Ramsey vs. Town of Oliver Springs
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Supreme Court | ||
McIlvain vs. Russell Stover Candies
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Supreme Court | ||
Sullivan vs. Baptist Memorial Hospital
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Supreme Court | ||
Long vs. Tri-Con Industries
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Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Wayne Edison
We granted this Tenn. R. App. P. 11 appeal to determine the appropriate standard of review of a trial court’s decision to admit a breath-alcohol test result under State v. Sensing, 843 |
Jefferson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Ray Middlebrooks
This case is before us for automatic review of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ |
Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. James R. Lemacks
We granted this appeal by the State of Tennessee to address the issue of jury unanimity in cases where the State relies on alternative theories of guilt to convict an accused under a single count indictment. In this case, the appellee, James Lemacks, was charged with driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI). The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict the appellee of DUI based upon evidence that he operated his automobile while intoxicated or that he was criminally responsible for allowing his friend, Clinton Sanchez, to drive the automobile while intoxicated. The jury returned a general verdict convicting the appellee of DUI. |
Humphreys | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James R. Lemacks - Dissenting
Because the opinion filed by the Court of Criminal Appeals states the view I take, I respectfully dissent from the view held by the majority of my colleagues and would adopt the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Humphreys | Supreme Court | |
Hawkins vs. Hart
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Supreme Court | ||
Marcus vs. Marcus
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Supreme Court | ||
Guliano vs. Cleo
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Buggs
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Supreme Court | ||
Strouth vs. State
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Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
Strouth vs. State
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Brown
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Supreme Court | ||
Morris vs. State
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Meyer
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McMinn | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Rogers
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Supreme Court | ||
Taylor vs. State
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Brewer vs. Lincoln Brass Works
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Supreme Court | ||
Matthews vs. Pickett County, Tennessee
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Pickett | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronnie William (Billy) Taylor - Concurring
We granted this appeal by Ronnie William (Billy) Taylor, the appellant, in order to address issues pertinent to the sentences he received in the trial court. In our review, however, we notice as plain error an invalid conviction that was imposed upon appellant for an offense that was not charged in the indictment.1 Accordingly, for the reasons outlined below, we vacate the invalid burglary conviction and affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified. The cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Gibson | Supreme Court | |
Tommy L. King v. State of Tennessee
In this post-conviction capital case, we granted this appeal to determine whether the jury’s reliance on an invalid felony murder aggravating circumstance was harmless error. Upon review, we hold that the jury's consideration of the invalid felony murder aggravating circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the strength of the remaining valid aggravating circumstances and the relative weakness or absence of any mitigating circumstances. The Court of Criminal Appeals' decision affirming the trial court's dismissal of the post-conviction petition is affirmed. |
Maury | Supreme Court | |
Tommy L. King v. State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
I agree with the majority that the jury’s reliance on the felony murder aggravating circumstance in this case violated article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution and that a harmless error analysis must be applied under our decision in State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1993). I disagree, however, with both the majority’s application of the Howell analysis and its conclusion. |
Maury | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ray L. Taylor - Concurring
We granted this appeal to decide whether a defendant’s credibility may be impeached by reference to a prior conviction for a “felony involving dishonesty.” We hold that the trial court erred in ruling that the State could impeach the defendant by asking him whether he had been convicted of any “felonies involving dishonesty.” We hold, however, that the error was harmless.1 |
Shelby | Supreme Court |