Employee Patrece Edwards-Bradford filed a petition for benefit determination seeking permanent disability benefits for an alleged back injury. The Court of Workers' Compensation Claims denied Employee's claim, finding that she had not rebutted the presumption of correctness afforded to the causation and impairment opinions of her authorized treating physicians, and was therefore not entitled to permanent disability benefits. Employee has appealed, and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for consideration and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm.

Tony R. Hearon ("Employee') allegedly developed an occupational disease during the
course and scope of his employment with the State of Tennessee ("Employer"). Employee
gave notice of his injury to Employer but his claim was denied. The denial letter advised
Employee that he must file a petition for benefit determination within ninety days or risk
dismissal of his claim. Employee filed his petition several months after the expiration of
the ninety-day period. Upon receiving a dispute certification notice dismissing his claim,
Employee filed a workers' compensation complaint in the Claims Commission, which is
the agency responsible for handling disputed claims of state workers. Employer moved for
summary judgment, asserting Employee failed to meet the ninety-day statutory deadline.
The Commissioner granted summary judgment concluding that Employee failed to timely
file his petition for benefit determination and therefore failed to exhaust the benefit review
process as required by statute. Employee appealed. The appeal was referred to the Special
Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel ("Panel") for a hearing and a report of findings of
fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the
judgment of the Commissioner.

Kathryn Wilburn fractured her pelvis during the course and scope of her employment with
Food Lion, Inc. Wilburn and Food Lion entered into a settlement agreement that obligated
Food Lion to provide for future medical treatment related to Wilburn's fractured pelvis.
More than a decade later, Food Lion filed a petition to determine whether Wilburn's
ongoing treatment for pain was causally related to that injury. After considering the report
and testimony of the physician who conducted an independent medical examination
("IME") at Food Lion's request and the C-32 form of Wilburn's authorized treating
physician, the trial court denied the petition. It also denied Wilburn's request for attorney's
fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(b)(2). The appeal has been
referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of
findings of fact and conclusions of law under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm
the judgment of the trial court.

Employee Dianne Moore experienced bilateral numbness, weakness, and tingling from her mid-chest down after performing a work-related task as a truck driver for Employer Beacon Transport, LLC. Following initial treatment in a local emergency room in Ardmore, Oklahoma, Employee was seen by Oklahoma City neurosurgeon Dr. Joseph Cox. Dr. Cox diagnosed Employee with an incomplete spinal cord injury in the form of a spinal cord contusion or lesion, which he opined resulted from her work-related activity. Employee was subsequently seen by panel physician, Nashville, Tennessee neurologist Dr. W. Garrison Strickland. Dr. Strickland diagnosed Employee with a thoracic spinal cord lesion caused by transverse myelitis, a condition which was not work-related. Employee additionally was seen by Nashville, Tennessee neurologist Dr. Darian Reddick, who similarly diagnosed Employee with idiopathic transverse myelitis syndrome-myelitis of unknown origin—a condition which was not work-related. Employee self-referred to Goodlettsville, Tennessee neurologist Dr. James Anderson, who indicated that Employee suffered a work-related back injury with effect on the spinal cord caused by back strain with transient give-way of structural elements traumatizing the spinal cord. The Court of Workers' Compensation Claims denied Employee's claim for benefits, and the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board affirmed. Employee has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in accrediting the causation opinions of Dr. Strickland and Dr. Reddick, over the opinions of Dr. Cox and Dr. Anderson and concluding that she had failed to establish her condition was work-related. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm.

This appeal arises from an award of attorneys’ fees.  At issue is whether the trial court, when determining an award of fees in a workers’ compensation death case, must consider the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees or whether the trial court must deem the fees reasonable if the fees do not exceed twenty percent of the award. Employer also takes issue with a lump sum award of attorneys’ fees.  We affirm the trial court’s award of $46,457.10 in lump sum.

