SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Stephen A. Wakefield v. Michael F. Crawley, MacTenn Valve Company, a Tennessee Corp., and Macaweber Systems Inc., a Tennessee Corp.
03S01-9903-CH-00029
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Chester H. Rainwater

We granted this appeal to determine whether stock in a closely-held corporation is a “security,” as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-8-102 (1992 Repl. & Supp. 1998)1, so that Chapter 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs its sale or transfer. In Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tenn. 1983), we concluded that closely-held stock was not a security within the meaning of Chapter 8 of the UCC. Because we have determined that the Official Comments of the 1977 version of the UCC, adopted by the Tennessee General Assembly in 1986, as well as the 1995 and 1997 amendments to the Code, overrule the reasoning in Blasingame, we now hold that closely-held stock is a security within the meaning of the UCC’s Chapter 8, and that the closely-held stock at issue in this case is governed by Chapter 8. Because the plaintiff cannot produce a signed writing that comports with the statute of frauds found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-8-319 (1992 Repl. & 1996 Repl.), nor can he satisfy one of the statutory exemptions, we reverse the judgments of the lower courts and find in favor of the defendant.
 

M1996-00011-SC-R11-CD
M1996-00011-SC-R11-CD

State vs. Fowler
01S01-9810-CC-00185
Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins

State vs. Fowler
01S01-9810-CC-00185

Overnite Transportation Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 480, et al.
M2002-02116-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Ellen H. Lyle
We granted this appeal to determine 1) whether a trial court's order declining to hold an alleged contemnor in civil contempt may be appealed; 2) whether compensatory damages for civil contempt are available pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-105 (1980 & 2000) from a contemnor who commits an act forbidden by a trial court's order; and, if so, 3) whether those damages may be recovered if the violation is not ongoing at the time of the hearing. We answer these questions in the affirmative. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Goodwin vs. Hendersonville Police Dept.
01S01-9804-CH-00077
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray

State of Tennessee v. Albert Dewaynn Porter - Concurring
02S01-9803-CC-000205
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

We granted this appeal to determine whether the common law "procuring agent defense" has been abolished by statute. We hold that the procuring agent defense was abolished by Tenn. Code Ann. §39-11-203 (e)(2) which expressly states that "[d]efenses available under common law are here by abolished." The trial court appropriately declined to instruct the jury on the procuring agent defense, and the defendant's conviction for selling a controlled substance was supported by the evidence.

In re: Brittany Swanson, a Minor, Tennessee Baptist Children's Homes, Inc., v. Harry Lee Swanson
02S01-9810-CV-00103
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe H. Walker

This case concerns the termination of appellant Harry Swanson’s parental rights over his biological child, Brittany Swanson, who is now nine years old and in the custody of the appellee Tennessee Baptist Children’s Homes, Inc. (Baptist Children’s Home). Although Mr. Swanson’s parental rights were originally terminated by the Tipton County Juvenile Court, the circuit court of Tipton County denied the petition to terminate parental rights on an appeal by Mr. Swanson. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court and found that Mr. Swanson had “abandoned” Brittany because he had “willfully failed to support” her or “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward [her] support” within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(D) (1996). We hold that the statutory definition of “willfully failed to support” and “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward such child’s support” is unconstitutional because it creates an irrebuttable presumption that the failure to provide monetary support for the four months preceding the petition to terminate parental rights constitutes abandonment, irrespective of whether that failure was intentional. This presumption violated Mr. Swanson’s federal and state constitutional right to the care and custody of his daughter. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed below, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the circuit court for entry of an order returning custody to Mr. Swanson.

