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| Christopher v. Sockwell
03S01-9701-CH-00005
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment in this case wherein the deceased was found dead in his truck, having died, according to the Certificate of Death, of "natural causes," not otherwise defined. The appellants conceded that the cause of death of their decedent, Mr. Arons, was unknown, and it was essentially upon this basis that the claim for benefits was denied. The surviving dependents of Mr. Arons appeal and present for review the propriety of summary judgment "when a worker is found dead at his post with no proof of the cause of death." Mr. Arons was 44 years old when he died on November 19, 1993. The appellant is his second wife, to whom he was married in 1973. They had one child, Nichole, who was born in 198. Mr. Arons and his first wife had four children. The family was dysfunctional, with the father being completely estranged from these children for a variety of causes, apparently attributable to drug and alcohol abuse. His second marriage was not idyllic; he abused alcohol to the extent he required hospitalization and, on occasion, his wife sought an order of protection. He was an inveterate cigarette smoker -- forty to sixty per day for 15 years -- and his eating habits were unusual in that he ate only one meal--breakfast--each day, snacking on junk food thereafter. His daughter, Nichole, was injured in a serious traffic accident on October 1, 1993 and his request for time-off from work was granted. He returned to work on November 3, 1993 and was found dead in his truck on November 19, 1993. After he returned to work, the decedent performed his duties without incident. He was not required to load, unload, supervise or do anything except drive. He had not engaged in any strenuous activity and had no altercations. He had made no complaints about illness and had never been treated for cardiovascular disease. 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Sharon J. Bell |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/30/97 | |
| Lambdin v. Old
03S01-9610-CH-00102
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appeal has been perfected by defendants, Old Republic Insurance Company and Kopper-Glo Fuels, Inc., from an award to the plaintiff, Randy Lambdin, of 25% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Defendants seek to overturn the award on several grounds. They contend (1) the injury was not work-related, (2) proper notice of the injury was not rendered, (3) the claim was barred by the one year statute of limitations, and (4) the award of 25% to the whole body is excessive. Plaintiff was 4 years of age and had completed the eighth grade. He testified he was lifting a belt structure off a flat bed truck when he felt pain in his back. He said he reported the incident a day or two later to his supervisor, James Thacker. He also said he told the superintendent, Kore Chedester, about the same time. Plaintiff's brother, Ronald Lambdin, was working with plaintiff and another employee. He also testified Mr. Thacker was told about the incident causing the injury. Sometime after the event, plaintiff saw Dr. Mary Anne Woodring, a family practice physician who had seen plaintiff for prior health problems. He told the trial court he did not think the injury was serious. Dr. Woodring treated him for a muscle strain by giving medication and prescribing therapy. He continued to work and saw her several times through April, 1993. Since he did not get better, he went to see a chiropractor. Later, during October, 1993, he saw Dr. Ronald Dubin, who determined his condition was more serious and that he had a ruptured disc. Dr. Dubin's office notified defendant employer of the plaintiff's compensation claim when the office requested the identification number of the insurance company. Plaintiff testified he was repeatedly told by company representatives his medical expenses would be paid; that they stated there was a dispute between two insurance companies as to which company might be responsible; that David Burton, 2
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Billy Joe White, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/30/97 | |
| Jeanette Wilson v. Tecumseh Products Co.
