Brown
We granted this appeal to determine whether the appellant's sentence of life without parole for first- degree murder was an illegal sentence and, if so, whether the appellant was entitled to habeas corpus relief. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We conclude, and the State concedes, that the sentence of life without parole was not a statutorily authorized punishment at the time the appellant committed the offense of first-degree murder and that the illegal sentence was properly challenged in a habeas corpus petition. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Johnson
Supreme Court
State vs. Hooper M1997-00031-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace
The single issue in this appeal is whether the proof introduced at the sentencing hearing is sufficient to support a denial of probation based solely upon the need for deterrence. The Court of Criminal Appeals initially affirmed the sentence and held that proof of deterrence was not needed because drug use and possession cases are "deterrable per se." Upon the defendant's petition to rehear, however, the intermediate court reversed itself, holding that a "per se" rule of deterrence is inconsistent with the holding of this Court in State vs. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991). The State appealed to this Court. For the reasons given herein, we hold that the proof in this case is sufficient to justify denial of probation on the sole ground of deterrence. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals granting an alternative sentence is reversed, and the defendant's original term of incarceration is reinstated.
Humphreys
Supreme Court
State vs. Wilson E1996-00006-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court for Blount County, where Brandon Wilson, the defendant, pleaded guilty to seven counts of delivery of cocaine and to three counts (merged by the trial court into one count) of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. Wilson appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals contending, inter alia, that his indictments were legally insufficient and that the trial court erred in accepting the guilty plea because it was not voluntarily entered. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and reversed Wilson's convictions on all counts. We hold that the seven indictments for delivery of cocaine are sufficient; Wilson's convictions on these indictments are, therefore, reinstated. Additionally, because the issue concerning the voluntariness of Wilson's plea was not properly before the intermediate appellate court, we reinstate the conviction for possession of cocaine. This reinstatement is without prejudice to Wilson's right to file a petition for post-conviction relief within the appropriate time.
We granted this appeal to determine: 1) whether private school tuition constitutes an extraordinary educational expense under the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines; and 2) whether the noncustodial parent should be required to pay those expenses in addition to child support based upon the percentage of net income of the noncustodial parent. We hold that pursuant to the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines private school tuition is an "extraordinary educational expense." We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals requiring the total amount of private school tuition to be paid by the obligor-father. We hold, however, that in appropriate cases a court may apportion the amount of tuition between the parties.
Hamilton
Supreme Court
State vs. Swindle M1998-00362-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County, which convicted the defendant of two counts of facilitation of child rape and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on Class B misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery. After the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions, the defendant sought, and this Court granted, permission to appeal on the following issue: whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on Class B misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery. We hold that Class B misdemeanor assault is a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery and that it was error for the trial court not to instruct the jury accordingly. Nevertheless, having determined that such error was harmless, the defendant's convictions for aggravated sexual battery are affirmed.
Davidson
Supreme Court
State vs. Jefferson M1997-00115-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
This case is before us upon a jury's resentencing of the defendant, James Thomas Jefferson, on his conviction for premeditated first degree murder. In the original appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. On remand, the defendant requested a new jury trial on the merits in addition to the already-ordered resentencing. The trial court denied the request for a new trial. After a new hearing, the jury fixed a sentence of life imprisonment. The defendant appealed of right, challenging the trial court's overruling of his motion for a new trial on the merits. Relying on the "law of the case" doctrine, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. We granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal and now hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals properly determined that the law of the case doctrine barred the trial court from granting Jefferson's motion for a new trial. The Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.