Employee Frederick Russell was working for Employer Aluma-Forrn, Inc. in January 2018 when he sustained an injury to his left shoulder and neck. He reported the injury and received treatment from an orthopedic specialist whose conservative approach to his case included an MRI, an EMG, physical therapy, and referrals to a neurosurgeon and a pain management specialist. Though Employee reported continued pain despite these efforts, his medical providers opined that they could find no objective basis for his reported syrnptoms and believed them unrelated to his work injury. Employee later sought treatment from a different, unauthorized orthopedic specialist who performed surgeiy on his shoulder and thereby discovered and repaired a previously undiagnosed torn labrum. Employee sought compensation, and after considering the proof, the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims held that Employee had established that his injury was caused by his workplace incident, that Ernployer was liable for his medical expenses including those incurred for unauthorized treatrnent, and that Employee was entitled to both permanent partial disability benefits and temporary total disability benefits. Employer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred on all three issues. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for consideration and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

This appeal involves an employer's appeal of an order to compel medical treatment. The employer argues the trial court erred by ordering it to provide the employee specific continuing treatment, as well as treatments requested by all of her approved treating physicians in the future, without evidence that the continuing and future treatments are reasonably necessary and causally related to her work injury. The employer's appeal has been referred to this Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Suprerne Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court's order compelling the requested medical treatment, but modify the order to omit predetermined approval of future medical treatments, and affirm as modified.

Employee sustained a back injury during his employment with Employer. Employee subsequently resigned from his employment as a result of the injury and filed a workers’ compensation claim. The trial court determined the injury was compensable as an aggravation of pre-existing back problems and awarded benefits. Employer has appealed, asserting the trial court erred in finding the injury was compensable; in adopting the impairment rating assigned by the authorized treating physician; and in applying a four multiplier. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a motion filed by Brian Coblentz (“Employee”) to compel Stanley Black & Decker, Inc. (“Employer”) to provide medical treatment under the terms of a consent order previously entered by the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Employee’s motion. Employee has appealed, and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

Bethany Shelton (“Employee”) filed a petition for benefit determination against Hobbs Enterprises, LLC (“Employer”) alleging an injury to her right shoulder suffered in a work- related accident on August 26, 2017. She sought temporary total, permanent partial, and continued medical benefits. Following the issuance of a dispute certification notice, Employer moved for summary judgment on the basis the only medical testimony, from the Employee’s treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Sean Kaminsky, was insufficient as a matter of law to establish causation. The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims (the “trial court”) denied the motion and denied Employer’s motion to reconsider. Employer sought an expedited appeal before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, but then sought and was granted a dismissal of that appeal. A trial was held, after which the trial court denied Employee’s claim on the ground she had failed to meet her burden to establish her right shoulder injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment with Employer. Employee filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. She appealed directly to the Supreme Court. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims.

Nicole Bowlin ("Employee") filed a workers' compensation claim against Servall, LLC ("Employer") alleging injuries suffered in a work-related motor vehicle accident. Employer initially denied the claim. After an expedited hearing, the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims ("trial court") ordered Employer to pay Einployee's medical expenses and awarded attorney's fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-226(a)(1). The Workers' Coinpensation Appeals Board ("Appeals Board") vacated the award of attorney's fees as premature and rernanded the case. The parties settled the case as to all issues except for attorney's fees. The trial court approved the settlement agreement but declined to order Employer to pay the attorney's fees authorized by section 50-6-226(a)(1). The Appeals Board affirmed. Employee appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the Appeals Board and adopt its opinion as set forth in the attached Appendix.

Gwendolyn Jumper (“Employee”) filed this action against Kellogg Company (“Employer”), seeking workers’ compensation benefits for an injury to her back. Following a hearing, the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims denied Employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

Employee filed a workers’ compensation claim against Employer alleging mental injury resulting from traumatic work-related experiences that occurred years earlier. Employer denied the claim and moved for summary judgment citing the statute of limitations. The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims denied the motion. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board vacated the order and remanded for the court to consider whether it had subject matter jurisdiction based on Employee’s alleged date of injury. After a second hearing, the court again denied summary judgment, concluding the date of Employee’s mental injury should be determined by the “discovery rule” and the “last day worked” rule. The Appeals Board reversed and remanded for entry of an order of dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Employee appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the Appeals Board and adopt its opinion as set forth in the attached Appendix.

Nesreen Boutros (“Employee”) suffered a work-related injury to her right arm and neck while working for her employer, Amazon.com DEDC, LLC (“Employer”), on April 23, 2015. The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims (the “trial court”) held Employee suffered a compensable injury and was entitled to lifetime medical benefits and temporary total disability (“TTD”) benefits, but suffered no permanent impairment. Employer appealed the award of TTD benefits and additional medical benefits, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (the “Appeals Board”) affirmed. Employer appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for consideration and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. After careful consideration, we affirm the decision of the Appeals Board and adopt its well-reasoned opinion in its entirety as set forth in the attached Appendix.  