02S01-9704-CV-00031
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5- 6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Tecumseh Products Company ("defendant") has raised the following issues by this appeal: Did the trial court err (1) in finding that plaintiff's vocational disability arose out of and in the course of her employment, (2) in awarding plaintiff temporary total disability and ordering defendant to pay certain medical expenses, (3) in finding that plaintiff sustained a forty percent permanent partial disability to her right arm and thirty percent permanent partial disability to her left arm, and (4) in charging certain discretionary costs incurred by plaintiff to defendant. We find no error and affirm. Jeanette Wilson ("plaintiff") was an employee of defendant, working on a production line. Her duties involved using a screwdriver to adjust wedges on motors that came down the assembly line. She was required to make adjustments on one side of the motor, turn the motor over and make adjustments on the other side. It is undisputed that these functions required plaintiff to use both of her hands and to lift motors which could weigh up to forty pounds. Plaintiff had no difficulty with her hands and arms prior to coming to work for defendant. She began to experience problems in both arms, specifically her right wrist, in November, 1995. She continued to work until the condition worsened to the point where she felt obliged to see a doctor. Upon notifying the defendant of her condition, defendant provided her with a choice of three physicians who could treat her. Plaintiff chose Dr. John Holancin. Dr. Holancin, after examining plaintiff, placed her on light duty and referred her to Dr. Ronald Bingham for a diagnostic test called an EMG. This test revealed that plaintiff had no median sensory slowing in either wrist, but did have severe median motor conduction slowing across both wrists. He concluded that plaintiff was suffering from severe carpal tunnel syndrome in both hands. Plaintiff continued to work until such time as her hands swelled so much that she was unable to perform her work. In the note that was written by her supervisor to the 2
Authoring Judge: Hewitt P. Tomlin, Jr., Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. C. Creed Mcginley, Judge |
Wilson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/29/97 | |
| Michael A. Smith v. Continental Casualty Co.
02S01-9704-CH-00033
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Following a bench trial, the chancellor below found that there was no proof that plaintiff injured his back during the course and scope of his employment, and further found that plaintiff gave his employer no notice of injury. On appeal plaintiff has raised one issue for our consideration: whether the trial court erred in preventing plaintiff from offering proof as to a specific injury and notice of injury by sustaining an objection to certain testimony of plaintiff. In addition, defendant presents one issue: whether the evidence preponderates against the chancellor's finding that plaintiff did not sustain a work-related injury. We find no error and affirm. Michael A. Smith ("plaintiff") was employed by Kroger Grocery Company from 1978 through March 1994. Specifically, on March 16, 1994, plaintiff worked a nine hour shift and went home. The next morning he awoke with extreme pain in his back. He later went to the emergency room of the hospital in Jackson where he was subsequently diagnosed as having osteoporosis and three or four possible compression fractures of the vertebrae in the thoracic spine. When plaintiff's pain did not clear up, his treating physician referred him to Dr. Genaro Palmieri, who practices a specialty of endocrinology and metabolic bone diseases in Memphis. The subsequent examination of plaintiff by Dr. Palmieri confirmed that he indeed had the disease osteoporosis, in which the bones become extremely porous and more easily subject to fracture. X-rays taken by Dr. Palmieri's radiologists confirmed the fractures at T-4 and T-7, which according to the radiologists were old and were present before 1987. During the course of the trial, plaintiff was asked upon direct examination when a doctor first informed him of a connection between his work at Kroger and his back condition. Defendant's objection on the ground of hearsay was sustained by the chancellor. Subsequently, the chancellor ruled that there was nothing to indicate that plaintiff injured his back during the course and scope of his employment, therefore the injury was not compensable. The chancellor also
Authoring Judge: Hewitt P. Tomlin, Jr., Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Joe C. Morris, Chancellor |
Smith County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/29/97 | |
| Robert Larry Jones v. Magnetek Century Electric, Inc., Etc.
