Workers' Compensation Opinions

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008)
for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. It involves the efforts of a retired employee of an automobile manufacturer to obtain workers’ compensation benefits for an injury to his right shoulder that was diagnosed after his retirement and also to obtain reconsideration of an earlier award of workers’ compensation benefits for a work-related injury to his left shoulder. Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court for Williamson County concluded that the retired employee had sustained a compensable injury to his right shoulder and awarded him benefits based on a thirty-two percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The trial court also determined that the employee was ineligible for reconsideration of the award for the injury to his left shoulder. On this appeal, the employer takes issue with the award for the injury to the employee’s right shoulder, and the employee takes issue with the trial court’s refusal to reconsider the award of benefits for the injury to his left shoulder. We have determined that the trial court properly declined to reconsider the award for the injury to the employee’s left shoulder. We have also determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s conclusion that the injury to the employee’s right shoulder was work-related. However, we have determined that the trial court erred by failing to limit the award of benefits for the injury to the right shoulder to the cap in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008).

Employee sought workers’ compensation benefits and medical expenses for a shoulder injury he
allegedly suffered while working for Employer. The trial court bifurcated the trial with regard to (1)
whether the injury was compensable, and (2) if so, the extent of compensation benefits to which
Employee is entitled. At the close of Employee’s proof as to compensability, the trial court
dismissed Employee’s claim, finding that the issue of causation was not established. Employee has appealed this judgment. Employee contends that the evidence does not support the trial court’s ruling that he had failed to sustain his burden of proof as to compensability. We reverse the judgment dismissing the claim and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.1

