George Campbell Jr. v. State of Tennessee

Petitioner, George Campbell, Jr., was convicted by a jury in Memphis of felony murder and aggravated assault and sentenced to life in prison in 1994. See State v. George Campbell, Jr., No. 02-C-01-9408-CR00165, 1996 WL 368224, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 28, 1996), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Jan. 6, 1997). His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Id. Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief and this Court affirmed the decision of the post-conviction court. See George Campbell, Jr. v. State, No. W2002-00703-CCA-R3-PC, 2001 WL 1042112, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Sept. 10, 2001), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 27, 2001). Then Petitioner sought relief via the writ of habeas corpus on the basis that his convictions were void for various reasons. The trial court denied relief and this Court affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief on appeal. See George Campbell, Jr. v. Bruce Westbrooks, No. W2002-02086-CCA-R3-CO, 2003 WL 22309471, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 6, 2003). Petitioner also sought redress in the form of a motion of writ of error coram nobis in which he claimed that newly discovered evidence may have resulted in a different judgment at trial had the evidence been admitted at the trial. See George Campbell, Jr. v. State, No. W2007-00820-CCA-R3-CO, 2008 WL 2219305, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 28, 2008). This Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition for writ of error coram nobis on the basis that it was untimely and “nothing in the record implicate[d] any due process concerns that would require that the statute of limitations be tolled.” Id. at *2. Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of error coram nobis that is the subject of the appeal herein. After a hearing concerning the timeliness of the petition, the trial court entered an order finding that Petitioner’s claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations pertaining to coram nobis petitions and that due process did not require the rolling of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the determination made by the trial court. The petition was filed more than one year after the judgment became final. Further, Petitioner has shown no reason that due process would require the tolling of the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.