In two unanimous opinions released today, the Tennessee Supreme Court has determined that an indictment that includes a charge for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony does not have to specifically state which underlying felony is tied to the firearms charge when it is listed in the same indictment.
The cases address a Tennessee law that creates an additional crime if certain “dangerous” felonies are committed with a firearm. In one case, Rhakim Martin was accused of a carjacking using a firearm, resulting in two charges: carjacking and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. In the second case, Willie Duncan was charged with especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, among other crimes.
In both cases, the defendants argued that because the charge of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony did not specify in the indictment what the underlying dangerous felony was, the indictment was insufficient to meet the constitutional requirement of giving defendants notice of the charges against them.
The Court of Criminal Appeals heard both cases on appeal. In Duncan they reversed the conviction for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and in Martin they upheld it. As the Supreme Court noted in its opinion, the Court of Criminal Appeals had varying results in other similar cases it had decided, based mostly on whether the indictment contained more than one charge that could serve as the underlying felony for the charge of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.
The Supreme Court held that, in all cases, the United States and Tennessee constitutions guarantee the accused the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Court reasoned that in both cases, regardless of the number of dangerous felonies that could serve as the underlying felony to tie to the firearms charge, the indictments contained the essential elements of the crime and enabled the defendants to adequately prepare their defense to the charge.
Although it held that the indictment in the Duncan case was sufficient, the Court noted that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that the especially aggravated kidnapping could be considered as the underlying dangerous felony for charge of the employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and the law specifically prohibits that. For this reason, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction on employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and returned the case to the trial court for a new trial on that charge only. The Court upheld the remaining convictions and sentences.
Also, in the Martin case, the court considered whether the victim’s identification of her carjacker was tainted because, prior to her viewing a photo lineup at the police station, she looked at a county-operated website containing online mug shots of people who had been arrested in Memphis. Because the victim acted alone, without any improper action by the state to influence the outcome of the photo array, the Court held that the identification was proper.
Read the opinions in State of Tennessee v. Rhakim Martin and State of Tennessee v. Willie Duncan, both authored by Justice Holly Kirby.