02S01-9706-CH-00055
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, Magnetek Century Electric, Inc., ("defendant") contends that the trial court erred in awarding permanent partial disability benefits on the basis of forty- nine percent (49%) disability to the body as a whole as well as in commuting the award to a lump sum. The panel finds that the award should be modified to one based on twelve and one half percent (12 _%) disability to the body as a whole and that the trial court abused its discretion in making a lump sum award. In May, 1994, Robert Larry Jones ("plaintiff") was working for defendant when a work tool weighing approximately 45 pounds struck plaintiff on the right ankle and cut it. He was taken to the emergency room where the wound was treated and his Achilles tendon was sewn up. As a result of this injury, plaintiff developed a condition known as a Deep Vein Thrombosis in the right leg. This is a blockage of the flow of blood through a deep vein. The emergency room physician referred plaintiff to Dr. Warren Ramer, who treated him from July, 1994 through the time of trial in November, 1996. At the time Dr. Ramer began treating plaintiff, there was edema (for our purposes- swelling) of the lower right leg and ankle. Over the months that followed, plaintiff's condition continued to improve, although his condition at times fluctuated during this period of treatment. In other words, the swelling in plaintiff's leg was more pronounced at some times than it was at others. Plaintiff wore an elastic sock and took medication for the purpose of controlling the swelling in his leg. In October, 1995, at the request of defendant, plaintiff became a patient of Dr. Jessie Davis, a specialist in general vascular surgery in Memphis. Dr. Davis was requested to treat as well as evaluate plaintiff's condition. Dr. Davis' tests revealed a blockage in plaintiff's right leg beginning about three inches below the knee and extending upward about three inches above the knee. Thereafter, both Dr. Davis and Dr. Ramer continued to treat plaintiff jointly and cooperatively, with Dr. Ramer seeing plaintiff about once a month in order to monitor his condition and medication, and Dr. Davis every two or three months to evaluate the status of plaintiff's leg. Dr. Ramer deferred the assignment of any permanent impairment rating to Dr. Davis, the vascular specialist. Dr. Davis last saw plaintiff on April 16, 1996. In Dr. 2
Authoring Judge: Hewitt P. Tomlin, Jr., Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Joe C. Morris, Judge |
Chester County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/29/97 | |
| James Buttrey v. Insurance Co. of The State of Pennsylvania
01S01-9705-CH-00102
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant contends the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment and that the employee failed to give proper notice of his injury. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The claimant is forty-five years old and has an eighth grade education. He was employed in the receiving department of Home Depot, responsible for unloading an average of eighteen or nineteen trailers per day. He was so working on Thursday, April 6, 1995, when six or seven doors fell on his left shoulder and neck. He finished his shift and worked through his pain the next day. By Sunday, he could not move his head from side to side and the pain was so severe that he called the assistant manager of the store. The next day, he went to the company doctor, Barrett Rosen. The doctor told him to take off work and so advised the employer through the employee. On June 18th, he told the store's manager he did not want to file for workers' compensation benefits unless he had to, even though the manager knew he was claiming an injury at work. On the same day, the employee visited Dr. Everett Howell, a neurosurgeon, on the referral of Dr. Rosen. Dr. Howell diagnosed a ruptured cervical disc and testified the injury could have been caused by the accident of April 6th, when the doors fell on the claimant. We find in the record no evidence of another possible cause. The trial judge found the injury to have been one arising out of and in the course of employment and that the claimant had a reasonable excuse for his failure to give the required written notice. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). An injury arises out of and in the course of one's employment when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon a consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury, and occurs in the course of one's employment if it occurs while an employee is performing a duty he was employed to do. Fink v. Caudle, 856 S.W.2d 952 (Tenn. 1993). In a workers' compensation case, a trial judge may properly predicate an award on medical testimony to the effect that a given incident "could be" the cause of a claimant's injury, when, from other evidence, it may reasonably be inferred that the incident was in fact the cause of the injury. McCaleb v. Saturn Corp., 91 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Irvin Kilcrease, |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/25/97 | |
| Jimmy Dayle Shelton, Ii v. The Torrington Co.
01S01-9704-CV-00092
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends the evidence preponderates against any award of benefits for a claimed occupational disease because (1) the claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, (2) the claimant failed to give timely written notice of his claim, (3) the disease did not arise out and in the course of employment, (4) the claimant is not permanently disabled or, if he is, the award of permanent disability benefits is excessive, and (5) the defendant is not the employer for which the claimant was working at the time of the last injurious exposure. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be reversed and the case dismissed. The employee or claimant, Shelton, is thirty-eight years old with a high school diploma, twenty-seven credit hours toward an Associate of Arts degree and a certificate in automotive technology. He worked in the employer's ball bearing manufacturing plant from April 14, 198 until September 28, 199, when he quit because something in the plant made breathing difficult for him. He did not tell anyone at Torrington the reason for his quitting. During his employment at Torrington's ball bearing plant, he held positions in different areas of the plant, including the steel yard, the cast iron department, the screw machine department and the shipping department. He testified that breathing was difficult for him in all those areas. Before becoming employed by Torrington, he worked for other employers and had no breathing problems. In the spring of 1989, there was a fire in the plant. The claimant was exposed to smoke for about five minutes. In the spring of 199, he was briefly exposed to steam from an overheated battery. He first received medical treatment for chest pain and tightness on May 25, 1989 and for shortness of breath on May 22, 199. Two pulmonary specialists, Dr. A. Clyde Heflin and Dr. Alan H. Arrington, testified at the trial by deposition as to the claimant's physical condition. At the time of the trial on October 1, 1996, the claimant was employed by Advance Auto Parts as an assistant manager and had been so employed for almost two years. The trial judge found the claimant first knew he had an occupational disease on September 22, 1993, when Dr. Arrington sent a letter to the claimant's attorney, and that the claimant had a compensable permanent partial disability of thirty-five percent to the body as a whole, which the trial judge commuted to a lump sum judgment of $36,36.2, using the agreed upon compensation rate. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Jim T. Hamilton, |
Giles County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/25/97 | |
| Sharon Abbott v. Saturn Corp.