Charles Nesbit (“Employee”) worked as a bucket truck driver for Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division (“Employer”). Employee sought workers’ compensation benefits for a gradually occurring injury to his knees. Relevant to the issues on appeal, the trial court found Employee suffered a compensable gradually occurring injury at work, and gave timely notice of his claim. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to this Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We find that Employee did not give timely notice of his claim, and we reverse the judgment.

Charles Hopper filed this workers’ compensation action after suffering a work-related injury to his neck. The trial court found that Mr. Hopper is permanently and totally disabled. Employer concedes that Mr. Hopper suffered a work-related injury but argues that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s judgment as to permanent and total disability. Employer also argues that any award should be limited to 1.5 times the impairment rating. The appeal has been referred to this Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Plaintiff-Appellant John Pearson appeals the decision of the Court of Workers’ Compensation declining to award him benefits for a spinal cord injury allegedly sustained during the course and scope of his employment. The trial court held that Mr. Pearson’s claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and, alternatively, that he had failed to prove that his job installing streetlights was the actual and proximate cause of his injury. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Because we conclude that Mr. Pearson filed his petition more than one year after he discovered his injury, the statute of limitations bars his claim. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits alleging he sustained high-frequency hearing loss during his employment with Employer. Employer disputed both causation and the method used by Employee’s physician’s to ascertain anatomical impairment. After considering the proof, the trial court determined the hearing loss was caused by Employee’s employment and awarded benefits. Employer has appealed, arguing Employee’s hearing loss was not primarily caused by his employment and contending the trial court erred in adopting an anatomical impairment rating method not “used and accepted by the medical community.” The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the chancery court’s causation findings but we reverse the judgment in all other respects.

The employee in this workers’ compensation case appeals the trial court’s ruling that the independent intervening cause principle applies to relieve her former employer of liability for continued benefits under the parties’ settlement of the employee’s prior claim. After the employee’s original compensable injury while working for the defendant employer, the parties settled the claim. The employee was placed on lifting restrictions. The trial court held the employee negligently exceeded those lifting restrictions and this conduct constituted an independent intervening cause that relieved the original employer from liability for continued workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court also held, however, that the employee’s negligent conduct did not result in a new injury. On appeal, we hold that, if the employee’s activity results in only an increase in pain but there is no new injury or aggravation of the original injury, the independent intervening cause principle is not applicable to relieve the original employer of liability. We reverse the trial court’s holding that the independent intervening cause principle relieves the defendant employer of liability for workers’ compensation benefits. We affirm the trial court’s holding that there was not a new injury or an aggravation of the employee’s condition and hold that the employee is entitled to statutory medical benefits, attorney fees, and costs.

An employee sustained severe injuries when she was run over by a public transit bus on her way to work. The employer denied the employee’s workers’ compensation claim, and she filed a complaint with the Tennessee Claims Commission. Both parties filed competing motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the employee was within the course and scope of her employment when the injury occurred. The Claims Commission answered the question in the negative and determined that the case was subject to the “coming and going” rule. Therefore, the Claims Commission granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. Upon our review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the decision of the Claims Commission.

Employee injured his left shoulder during a training session. He was diagnosed with a torn shoulder ligament which required a surgical repair of the left shoulder. Nine months later, Employee’s treating physician performed a posterior capsular release of the left shoulder. When his symptoms failed to improve, Employer authorized follow up care with a different orthopedic surgeon, who performed another surgery to release the bicep tendon that had been previously repaired. Employer was provided with a letter from Employee’s treating physician that Employee’s restrictions had been lifted. Employee was required to take a return to duty test, which he ultimately failed. Subsequently, Employee developed intermittent violent movements of his head and was diagnosed with conversion disorder. At the request of Employee’s counsel, Employee underwent an independent medical examination by a psychiatrist, who concluded that the conversion disorder arose out of Employee’s work injury. However, because the psychiatrist noted issues regarding symptom magnification, he reduced Employee’s psychiatric impairment rating to ten percent. Following a trial, the court awarded benefits for injuries to Employee’s left shoulder and for the psychiatric injury; however, it found that Employee was not permanently and totally disabled. The trial court also declined to apply a multiplier to the impairment rating for the psychiatric injury and award temporary total disability related to that injury. The Employee appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.