Workers' Compensation Opinions

The employee was injured in 2007 and returned to work for his pre-injury employer. The employee’s claim was settled in November 2007 and was subject to the one and one-half times impairment cap set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). In July 2009, the employee was diagnosed with cancer, and he took a medical leave of absence. The employee remained on leave for over one year. The employer’s policy permitted one year of medical leave. When the employee was unable to return to work in July 2010, he was terminated pursuant to that policy. The employee then sought reconsideration of the November 2007 settlement. The trial court found that the employee was not eligible for reconsideration. The employee has appealed, contending that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee injured his lower back on August 22, 2005. The trial court approved a settlement of his workers’ compensation claim in 2008. The order approving the workers’ compensation settlement provided for future authorized medical treatment in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204. In January 2011, the employee’s treating physician recommended a surgical procedure. The employer’s medical utilization review provider determined that the medical necessity of the procedure was not documented, and the employer denied approval for the procedure. The employee appealed the decision to the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“the Department”), and the Department’s medical director did not overturn the utilization review decision. The employee then filed a petition in the trial court, seeking an order requiring the employer to authorize the surgery. The trial court granted the petition but denied the employee’s application for attorney’s fees. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by granting the petition, that the employee failed to exhaust his administrative remedy, and that the petition is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. The employee has appealed from the denial of an award of attorney’s fees. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case without reaching the merits of the appeal.

An employee filed a motion requesting that a former employer be ordered to provide postjudgment medical treatment. After a hearing, the trial court granted the employee’s motion. The former employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in granting the employee’s motion. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The only issue before the trial court was the apportionment of liability between the employer and the Second Injury Fund. The employee had two compensable injuries prior to the injury that rendered her permanently and totally disabled. The trial court found that those injuries had caused 85% permanent partial disability. Based on that finding, it held the employer liable for 15% of the award and the Second Injury Fund liable for 85% of the award. We find that the trial court incorrectly applied Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6208(a)(1)(2008), and modify the award accordingly.
 

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee suffered a fractured wrist as a result of  workplace accident. He contended that he also sustained a neck injury and post-traumatic tress disorder from the accident. The trial court awarded benefits for the wrist injury only, and the employee has appealed. We affirm the judgment.

An employee alleged that he sustained a work-related injury to his elbow and that his work aggravated his pre-existing carpal tunnel syndrome. His employer denied the claims, asserting that the employee’s elbow problem was related to a prior injury and that his carpal tunnel syndrome was not caused or worsened by his work. The trial court awarded benefits for both injuries. The employer appealed, contending that the trial court erred in finding that the employee sustained a compensable injury to his elbow. The employer also contends that the trial court erred in finding that the employee’s carpal tunnel syndrome was compensable and that the employee gave proper notice of the carpal tunnel injury. The employer also appeals the trial court’s finding that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work, the award of temporary total disability benefits, and the amount of the award to the employee. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur fully in the majority’s conclusions on all issues except for the notice of the aggravation or advancement of the carpel tunnel syndrome claim, and it is on that issue that I must respectfully dissent. On the issue of notice the trial court found that “Notice was available to Delta not only through its pre-employment physical, but through its own doctor's records, particularly Dr. Pearce who performed CT surgery on Noles. No prejudice was shown to Delta by any delay in notice.” I fully agree with the majority’s conclusions that Delta did not receive proper notice from the preemployment physical and Dr. Pearce’s medical records. The majority correctly states that Mr. Noles testified that he informed Delta’s plant nurse that he had numbness in his left hand and right thumb at the time he reported his elbow injury and that Delta did not produce the plant nurse to testify at trial. The majority then states that Mr. Noles’ testimony on that point was unrefuted at trial. Since the trial court had resolved some conflicts in evidence in favor of Mr. Noles, the majority infers that the trial court accredited Mr. Noles’ testimony on the notice issue as well. Based upon this inference the majority concludes that Delta received notice of the advancement of the carpel tunnel injury by way of Mr. Noles’ conversation with Delta’s plant nurse.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tenn.Sup.Ct. R. 51. The employee filed a complaint in the ChanceryCourt forCoffee Countyseeking workers’compensation benefits forhis lossofhearing. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the employee’s hearing loss was caused by his exposure to noise at the workplace. Accordingly, the trial court awarded the employee $68,759.73 in permanent partial disability benefits after concluding that the employee had a vocational disability of 78% to his hearing. The court also awarded the employee his reasonable and necessary medical expensesand discretionary costs. The employer raises two issues on this appeal: (1) whether the employee gave timely notice of his alleged injury; and (2) whether the employee failed to prove that his hearing loss was work-related. We hold that the trial court did not err in finding that the employee gave timely notice and that the employee proved his hearing loss was work-related. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee has appealed the trial court’s denial of benefits for injuries to his right shoulder purportedly caused by a fall at work. The trial court denied the claim based on a finding that the employee’s testimony was not credible and that he failed to establish that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. The employee has also challenged the trial court’s award of $3,245.25 in discretionary costs to the employer. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee was injured on the job and was able to return to his pre-injury position. His initial workers’ compensation claim was settled after a benefit review conference. As a part of his settlement he retained a right of reconsideration pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1) (2008). Subsequently,he lost his employment. After an impasse at the benefit review conference, his employer filed this action to reconsider the employee’s benefits in the county where the injury occurred. The employee then filed a similar suit in the county of his residence. The employee filed a motion to dismiss the employer’s action, contending that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(B)(iv) does not permit an employer to file a reconsideration action. The employer contended that the statute did permit filing of a reconsideration action by an employer or in the alternative, the statute was unconstitutional. The trial court in the employer’s case granted the motion to dismiss and found the statute constitutional. The employer has appealed. We affirm the judgment.
 