01S01-9703-CH-00071
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fairly stated the issue raised by the employee or claimant, Abbott, is that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that her permanent disability is not causally connected to her work- related injury. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be reversed. On or about September 1,1993, the claimant,while working for the employer, Saturn, felt a sharp pain in her neck and shoulder while reaching for boxes of parts. She continued to work off and on with pain until November of 1994, when she became disabled to work and was referred by the employer to a Dr. Tom Bartsokas, a family and sports medicine practitioner. The doctor made a preliminary diagnosis of cervical disc disease with myelopathy and myofascial pain syndrome. He excused her from work for one week and ordered a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan. He also prescribed physical therapy. The MRI scan revealed areas of disc bulging in the midline at three levels, particularly C4-C5, C5-C6 and C6-C7 with degenerative disc narrowing from C4 down to C7. In his deposition, Dr. Bartsokas opined the claimant was permanently impaired and gave the following testimony concerning causation: Q. All right. Sir, do you have an opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as to what was the cause, then, of this permanent impairment that she has? A. My personal opinion is that, number one, she has cervical disc degeneration. It's a form of disc disease compounded by osteoarthritis, spurring of the spine, and particularly at the level where she had her disc degeneration. And this condition that she was born with the proclivity to manifest was aggravated by the work she performed. In July of 1995, the claimant was referred to Dr. Noel Tulipan, a neurosurgeon, who also found her to be permanently impaired and, by deposition, gave the following testimony: Q. So you said earlier that the patient attributed her condition to her work. My question is to you, do you attribute her condition, the condition that you've described and that you found in her neck, to her work? 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. William B. Cain, |
Maury County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/25/97 | |
| Christopher v. Sockwell
01S01-9703-CH-00067
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends the employee's injury did not arise out of her employment. The employee contends the award is inadequate. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Before she began working for the employer, Printing Industry Association of the South, the employee or claimant, Vance, worked as a nurse technician for Baptist Hospital in Nashville until she suffered a back injury for which she received a workers' compensation award based on fifty percent to the body as a whole. She began working for the present employer on May 23, 1995, doing bindery work requiring repetitive use of the hands. On September 1, 1995, while attempting to lift a carton of tapes, she felt a sudden pain in her shoulder and neck, but finished her shift. She sought medical care the next day when the pain worsened and her hands swelled. She was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome which was surgically treated. The operating surgeon did not testify, but a report from him reflected that he advised the claimant she would never completely recover from the condition. Two examining physicians confirmed the injury was causally connected to the accident of September 1, 1995 at work. One of them assessed her permanent medical impairment at ten percent to both arms. The chancellor found the claimant's injury compensable and awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on twenty-eight percent to both arms. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 225(e)(2). An accidental injury arises out of one's employment when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon a consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Fink v. Caudle, 856 S.W.2d 952 (Tenn. 1993). The evidence fails to preponderate against the chancellor's finding that the claimant's injury was one arising out of her employment with the defendant. Once the causation and permanency of an injury have been established by expert testimony, the trial judge may consider many pertinent 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Carol Mccoy, |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/25/97 | |
| Andrea Nichols v. Square D Company
01S01-9611-CH-00226
