Stephen Benker V.Williams Telecommunications Service, Inc., et al.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer has appealed from the trial court's ruling the employee is totally disabled raising issues concerning compensability of the claim and the apportionment of the award. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed. THAYER, SP. J., in which ANDERSON, C. J. and BYERS, SR. J., joined. Robert W. Knolton, of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the Appellants, William Telecommunications Service, Inc. and Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, and E. Blaine Sprouse, Assistant Attorney General, of Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, State Second Injury Fund. J. Anthony Farmer, of Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Stephen Benker. OPINION The employer, Williams Telecommunications Service, Inc., and the Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, have appealed from the trial court's ruling finding the employee, Stephen Benker, to be totally disabled. Facts Employee Benker was 51 years of age and was a high school graduate with some vocational training. His prior work history was a laborer, maintenance worker, construction worker and carpenter. He was employed as a telephone computer service system installer on September 23, 1997, when he tripped on some phone cords and fell. When this occurred, he testified he twisted his back, felt sharp pain down his leg and some numbness in his low back. Prior to this accident, he had disc surgery in 1975 or 1976 and returned to work. In 199 he had another disc operation and returned to work. He had complaints from back problems for several years prior to the incident in question and had missed work at different times between 199 and the accident in 1997. He has not worked since the September 23rd incident and states he is not able to work at any of the jobs he has held. His wife, Lisa Benker, testified as to his physical limitations and testified that she does everything both inside and outside their home and that "our entire life has changed, everything is different." Dr. John T. Purvis, a neurosurgeon, performed the second surgery in 199 which involved a ruptured disc. He saw the employee again after the incident in question and stated that he had severe osteoarthritis in his low back and with his prior historyof having disc surgery twice, he would be very sensitive to any type of injury to the back. He concluded that Benker sustained an aggravation and acceleration of his lumbar spondylosis to such an extent that he was unable to work; that there was some anatomical change and he was surprised that he had worked as long as he did. He gave impairments of 1 percent due to the 1976 surgery, 15 percent due to the 199 surgery and 1 percent due to the September 1997 accident. Opposing this medical testimony was the written medical report of Dr. Archer Bishop. He performed an independent medical examination on November 1, 1998 and was of the opinion the accident had only increased his pain and that there was no additional impairment. Witness, Julian Nadolsky, a vocational consultant, testified the employee had "no capacity to earn a living in any occupation" based on the opinion of Dr. Purvis. He admitted that there would be no vocational disability under Dr. Bishop's conclusion. The trial court found the accident of September 23, 1997 rendered the employee totally disabled and apportioned the award of permanent total disability pursuant to subsection (a)(1) of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-28. The court ordered the employer to pay 6 percent of the award and the state second injury fund to pay the remaining 4 percent. Issues on Appeal The employer and insurance company contend: (1) the accident in question did not cause any anatomical change in the employee's pre-existing condition, (2) the employee was not totally disabled as a result of the last accident and (3) the court was in error in apportioning a greater portion -2-