The employee sought workers' compensation for a knee injury suffered in a fall. While acknowledging compensability for the claim, the employer sought to cap the award at 1.5 times the disability rating. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008). The trial court held that the employee was terminated due to her injury rather than her misconduct but applied the 1.5 cap on the award. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's factual findings, but its application of the cap was in error. The judgment of the trial court is reversed in part and the cause is remanded.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the trial court found that the employee suffered a 70% vocational disability to the body as a whole as the result of an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Since the employee was over sixty at the time of the injury, the trial court limited his award to 260 weeks pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(4)(A)(I). The trial court concluded that the employer’s liability was likewise capped at 260 weeks, and, since the employer had already paid 152 weeks of compensation to the employee for previous injuries, the court allocated 108 weeks of the 260-week award to the employer, and the remaining 152 weeks to the Second Injury Fund. The Second Injury Fund appeals, arguing that the employer’s liability is not capped at 260 weeks, but rather remains 400 weeks. We hold that the trial court erred in capping the employer’s liability at 260 weeks, rather than 400 weeks. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this issue for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, James Bumpus, appeals the trial court’s ruling that his sternal non-union following open-heart surgery was a noncompensable injury because it was caused by over fifty years of heavy smoking and a chronic cough rather than work-related activities. Mr. Bumpus also appeals the trial court’s ruling that work-related activities did not cause an actual advancement or progression of his pre-existing condition. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s ruling, and affirm the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case employer appeals the trial court’s findings that the employee’s injury arose out of employment, that the employee did not make a meaningful return to work, and that the employee met at least three of the four criteria set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242(b) by clear and convincing evidence and thus was not subject to the six times cap. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the employee’s injury arose out of her employment. However, we reverse the finding of the trial court with regards to the employee’s meaningful return to work. Our conclusion that employee made a meaningful return to work therefore precludes consideration of the issue of whether the six times cap applies.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee, Glenda Overton, 80% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and temporary partial disability benefits in a stipulated amount. It also awarded a 25% lack of good faith penalty on the temporary disability for non-payment. The employer, Regis Corporation, has appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in finding that Ms. Overton sustained a permanent injury or, in the alternative, that the amount of the award is excessive. Regis also contends that the trial court erred in assessing the penalty for non-payment of the temporary disability benefits. We affirm the award of permanent disability and reverse the assessment of the penalty for non-payment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the trial court ruled that the employee, Ms. Rene Burns, sustained a 49% permanent partial disability to the hand. The employer asserts that the trial court erred because it considered Ms. Burns’ disfigurement and alleged fear of equipment as part of the vocational disability award. Consequently, the employer contends that the trial court’s award was excessive. We agree and modify the award to 35% permanent partial disability.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Edith Staggs, brought this action, claiming that she fell, injuring her hip, as a result of a slippery floor while working at Hardee's. Her employer's insurance company, Travelers Indemnity Co., claims that she fell as a result of a seizure. The trial court awarded benefits to Ms. Staggs, and found her to be a credible witness. Travelers Indemnity Co. appeals, arguing that the trial court ruled incorrectly when it determined that Ms. Staggs was a credible witness and that she sustained a compensable injury.  We affirm the trial court's judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that Employee’s expert and lay testimony established that his injuries arose out of and in the scope of his employment. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee alleged that he sustained an aggravation of pre-existing pulmonary disease as a result of exposure to a chemical in the workplace. The trial court awarded benefits. On appeal the employer contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s decision. We affirm the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, John W. Krantz, III, sustained a compensable back injury. His authorized physician placed restrictions upon his activities. The employer, Nissan North America, Inc., had a pre-existing written policy requiring adherence to medical restrictions at all times, including while away from the workplace. Mr. Krantz violated the restrictions in question by engaging in competitive horsemanship, and was terminated as a result. The trial court found that he did not have a meaningful return to work and awarded permanent disability benefits in excess of 1.5 times the anatomical impairment. Nissan has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that Mr. Krantz did not have a meaningful return to work. We agree, and modify the judgment accordingly.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sustained a compensable injury. He subsequently developed a condition known as “winging” of the scapula.  Two treating doctors testified that the AMA Guides did not provide for assigning impairment for this condition. An evaluating physician agreed that the AMA Guides did not cover the condition, but assigned 10% permanent impairment to the body as a whole, based upon his experience and judgment. The trial court awarded 15% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole.  Employer has appealed, contending the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This is a suit to recover workers’ compensation death benefits. Employer denied that Decedent’s cardiac arrest was caused by his employment. The trial court found the death to be work-related, and awarded benefits to the survivors. On appeal, Employer contends that the evidence preponderates against that finding.  We disagree, and affirm the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court determined that: (1) under Building Materials Corp. v. Britt, Employee’s date of injury was his last day worked before having shoulder surgery, December 15, 2005; (2) Employee’s meaningful return to work was not frustrated by a plant-wide lay-off; and (3) Employee’s permanent partial disability award should be capped at 1.5 times the medical impairment rating. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Velma Lynn Saunders Manuel, was injured in an automobile accident which occurred as she was returning to her home from receiving medical treatment for a compensable work injury. She sought benefits for the additional injury. Her employer, Davidson Transit Organization, denied the claim.  The trial court ruled that the additional injury arose from and in the course of the employment, and awarded 28% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred by finding the injury to be compensable. We affirm the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  In a previous appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed an order requiring the employer to reimburse a third-party insurer for payments made for medical care. The judgment was paid. The insurer sought post-judgment interest on the amount, and the trial court awarded that interest. The employer has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by awarding post-judgment interest for medical expenses. We agree and reverse the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome, which was accepted as compensable by Employer. The trial court found that Employee had sustained no vocational disability as a result of the condition, and therefore awarded 2% permanent partial disability to the arm, which was the anatomical impairment assigned by two of the three doctors to testify. The trial court also ordered that Employer was no longer required to provide medical treatment for the condition. On appeal, Employee contends that the award of permanent disability benefits is inadequate, and that the trial court erred by terminating future medical benefits. We affirm the disability award, but modify the closure of medical benefits.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court erred in three ways: (1) by finding that she did not carry her burden of proof with respect to causation; (2) by finding, in the alternative, that she retains only a ten percent permanent partial disability; and (3) by allowing the employer to admit extrinsic evidence of specific conduct in an attempt to attack the credibility of her expert medical witness. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The employee, Juanita Kirk, sustained a compensable injury and her claim was settled. The settlement was approved by the trial court based upon an affidavit executed by the employee.  Several months later, Ms. Kirk filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to set aside the settlement on the basis of fraud, that it was approved without Ms. Kirk having personally appeared before the court, and that it did not afford to Ms. Kirk substantially the benefits to which she was entitled. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Ms. Kirk had not sustained her burden with regard to the issue of fraud and denied the motion. She has appealed from that order. Although we agree that the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion on the issue of fraud, we find that there were “other reason[s] justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Tenn. R. Civ. Proc. 60.02(5). We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for additional proceedings.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee was struck on the back by a heavy bundle of paper. Her injury was accepted as compensable. She was examined and treated by three authorized doctors, all of whom opined she had no permanent impairment. She sought additional medical treatment, which ultimately led to surgery to repair her sacro-iliac joints. The trial court found that the surgery was related to her work injury, and awarded 50% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole. Employer has appealed, contending that the medical evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. We affirm the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee suffered a compensable injury. The trial court found him to be permanently and totally disabled.  Employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the finding of permanent total disability. We affirm the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome. The injury was accepted as compensable. Before he reached maximum medical improvement, he was terminated as a result of an argument with a co-worker.  He sustained a 5% impairment to each arm as a result of his work injury. The trial court awarded 30% PPD to both arms. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred by finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision, and affirm the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sustained an aggravation of his pre-existing degenerative back condition while rising from his chair during his lunch break on Employer’s premises. The trial court found the injury was compensable and awarded 15% permanent partial disability benefits. Employer has appealed, contending that the injury did not arise from the employment. We affirm the judgment.