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court's award of 65% permanent partial disability to the p laintiff's left ha nd is exces sive. The p anel conc ludes that it is and reduces it to 5%. While working in an assembly line job in August 1994,, the plaintiff developed a repetitive motion injury to her left hand. She is right handed. The initial conservative medic al treatm ent con sisted of restrictin g the rep etitive us e of the plaintiff 's left ha nd. She tried on e job, but said she could n't do it, then w as given a jo b she cou ld perform with only one hand. She said s he couldn't do that, either. The employer informed the plaintiff that no more jobs were available for her that day, but mad e an appo intment fo r her to see an orthoped ic surgeon . The first av ailable appointm ent was f airly far in the futu re, so the em ployer told the p laintiff that it w ould attempt to accommodate her restriction until the appointment. The plaintiff responded by quitting her job . She ne ver retu rned to work for the e mployer . And s he has n ot soug ht any oth er emp loyment. Dr. Howard Miller performed outpatient surgery on the plaintiff in January 1995 and released her to light duty work shortly thereafter. He released her to return to her former job at the end of February. The doctor reported in June 1995 that the plaintiff had full motion in her wrist a nd digits and that she w as largely asympto matic. Dr. M iller did not give the plaintiff any permanent restrictions and did not give her any permanent impairm ent. The plaintiff's attorney sent her to see another doctor, Earl Jeffres, in September 1995. He assessed a 22% permanent partial impairment to the plaintiff's left hand. He acknowledged that the plaintiff's complaints of pain exceeded his objective findings. The plaintiff's complaints of pain in her left hand and the probability that she should av oid repetitive u se of it does limit her emp loyability. But she is ce rtainly employable. She completed two years of business school and worked as assistant mana ger at a r estaura nt for a n umbe r of years . Given the treating physician's finding of no permanent impairment, the other physician's finding of 22% impairment to the non -dominant hand , and the plaintiff's acknowledged refusal to even attempt to find any other work, the panel concludes that the award of 65% to the left hand is excessive and reduces it to 5%. Costs are taxed to the - 2 -
Authoring Judge: Robe R T S. Br Andt , Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Jim T. Hamilton, |
Giles County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/24/97 | |
| Allen Booher v. City of Bristol
03S01-CH-00017
Authoring Judge: Don T. Mcmurray, Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. R. Jerry Beck |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/19/97 | |
| Carden v. Modine
03S01-9701-CV-00013
Authoring Judge: Don T. Mcmurray, Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/19/97 | |
| Hicks v. Brown
03S01-9702-CV-00016
Authoring Judge: Don T. Mcmurray, Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/19/97 | |
| Joseph Craig v. Murray Guard, Inc., et al.
01S01-9612-CH-00251
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer and its insurer contend the injury did not arise out of the employment and that the award of permanent partial benefits is excessive. The employee contends the award is inadequate. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Joseph Craig, was sixty-eight years old at the time of the injury. He has a college degree in engineering but has never been employed in that field. On March 12, 1995, while working as a security guard for Murray, he slipped and fell to a linoleum floor, fracturing his left hip. The employer's contention is that the injury is not compensable because the proof does not establish that there was any slippery substance on the floor. The injured hip was surgically repaired by Dr. Daniel Phillips, who assigned no permanent impairment or limitations. Another orthopedic surgeon, Dr. John McInnis, examined the claimant and opined he would retain a permanent impairment of five percent to the whole body and advised that the claimant limit his activities to minimal squatting and walking and not more than two or three hours of standing per day. The claimant returned to work on May 5, 1995 at his previous salary. The trial court found the injury to be compensable and awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on five percent to the body as a whole. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 225(e)(2). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review. McCaleb v. Saturn Corp., 91 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1995). In a workers' compensation case, the claimant is not required to establish any degree of fault by the employee, merely that the injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. An injury arises out of the employment when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon a consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Fink v. Caudle, 856 S.W.2d 952 (Tenn. 1993). The employer's contention that the fall was idiopathic is based entirely on the circumstance that no slippery substance was found on the floor where the claimant fell. The claimant was alone at the time and was not found 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Walter C. Kurtz, |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/12/97 | |
| Brenda Gail Howell v. Murray Ohio Manufacturing Co.