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee sustained a compensable back injury for which he was prescribed medication. Approximately five weeks after his injury, the employee died from gastrointestinal bleeding. His widow sought workers’ compensation benefits, claiming that his death was compensable because it was caused by the medication he was prescribed for his work injury. The employer denied her claim, contending that the employee’s death was not caused by the medication, but was instead the result of esophageal varices caused by alcoholism and cirrhosis of the liver. The trial court held that the widow did not sustain her burden of proof, and she appeals. We affirm.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee contended that he struck his head against the casing of a conveyor belt, causing permanent and total disability due to a resulting cervical strain and mental injury. His employer denied that he sustained any permanent disability as a result of the incident. The trial court awarded 95% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment.

The employee had degenerative disk disease for a number of years prior to April 2009, when she reported to her employer that she was experiencing significantly increased neck pain and symptoms, and she sought treatment. The employer denied the employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court credited the testimony of the employee and of one of the treating physicians and awarded the employee 28.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer appeals, asserting that the employee’s injury was not caused by her employment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee sustained injuries to his right hip, knee, and ankle as a result of a fall while employed as a truck driver. Although he received medical treatment and briefly returned to work, the employee continued to have pain and eventually required knee surgery. After the employee recovered from the surgery, the employer was unable to return him to work. The treating physician assigned a permanent partial impairment of 2% to the right lower extremity. The employee’s evaluating physician assigned a 13% impairment rating. The trial court awarded 45.5% permanent partial disability to the right leg. The employer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by utilizing the evaluating physician’s impairment rating and that the award of benefits is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury in October 2005 and that she was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the injury. It also found that the employee’s hospitalization in November and December 2009 was related to her work injury and ordered her employer to pay associated medical expenses. On appeal, her employer contends that the trial court erred by finding that the employee was permanently and totally disabled and that the 2009 medical expenses were related to her work injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An employee sustained a compensable injury to her hand and elbow. Employee’s authorized treating physician assigned an impairment rating of 1% to both her right and left arms. The employee’s evaluating physician assigned 16% impairment to her right arm and 15% to her left arm. Due to the disparity between the physician’s ratings, the parties selected a  physician from the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) who assigned 5% impairment to each of the employee’s arms. The trial court based its award of disability benefits on the MIR physician’s rating. The employee has appealed, contending that she successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of correctness given to the MIR physician’s rating. We affirm the trial court’s ruling.

