Mary Alice Maupin v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge, has appealed from the trial court's ruling awarding the employee, Mary Alice Maupin, certain travel expenses pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. _ 5-6-24. All other issues were settled and approved by the trial court. The sole issue is whether the employee is entitled to a mileage allowance under subsection (a)(6)(A) of the statute which provides; "When an injured worker is required by the worker's employer to travel to an authorized medical provider or facility located outside a radius of fifteen (15) miles from such insured worker's residence or workplace, then, upon request, such employee shall be reimbursed for reasonable travel expenses. The injured employee's travel reimbursement shall be calculated based on a per mile reimbursement rate, as defined in subdivision (a)(6)(B), times the total round trip mileage as measured from the employee's residence or workplace to the location of the medical provider's facility. . . . . . . ." The trial court made findings that the employee "was not able to work at the time these medical expenses were incurred, and that the plaintiff's residence was more than fifteen miles from the location of the requested medical treatment and as the plaintiff had to travel in excess of fifteen miles from her home to the location for medical treatment, the Court finds that these expenses should be reimbursed." The order also recited that plaintiff had not been released to return to work at the time her travel expenses were incurred and that the medical treatment was authorized. The employer contends the trial court misconstrued the statute and that the mileage allowance should not have been allowed as the authorized medical treatment was within fifteen miles of the workplace and that the statute measured the right to mileage reimbursement by determining whether the travel was fifteen miles from the worker's residence or workplace. The employee insists the statutory language does not give the option to the employer to measure mileage from the location it may choose but the statute must be examined in light of actual distance traveled. It is also argued that the statute does not say mileage is to be determined and measured "from the employee's residence or workplace, to be determined by the employer" or it does not state measurement shall be "from the employee's residence or workplace, whichever is less." The case is to be reviewed de novo accompanied by a presumption of the findings of fact unless we find the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). However, in reviewing a question of law, there is no presumption in favor of the ruling. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Tenn. 1993). There is no issue concerning the factual findings of the trial court. In construing a statute, proper interpretations should give effect to the entire statute by giving its words their natural and ordinary meaning. Pryor Oldsmobile v. 2