01S01-9609-CH-00176
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant employer insists (1) the award of permanent partial disability benefits based on sixty percent to the body as a whole is excessive, (2) the trial court applied an incorrect compensation rate, and (3) the trial court erred in commuting the award to a lump sum. The lump sum issue was withdrawn during oral argument. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award of permanent partial disability benefits and the compensation rate should be modified. Because both issues are fact driven, appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). This tribunal is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Authoring Judge: Robert A. Lanier, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. James L. Weatherford, |
Lawrence County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/12/97 | |
| Charles H. Smith v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc.
01S01-9610-CH-00207
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. |
Smith County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/12/97 | |
| Robert Stone v. Saturn Corporation
01S01-9610-CH-00213
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. |
Maury County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/12/97 | |
| Abigail Hackett v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, et al.
01S01-9701-CH-00003
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case presents the issue of whether permanent partial disability ("PPD") awards of 5% and 25% are excessive in light of anatomical disability ratings of 12% and 5%. We conclude that the awards were not excessive and affirm the trial court's decision. The employee/appellee, Abigail Hackett, slipped and fell while coming off her shift at her employer's factory. She suffered extensive injury to both knees. Dr. Robert Landsberg, the orthopaedic surgeon who operated on her knees, testified that she had a 12% impairment in her left leg and a 5% impairment in her right leg. Hackett, age 44, has a GED and has worked in the past as a maintenance worker, school bus driver and sewing machine operator. As a result of the injuries to her knees, she can no longer perform these jobs. After the surgery, Hackett returned to work as a fork lift driver. The employer, G.F. Office Furniture, has accommodated her disability by modifying assembly line procedures. The trial court awarded Hackett a lump sum of $41, 35.5, which represented a PPD assessment of 5% to her left leg and 25% to her right leg. The employer/appellant argues that the trial court's award was excessive 2
Authoring Judge: Robert S. Brandt, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. C. K. Smith, |
Wilson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/12/97 | |
| Glover v. Philips
03S01-9607-CV-00076
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff, who was 38 years of age at the time of this trial and who has a meager education, testified she fell over a fan on September 15 or 16, 1993 while working for the defendant and injured her back. The trial judge awarded 31% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. We affirm in part and reverse in part. The plaintiff testified she told her supervisor at the time of the fall that she was injured. The supervisor denied he received this report. The dispensary nurse at the plant notes that on September 16 at 3:45 p.m., the plaintiff came to the dispensary and complained of back pain which, the note showed, was reported to be the result of a fall three years previously. There is no indication the nurse in the dispensary referred the plaintiff to an approved physician for treatment or evaluation of work injuries. The entry shows the plaintiff was sent home and ordered to take Advil for the pain. On September 17, 1993, the plaintiff was seen by Dr. Stanley of the Takoma Medical Group. Medicine for pain and muscle relaxers were prescribed for the plaintiff. The plaintiff was next seen in March 1994 by the group, then June 13, 1994, July 2, 1994, October 4, 1994, November 1, 1994 and March 1995. The testimony concerning the plaintiff's treatment and depression was given by Dr. Richard J. Aasheim, a family practitioner. The testimony reveals the plaintiff had a plethora of ailments, many attributable to her general physical condition, which showed a person 5'2" who weighed more than 18 pounds and was moderately obese. We need not go into great detail concerning the overall medical findings concerning the plaintiff. The pertinent parts of the doctor's testimony for the purpose of this case is his finding the plaintiff had lower back pain and muscle spasm as a result of the fall she related to him, with underlying chronic back pain prior to the fall. He testified that the fall aggravated and advanced pre-existing chronic back pain. 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Ben K. Wexler, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/10/97 | |
| Charles C. Jones v. Tridon, Inc., et al.