State vs. Lane
03S01-9802-CC-00013
Trial Court Judge: R. Steven Bebb

Doe vs. Sundquist
01S01-9901-CV-00006

Doe vs. Sundquist
01S01-9901-CV-00006

Mulheim vs. Knox Co. Board of Education
03S01-9808-CH-00089

State vs. Ferguson
03S01-9803-CR-00029
Trial Court Judge: Lynn W. Brown

Stephens vs. Henley's Supply & Industry
01S01-9712-CH-00277

Ivey vs. Trans Global Gas & Oil
03S01-9804-CH-00037

C.L. Randolph v. Virginia Henley Randolph
03S01-9510-CV-00119
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Special Judge M. Drew Robinson

We granted this appeal to clarify the statutory standard by which the validity of antenuptial agreements should be judged. The trial court in this case held the antenuptial agreement invalid, finding the wife did not “knowledgeably” sign the agreement, as required by statute1. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed, finding the totality of the circumstances established that the wife possessed sufficient knowledge of the husband’s business affairs and financial status at the time she signed the agreement to meet the statutory requirement of "knowledgeably" executing the agreement and that the agreement was therefore enforceable. We interpret the statutory requirement that an antenuptial agreement is enforceable only if entered into "knowledgeably" to mean that the spouse seeking to enforce an antenuptial agreement must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, either that a full and fair disclosure of the nature, extent and value
of his or her holdings was provided to the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement, or that disclosure was unnecessary because the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement had independent knowledge of the full nature, extent, and value of the proponent spouse’s holdings.

Demetra Lyree Parker v. Warren County Utility District
01S01-9806-CH-00107
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge John W. Rollins

We granted review to address the standard for an employer's liability in supervisor sexual harassment cases under the Tennessee Human Rights Act following the recent United States Supreme Court's decisions in Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998). Upon review, we adopt a standard consistent with Ellerth and Faragher and hold that an employer is vicariously liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor. An employer, however, may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages when no tangible employment action has been taken. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as modified.

State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey D. Hunter
01S01-9806-CC-00118
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark

We granted this appeal by Jeffrey D. Hunter, the appellant, in order to address issues pertinent to a trial court’s authority during probation revocation proceedings. For the reasons provided herein, we hold that when a trial court has determined that a probation violation has occurred, it possesses the authority to: (1) order incarceration; (2) order the original probationary period to commence anew; or (3) extend the remaining period of probation for as much as an additional two years. We further conclude that a defendant is not entitled to credit on his or her sentence of incarceration for any time served on probation prior to probation revocation and reinstatement of the original sentence. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Pat Bondurant
01S01-9804-CC-00064
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank W. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

In this appeal, the defendant, Pat Bondurant, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and arson. Upon finding that the State had proven two statutory. The jury found the following two aggravating circumstances: (1) “[t]he defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, which involve the use or threat of violence to the person;” and (2) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved to rture or de pravity of m ind.” Ten n. Code Ann. § 39 -2-203( i)(2) and (5 ) (1982). These statutory aggravating circumstances were redefined in 1989 and are currently codified at Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-204(i)(2) and (5) (1998 Sup p.). 2Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-206(a)(1) (1997 R epl.).
aggravating circumstances1 beyond a reasonable doubt and that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the jury sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution on the conviction for first degree murder. On the arson conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years consecutive to the death penalty. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Thereafter, the case was docketed in this Court2 and set for oral argument with respect to eight of the issues raised by the defendant. See Tenn. S. Ct. R. 12.

Virginia Graf Waddey v. Ira Clinton Waddey, Jr.
01S01-9811-CV-00198
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Corlew, III

We granted this appeal to determine whether a party receiving periodic alimony may obtain a modification or extension of alimony when: 1) a termination date was agreed to by the parties in their property settlement agreement; and 2) the petition to modify was filed after the termination date but prior to the expiration of thirty days. We hold that the alimony was not modifiable after one of the contingencies listed in the property settlement agreement occurred. We affirm the Court of Appeals, but we base our decision upon other grounds

Hawkins vs. Hart
01S01-9811-CV-00199

Hathaway vs. First Family Financial Svcs.
01S01-9811-FD-00203
Trial Court Judge: John T. Nixon

Concrete Spaces vs. Sender
01S01-9812-CH-00224
Trial Court Judge: Cecil Crowson

Schering Plough Healthcare vs. State Bd. of Equalization
02S01-9810-CH-00096

Cleek vs. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
W1999-02419-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris