The appellant, Charles WilliamYoung, was convicted in a jury trial of the offense of theft over $500. He was sentenced to one year and six months and ordered to serve 60 days of incarceration, to pay a $500 fine and restitution of $800. The appellant's probation was revoked for the first time in 1997, but he was again placed on probation for 18 months. Two years later his probation was again revoked and the appellant was ordered to serve his original sentence with 94 days of jail credit. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, or in the alternative, a writ of habeas corpus and alleged inter alia that a number of alleged constitutional errors occurred at both probation revocation hearings. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition.
We hold that the Post-Conviction Procedures Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-30-201, et seq., does not provide a cause of action for a collateral attack on a probation revocation proceeding. Moreover, the appellant's allegations, taken as true, would at most render the results of the probation revocation proceedings voidable, not void, and therefore the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the appellant. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.