01S01-9703-CV-00057
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the defendants-appellants contend (1) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding of an injury by accident, (2) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the claimant's injury was one arising out of the employment, (3) the trial court exceeded its authority under an agreed order, and (4) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's award of medical and temporary total disability benefits. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award of medical and temporary total disability benefits should be reversed and the judgment otherwise affirmed. The claimant, Jones, was an employee of the employer, Tridon, on January 3, 1993, when he suffered a compensable back injury and was provided some medical benefits by the employer's insurer, Royal. He continued to work and, in January of 1994, requested additional benefits, claiming a new injury. He was given a list of approved physicians but chose, without further consulting the employer or its insurer, to see a chiropractor who was not on the list. The trial court found that a compensable injury occurred on January 21, 1994 and awarded the medical expenses for treatment by Dr. McCombs, 36 weeks of temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits based on 15% to the body as a whole. No issue has been raised with respect to the extent of permanent partial disability. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 225(e)(2). This panel is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Robert Corlew, |
Rutherford County | Workers Compensation Panel | 08/29/97 | |
| Kay Perryman v. Cosmolab, Inc.
01S01-9703-CH-00069
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court inaccordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's award of permanent partial disability benefits and temporary total disability benefits. The employee concedes the award of temporary total disability benefits is excessive, but contends the trial court used an incorrect compensation rate. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award of permanent partial disability benefits should be affirmed and the award of temporary total disability benefits modified. The case is remanded for additional proof as to the correct compensation rate. The employee or claimant, Perryman, is forty years old with a high school education. She has worked for the employer for twenty years. In 1994, she injured her elbow at work. As part of her treatment, she was required to take medication which contained blue and yellow dyes, which were also used in the employer's manufacturing process. She had an allergic reaction to the dyes after taking the medication. As a consequence, she is no longer able to work for the employer. She returned to gainful employment on October 31, 1994, thirteen weeks after the beginning of her inability to work because of the injury and treatment. The proof of permanency consisted of the following from the testimony of Dr. Samuel Rowe Marney, Jr., a board certified specialist in Allergy and Immunology: Q. Dr. Marney, Ms. Perryman now has these allergies. Do you have an opinion based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to whether she will have those in the future? A. Based on the usual course of allergies, she's almost certain to carry these allergies the rest of her life. The trial judge awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on forty percent to the body as a whole and temporary total disability benefits for sixty-five weeks. The compensation rate was fixed at $216.22. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Lee Russell, |
Perry County | Workers Compensation Panel | 08/29/97 | |
| Walter A. Dickman v. Meadows Homes, Inc.
01S01-9703-CC-00061
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, Meadows Homes, Inc., contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the claimant was a covered employee and in favor of a finding that he was an independent contractor. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the claimant was an independent contractor. On June 13, 1994, the claimant, Walter Dickman, and Meadows Homes, Inc., entered into the following: CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT I/We Walter Dickman do state that I/We are general contractors who are duly licensed to perform the services for which we are offering to Meadows Homes. Our services are being offered to the general public. As a contractor, I/We provide our own commercial automobile, workmen compensation and liability insurance,and hereby release Meadows Homes from any and all liabilities concerning our contract and any employees and their properties. As a contractor I/We agree to provide all necessary tools, equipment and transportation necessary to complete any services required. As a general contractor I/We affirm that we are responsible to report and pay any local, state or federal taxes which may be due on income from services rendered. The paper writing was dated and signed by the claimant and a representative of Meadows Homes, Inc. Thereafter, Dickman bid on and was awarded work at property owned by Meadows Homes in Jackson County. Then, beginning on June 27, 1994, the parties agreed that he would be compensated on an hourly rather than a per job basis. He would perform the work, then bill Meadows for his time. 2
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. J. O. Bond, |
Workers Compensation Panel | 08/29/97 | ||
| Hon. Frank v. Williams, Iii,
01S01-9609-CV-00174
