State vs. Sledge
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Supreme Court | ||
Ahern (Pierotti) vs. Ahern
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Staples vs. CBL & Associates, et al
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Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Staples vs. CBL & Associates, et al
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Supreme Court | ||
Bryant vs. HCA Health Services of TN
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Supreme Court | ||
Robert Glen Coe v. State of Tennessee
In Heck van Tran v. State,1 a majority of this Court established the protocol that an inmate sentenced to death must follow to assert a common law and constitutional challenge to his or her competence to be executed. In the context of a Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, I identified three components of the protocol which, when implemented, would each produce an unconstitutional result. Two are most significant: (1) use of the protocol would permit the execution of inmates who are, due to mental defect or disease, unable to consult with and assist their counsel; and (2) use of the protocol would deprive inmates of the right to have the ultimate issue–-competence to be executed-- determined by a jury of their peers. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
W1999-01313-SC-DPE-PD
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Smith vs. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co.
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Supreme Court | ||
Gleaves vs. Checker Cab Transit
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
McCoy vs. T.T.C. Illinois Inc.
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Supreme Court | ||
Norton vs. McCaskill
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Walker
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Maury | Supreme Court | |
McConnell vs. State
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Supreme Court | ||
Donald P. Spicer v. State of Tennessee
In this appeal, we address several issues related to the consolidation and severance of multiple sexual abuse offenses pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 8, 13, and 14. More specifically, these issues are: (1) whether the appellant properly preserved his right to a severance of offenses under Rule 14(b)(1) by objecting to a pre-trial motion for consolidation; if so, (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by improperly consolidating two indictments alleging child rape and aggravated sexual battery in a single trial; and if so, (3) whether that abuse of discretion affirmatively appears to have affected the outcome of the trial. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the appellant properly preserved his right to a severance of offenses and that the trial court abused its discretion by consolidating both indictments in a single trial. Because we also hold that the trial court’s abuse of discretion affirmatively appears to have affected the outcome of the trial, we vacate the appellant’s conviction and sentence and remand this case to the Shelby County Criminal Court for a new trial. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part as modified and reversed in part. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Harry Clark March and Trudi Janette Marsh, Susan R. Limor, Trustee v. Fleet Mortgage Group and Bank United
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee,1 this Court accepted certification of the following question from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Damien Darden
We granted this appeal to decide (1) whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over criminal charges that were not addressed in juvenile court during the transfer hearing; and (2) whether the amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1- 159(d) (Supp. 1999), generally eliminating the requirement for an acceptance hearing, is unconstitutional. After examining the record and considering the arguments of the parties and applicable law, we conclude that the circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction over the criminal charges transferred from juvenile court as well as over the additional charges found in the grand jury’s indictment. In addition, we conclude that the General Assembly did not act unconstitutionally in eliminating the requirement for an acceptance hearing. Accordingly, for the reasons herein, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Supreme Court | ||
Gragg vs. Gragg
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Danny Spradlin
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Blount | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Daniel
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Daniel
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Supreme Court | ||
Brown vs. Wal-Mart
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Lawrence | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Howard Brown
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Knox | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Howard Brown
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Supreme Court | ||
Ashe vs. Radiation Oncology Assoc., et al
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Supreme Court | ||
Lamar Fletcher v. State of Tennessee
In this appeal we address two primary issues: (1) whether an indigent party is liable for payment of outstanding litigation taxes levied under Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-4-602 (1998), and (2) whether the Tennessee Department of Correction had authority to withdraw money from an inmate’s trust account to pay a distress warrant. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that indigent parties become liable for litigation taxes when taxed by the court and that the Tennessee Department of Correction has the authority to deduct money from an inmate trust fund to satisfy a distress warrant. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Jackson | Supreme Court |
