Seals vs. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg Co., Inc. and 2nd Injury Fund
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Claiborne | Supreme Court | |
Seals vs. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg Co., Inc. and 2nd Injury Fund
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Supreme Court | ||
Wayne Eldred Hill v. CNA Insurance and Larry Brinton, Jr. Director Chancellor of the Division of Worker's Compensation Fund, Tennessee Department of Labor
In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court determined that Wayne Eldred Hill, the employee, was permanently and totally disabled. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a), the court apportioned 10 percent of the award to the employer and 90 percent of the award to the Second Injury Fund. The case was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e). The Appeals Panel modified the award by apportioning 65 percent to the employer and 35 percent to the Second Injury Fund pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(b). |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Wayne Eldred Hill v. CNA Insurance and Larry Brinton, Jr., Director of the Division of Workers Compensation, Tennessee Dept of Labor - Concurring
I concur in the majority's holding that this case falls within the purview of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a). I, however, continue to adhere to my dissent in Bomely v. Mid-America Corp., 970 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. 1998), in which I concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a) is applicable when there is a subsequent injury and the employee is rendered permanently and totally disabled. Subsection (b), however, should apply only when the employee is still able to earn a wage or be gainfully employed but has received compensable vocational disabilities that exceed 100 percent or 400 weeks of compensation |
Supreme Court | ||
Sanjines vs. Ortwein & Assoc.
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Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Sanjines vs. Ortwein & Assoc.
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Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Wilson vs. Wilson
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Supreme Court | ||
Robert L. DeLaney v. Brook Thompson, et al.
In this case, we are invited to decide whether the Tennessee Plan for election of appellate judges, codified as Title 17, Chapter 4 of the Tennessee Code Annotated, is unconstitutional for a variety of reasons, but most particularly because it contemplates “retention elections” for incumbent appellate judges. In general, the Tennessee Plan provides that an incumbent appellate judge may run for reelection unopposed on the ballot, provided the incumbent’s retention has been recommended by the judicial evaluation commission; the judge will be retained in office if a majority of those voting in the election for that judge’s seat vote for such retention. Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-4- 115(d)(1)(1994). It is the duty of all courts, including the Supreme Court, to pass on a constitutional question only when it is absolutely necessary for the determination of thecase and of the rights of parties to the litigation. Glasgow v. Fox, 214 Tenn. 656, 666-667, 383 S.W. 2d 9, 13-14 (1964). See also, Jackson v. Davis, 530 F. Supp. 2, 4 n. 1 (E.D. Tenn.), aff’d, 667 F. 2d 1026 (6th Cir. 1981). We hold that it is not necessary to address the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan in this case, because it is not applicable to the facts of this case. For that reason, the Court of Appeals erred in holding the Tennessee Plan constitutional, just as the trial judge erred in holding the Plan unconstitutional. We reach this conclusion because the express provisions of the Tennessee Plan render it inapplicable to the election for which defendant Brook Thompson, State Coordinator of Elections, refused to accept a qualifying petition submitted by the plaintiff, Robert L. DeLaney. |
Supreme Court | ||
Walker vs. Saturn Corp.
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Supreme Court | ||
Walker vs. Saturn Corp.
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Supreme Court | ||
Est. of Ruth Garrett vs. St. Thomas Hospital
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Supreme Court | ||
Est. of Ruth Garrett vs. St. Thomas Hospital
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Supreme Court | ||
Alcazar vs. Hayes
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Bradley | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Bobby Blackmon
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Sumner | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Bobby Blackmon
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Sumner | Supreme Court | |
Wilson vs. Wilson
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Edmund George Zagorski v. State of Tennessee
We granted this post-conviction appeal to determine whether there is ineffective assistance of counsel where, at the express instruction of a competent and fully informed defendant, defense counsel does not investigate or present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital trial. For the reasons provided herein, we hold that there is not. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Billy R. Phillips v. Tennessee Technological University, State of Tennessee
We granted this appeal to address whether the State may be liable for discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) in a workers' compensation case. We hold that the State may only be taxed for costs expressly permitted by either the Tennessee claims commission statute or the Workers' Compensation Act. |
Supreme Court | ||
Billy R. Phillips v. State of Tennessee v. Tennessee Technological University, State of Tennessee
We granted this appeal to address whether the State may be liable for discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) in a workers' compensation case. We hold that the State may only be taxed for costs expressly permitted by either the Tennessee claims commission statute or the Workers' Compensation Act. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Fay Thomas Nutt v. Champion International Corporation
We granted this appeal to determine whether an employer is entitled to an offset of long-term disability payments against a workers’ compensation award for permanent total disability. A 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-114 permits offsets against workers’ compensation benefits for payments made to an employee under an employer-funded disability plan. The plaintiff’s injury pre-dated the effective date of the statute. We hold that the amendment is not retroactive and the employer is not entitled to an offset in this case. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Fay Thomas Nutt v. Champion International Corporation
This cause came on to be heard upon the record on appeal from the Special Worker’s Compensation Appeals Panel, and the briefs and argument of counsel; and upon consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that the 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-114 of the Workers’ Compensation Act is not retroactive and the employer is not entitled to an offset against the worker’s compensation award in this case. |
Wayne | Supreme Court | |
Baptist Hospital, et al., v. Tennessee Department of Health and Department of Finance and Administration
We granted this appeal to determine whether the Tennessee claims commission has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ challenge to certain Medicaid reimbursements paid to them by the State. Upon review, we hold that the Tennessee claims commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Because the plaintiffs’ challenge is based upon an assertion that a state Medicaid regulation is invalid under federal law, the Tennessee Department of Health was the agency with subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223 of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Baptist Hospital v. Tennessee Departments of Health and Finance and Administration
We granted this appeal to determine whether the Tennessee claims commission has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ challenge to certain Medicaid reimbursements paid to them by the State. Upon review, we hold that the Tennessee claims commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Because the plaintiffs’ challenge is based upon an assertion that a state Medicaid regulation is invalid under federal law, the Tennessee Department of Health was the agency with subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223 of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Paul Dennis Reid and Christopher Davis
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Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Pike
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Knox | Supreme Court |