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case was heard on March 15, 1996. The plaintiff alleged that he sustained work injuries on October 29, 1986 (pulmonary injury), January 21, 1986 (carpal tunnel syndrome), and January 6, 1986 (back injury). The trial court found the plaintiff's injuries were compensable and awarded the plaintiff permanent total disability plus medical costs. Prior to July 1, 1985, the level of review on appeal was whether there was any material evidence to support the findings of a trial court. Hilton v. Food Lion, Inc., 738 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Tenn. 1987). After July 1, 1985, the level of review is de novo upon the record with a presumption of the correctness of the trial court's findings of fact unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Alley v. Consolidated Coal Co., 699 S.W.2d 147, 147-48 (Tenn. 1985). All of the injuries upon which the trial court awarded compensation occurred after July 1, 1985. The standard of review, therefore, is under the preponderance rule set out in the 1985 amendment to the Workers' Compensation Law as elucidated in Alley, supra. The standard of review created by the amendment requires us to conduct an independent examination of the record on appeal to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Originating Judge:JIM T. HAMILTON, JUDGE |
Maury County | Workers Compensation Panel | 08/28/97 | |
| Goad v. Cna
03S01-9606-CV-00064
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer insists the award of permanent partial disability benefits is excessive; and the claimant or employee insists the award of permanent partial disability benefits is inadequate, the trial court erred in finding part of the claimant's claim to be time barred, the appeal should be dismissed for failure to file part of the transcript, and the appeal is frivolous. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the trial court's judgment that the claim for disability benefits resulting from a 1989 injury is time barred should be affirmed, and that the award of permanent disability benefits from a 1992 injury should be reversed and dismissed. This claim involves two separate injuries to the claimant, both arising out of and in the course of his employment by the same employer. The first injury occurred in November of 1989, when the claimant strained his lower back while lifting a fuel cell. The treating physician diagnosed lumbar disc injury with mechanical nerve compression. He was unable to work for three months. Although the doctor assigned a permanent whole person impairment rating of five percent, the claimant returned to work and received no permanent disability benefits. On April 8, 1992, the claimant injured his neck and low back in a fork lift collision, but was unable to work for only a few days. On June 29, 1992, he saw Dr. Robert J. Wilson, who found no objective evidence of injury, but assigned an impairment rating of three percent, from subjective complaints of pain. On January 5, 1993 and June 25, 1993, he saw Dr. William E. Kennedy, who diagnosed chronic low back and cervical syndrome superimposed on pre-existing degenerative disc disease. Dr. Kennedy assigned a permanent impairment rating of eight percent and restricted the claimant from activities requiring bending, stooping, squatting, heavy lifting, working over 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Ben K. Wexler, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 08/28/97 | |
| Joan Marie Griffin v. National Medical Hospital of Tullahoma
01S01-9606-CH-00130
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff is 29 years old, married, and has a young child. She is learning- disabled on account of a stroke when she was only four months old; she was born with congenital heart disease, and developed a pronounced scoliosis at age 12 which required the surgical implantation of rods in her back. Notwithstanding, she has held several jobs: attendant at a day care center, counter clerk at a fast- food eatery, sales clerk and cashier at a J. C. Penney store. She was employed by the defendant in August, 1992 in furtherance of its special employment program called Overcoming Challenges which was established to employ afflicted persons. Her initial job with the defendant was working in the cafeteria making sandwiches and serving food. Some of this work was difficult for her, and ambition lagged; the defendant constantly provided encouragement, and at the time of her alleged injury she had been assigned duties as a cashier. She was often absent from work owing to illness or to the pre-emptive care of her young child. She commonly experienced pain and fatigue as a result of standing or sitting for extended periods, or whenever she lifted objects. Her previous jobs at the day care center, fast food restaurant and the J. C. Penney Store also caused pain and fatigue. The injury from which this complaint arises occurred March 3, 1994 when the plaintiff attempted to lift a milk crate. She was initially treated by Dr. Ramprasad who prescribed physical therapy; thereafter, she was referred to Dr. Paul McCombs, a neurological surgeon. He saw the plaintiff on two occasions, April 25 and May 16, 1994, and on the second visit released her to return to work with the recommendation that she avoid prolonged repetitive twisting, bending and stooping, and that she avoid lifting in excess of 2 pounds at any one time or ten pounds repetitively. The plaintiff returned to Dr. McCombs on June 6, 1994 stating that she had a reoccurrence of pain while lifting her daughter. She returned again on July 25, 1994, 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. John W. Rollins, |
Coffee County | Workers Compensation Panel | 08/28/97 |