Workers' Compensation Opinions

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008)
for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee suffered a hernia as a result of his work. The trial court awarded 28.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred in basing its award upon the
testimony of Employee’s evaluating physician. We agree, and consequently modify the judgment to 4.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole.

Employee received an award of workers’ compensation benefits for a 1994 injury that
aggravated a pre-existing condition, Legg-Perthes disease. He received medical care for the condition thereafter through workers’ compensation. In 2007, his treating physician recommended hip replacement surgery. The trial court found that the necessity for surgery was not caused by the original injury. Employee has appealed. We affirm the judgment.1

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and  conclusions of law. Employee injured her ankle as a result of a fall. At the time the injury occurred, she was between two portions of a split work shift. She had undertaken a personal errand at a building adjacent to her workplace, and intended to return to an employee break room at her workplace to await the second half of her shift. The fall occurred on property owned by her employer, but the property was leased to an unrelated third party. The trial court held that the injury was compensable. Employer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by finding that the injury arose out of and occurred in the course of the employee’s employment. We agree with Employer, and therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.

 This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee had several compensable work injuries, the last of which was carpal tunnel syndrome. The trial court awarded benefits for permanent total disability (“PTD”). Liability was apportioned 90% to the Second Injury Fund (“The Fund”) and 10% to the employer. The Fund has appealed, contending, inter alia, that Employee’s claims as to it are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We agree, and modify the judgment accordingly.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee alleged that she injured her back and neck as a result of an accident at work. Her authorized treating physician released her with no impairment. Employee’s examining physician assigned 10% impairment. The parties invoked the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) process. The MIR physician assigned to Employee found 0% impairment. The trial court awarded benefits based upon the rating of Employee’s physician. The trial court did not explain how the opinion of Employee’s physician rebutted the MIR physician’s opinion. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred by not accepting the impairment as determined by the MIR doctor. The judgment for permanent partial disability benefits is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for additional proceedings.

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee, Tammie Haake, sustained compensable injuries which required her to have surgery on both wrists. After the first procedure, she was able to return to work, although with modified duties. While she was temporarily disabled from the second surgery, her employer, Saturn Corporation, offered its workers an early retirement incentive program. She accepted the offer, and, as a result, did not return to work. The trial court found that her retirement was reasonably related to her work injuries, and therefore did not apply the “cap” of one and one-half times impairment contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) Employer has appealed from that decision. We affirm the judgment. 1

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found Employee to be permanently and totally disabled as a result of a compensable injury. It apportioned benefits 70% to Employer and 30% to the Second Injury Fund. Employer appealed. Employer and Employee then reached an agreement to compromise Employer’s portion of the claim for a lump sum payment. The appeal was voluntarily dismissed. Employee thereafter filed a motion requesting that the Fund  immediately commence paying its share of the judgment. The trial court granted that
motion. The Fund has appealed, contending that the order violates several provisions of the workers’ compensation law. We agree, reverse the order at issue, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee, who was over sixty years of age at the time of her permanent injury, was not subject to the cap set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A), which limits disability benefits to one and one-half times the medical impairment rating and that she had proved three of the four elements in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242 and could therefore exceed the six-fold medical impairment cap set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(b). The court further found that the employee was not totally and permanently disabled and awarded ninety-eight percent permanent partial disability to both arms, a scheduled injury under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(A)(ii)(w). The trial court also ordered that the entire award of benefits in the amount of $108,587.92 be paid as
a lump sum. The employer contends the trial court erred when it failed to find that the  employee was permanently and totally disabled and when it awarded the benefits to be paid as a lump sum. We affirm the trial court judgement.

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee, Robbie Edwina Elmore, sustained compensable gradual injuries to her neck, shoulders and arms. The trial court made three separate awards, which totaled 122% to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer, Fleetguard, and the Second Injury Fund contend that the trial court erred by failing to make a single award pursuant to the concurrent injury rule, and by finding that she was not permanently and totally disabled. We conclude that the concurrent injury rule is applicable. We therefore modify the judgment to award 65% permanent partial disability, and find it unnecessary to address the remaining argument.1

Frankie Blankenship sought reconsideration of her workers’ compensation award after her employer, Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc., discontinued its operations. The trial court granted a multiplier of 6 times her permanent partial disability rating of 3 percent. In accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008), the appeal by the Employer has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel for findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the trial court specifically accredited the testimony of the Employer and properly addressed each of the factors pertinent to an award upon reconsideration, our scope of review is limited. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee, Barry R. Moore, was a truck driver. He was employed by a small corporation owned by a senior vice president of a large trucking company, Howard Baer, Inc. The smaller company leased his services to the larger one. He suffered a significant on-the-job injury. Mr. Moore obtained a judgment for workers’ compensation benefits against his employer, Ronald Baker, Inc. That corporation did not have workers’ compensation insurance and immediately discharged the debt in bankruptcy. He sought to receive benefits from Howard Baer, Inc., that he had been leased to, arguing that his employer was the “alter ego” of the larger company. The trial court found that the larger company was not liable for benefits, based upon the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-106(1)(A). We reluctantly affirm the judgment.1
 

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee suffered a compensable injury to his lower back, which resulted in two surgical procedures and a 12% anatomical impairment. Subsequently, his treating physician recommended an additional surgical procedure. Employer declined to pay for the procedure, contending that intervening events caused the need for surgery. The trial court awarded Employee 18% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The trial court also found that the additional procedure was related to the original work injury, and ordered Employer to pay for it. On appeal, Employer contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s ruling. We disagree, and affirm the judgment.