The employee fell at work. He was then diagnosed to have a brain hemorrhage. The evidence showed that the fall occurred in an open area, that it was unlikely that the employee either slipped or tripped, and that he struck his head on the floor but not upon any objects. Employee had no recollection of the fall. The employer denied the employee’s workers’ compensation claim, asserting that the fall did not arise from his employment. The trial court found that the employee did not sustain his burden of proof as to causation. Employee has appealed, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

In this workers’ compensation suit, the employee, a truck driver, alleged that he sustained a compensable injury to his back. His employer denied that an injury occurred and further contended that, if an injury did occur, it did not arise from or in the course of his employment. The trial court held that the injury was the result of the employee’s attempted assault on a co-employee and, therefore, did not arise from his employment. The complaint was dismissed, and the employee has appealed, arguing that the trial court’s finding was in error. We affirm the judgment.
 

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the employee alleged that he was working as a carpenter for the defendant, Wayne Neeley, when he fell from the roof of a house and seriously injured his right ankle. Neeley denied that he was the employer and also denied that he was a subcontractor for the defendant, B & L Construction, the general contractor. The trial court held that the employee was employed by Neeley and that Neeley was a subcontractor of B & L Construction. Because Neeley did not have workers’ compensation insurance, the trial court found B & L Construction liable for workers’ compensations benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-113 and awarded both temporary total disability benefits and accrued medical expenses, but nothing else. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court erred by failing to award permanent disability benefits and future medical benefits. In response, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by awarding temporary disability benefits. We hold that the trial court properly awarded temporary total benefits, but erred by failing to award permanent disability benefits and future medical benefits to the employee. The judgment is reversed in part and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

The employee, an undercover drug investigator for the City of Savannah, alleged that he sustained a heart attack as a result of a physical confrontation with a suspect on March 2, 2005, during which he experienced tightness in his chest and shortness of breath. He experienced pressure in his chest and low energy but continued to work the following two days. On March 5, while engaged in activities unrelated to his job, he experienced nausea, profuse sweating, and severe pain in his chest, jaw, and left arm. His wife took him to a hospital emergency room where he was treated for an acute myocardial infarction. At trial, one of his treating physicians testified that the heart attack began on March 2 and continued until March 5. A second treating physician and an evaluating physician testified that the March 2 incident did not cause the March 5 heart attack. The trial court found that the heart attack began on March 2, and the employer appealed. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that the statutory presumption had not been overcome, erred in concluding that employee’s heart attack began on March 2, 2005, and erred by finding that employee’s heart attack was causally related to his employment. Although we agree that the trial court erred in its application of the statutory presumption, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The employee, a registered nurse, injured her neck and lower back when she slipped and fell in a pool of water. She had surgical fusions of the cervical and lumbar spine. She continued to have serious symptoms for which she received numerous medications. Her treating physician testified that she was incapable of performing any nursing functions, including those that required only sedentary work. The trial court found her to be permanently and totally disabled. Her employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding on disability and that the employee should be held to have been offered a meaningful return to work. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant insurance company asserts on appeal that the employee failed to prove that his spinal infection was causally related to any work-place injury and that he also failed to provide the employer with timely notice of his injury. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the expert medical proof establishes causation and that the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the employee gave timely notice of his injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, a sheriff’s deputy, alleged that he sustained a mental injury as a result of a confrontation that occurred while he was serving an eviction warrant. His employer denied the claim and filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the injury was not compensable because the alleged precipitating event was not unusual or abnormal for a deputy. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court erred by concluding that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the incident in question was sufficiently extraordinary or unusual to support a mental injury claim. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the injury qualified as extraordinary and unusual or was merely the result of stress ordinarily experienced in the line of duty, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for trial.

An employee was exposed to smoke as a result of a fire at his workplace. Testing revealed the presence of bullous emphysema, a dangerous condition caused by cigarette smoking. Surgery was required to treat that condition. The Claims Commission ruled that the smoke exposure at work had aggravated and advanced his preexisting lung disease and awarded permanent total disability benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s finding of causation. We agree and reverse the judgment.

In this case, the plaintiff, a taxi driver injured in a motor vehicle accident, sought workers’ compensation benefits from the taxi company that he alleged employed him. The trial court held that he was an independent contractor and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm the judgment.