The employee, Reginald G. Peck, sought benefits for an alleged work-related injury to his lower back. The trial court found for the employer, Hochman Family Partners, L.P., and dismissed the complaint. Mr. Peck has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by entering judgment for the employer, and by denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment. 1 We affirm the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and  conclusions of law. The Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder during the construction of the Defendant’s auto wash. The trial court held that the Plaintiff was a casual employee of the Defendant, and therefore not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. It further held that the Defendant was not subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act because it did not have the required number of employees and because it was not in the construction business. On appeal, the Plaintiff contends that these findings were erroneous. We disagree, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee complied with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201(a) (Supp. 2003). It further found that she had sustained a compensable injury to her lower back and awarded 30% permanent partial disability. The employer has appealed, contending that the claim is barred by failure to provide timely notice and that the evidence preponderates against the finding of causation. We affirm the judgment.

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue raised on appeal is whether the Employee, who suffered a neck, arm and shoulder injury in the course and scope of her employment, made a meaningful return to work after her injury. The trial court ruled that the Employee did not make a meaningful return to work, and that, therefore, the cap on benefits of one and one-half times the impairment rating provided for in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1) did not apply. The trial court applied a multiplier of four times the impairment rating. The Employer appealed. We agree with the trial court that the Employee did not have a meaningful return to work, and thus the benefits cap does not apply. Moreover, the multiplier of four times the impairment rating was not excessive. We affirm the judgment.

Employee alleged that he sustained a gradual injury to his lower back as a result of his work as a route salesman for a soft drink company. He was treated by several doctors, to whom he gave differing histories concerning how his injury occurred. The trial court found that he had sustained a compensable injury and awarded 70% permanent partial disability apportioned between Employer and the Second Injury Fund. Employer appeals, contending the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment.1

Employee injured his neck in the course of his employment. While he was receiving treatment for that injury, his doctors discovered that he had a serious spinal condition. The treating doctors testified that this condition was unrelated to his work injury. After receiving treatment, Employee returned to work at his previous job. Several months later, his position was eliminated. He declined an offer of alternate employment. The trial court found that he did not have a meaningful return to work and awarded 65% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred by adopting the impairment rating of an evaluating physician and by finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work. We agree and modify the judgment accordingly.1

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee, Kyle McDonnell, was assigned to work at a job site in Kentucky. His employer, Continental Machinery Movers, paid for food and lodging. While waiting in a truck for his co-workers to return from breakfast, he suffered an apparent seizure. Subsequently, his shoulder was painful and he sought and received medical care at a local emergency room. An evaluating physician testified that the seizure had caused a dislocation of his shoulder joint. Mr. McDonnell sought workers’ compensation benefits, but the employer denied liability. The trial court found that Mr. McDonnell was a “traveling employee,” and that the injury was compensable. Continental Machinery Movers has appealed.1 We conclude that the injury did not arise from the employment and, therefore, reverse the trial court’s decision.

The employee filed a workers' compensation complaint against his employer for hearing loss and tinnitus, injuries which he claimed had occurred gradually over his nearly four years of working as a truck driver. Shortly before trial, the employee voluntarily dismissed his tinnitus claim but proceeded with his hearing loss claim. The trial court awarded the employee compensation for permanent partial hearing loss and the Employer appealed. Upon referral, the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, sitting in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3), affirms.

 This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee alleged that he developed carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of his work for Employer. Employer denied the claim. At trial, an evaluating physician opined that the condition was work-related but admitted that he had no specific knowledge of the tasks performed by Employee in the course of his job. Employer sought to exclude the testimony of the physician, contending that it was based upon speculation. The trial court admitted the testimony, found the condition to be compensable, and awarded benefits. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred by admitting the physician’s testimony, that the evidence preponderates against the judgment, and by not applying the missing witness rule as to the treating physician, who did not testify. Further, Liberty Mutual contends that there is no evidence in the record that it was Employer’s insurer at the time of this injury. We dismiss the complaint against Liberty Mutual and otherwise affirm the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee alleged that he sustained a hernia in the course of and arising from his employment. Employer denied liability. After a trial on the merits, the trial court ruled in favor of Employer. Employee has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. Because Employee has not filed a transcript or statement of the evidence, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding and affirm the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeal Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that Employee suffered a compensable work-related injury and that Employee’s workers’ compensation claim was not barred by the oneyear statute of limitations. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this action for workers’ compensation benefits, the deceased spouse of William W. Brown, Jr., died of lung cancer. He contended that her cancer was caused by exposure to chemicals in the workplace. The employer, Erachem Comilog, Inc., contended that the cancer was caused by cigarette smoking. The trial court found for Erachem. Husband has appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s ruling.1 We affirm the judgment.