Brackins v. Sevier

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found that plaintiff was 5% permanently partially disabled as a result of his work-related injury by accident. He further found that the workers' compensation carrier was entitled to a credit of $14,43.64, plaintiff's net recovery for his third-party tort settlement. He held that he could not exclude recovery for loss of consortium from plaintiff's net recovery because no specific amount of that recovery was apportioned to loss of consortium. He limited the recovery for medical expenses to plaintiff's out-of-pocket expenses. He granted the plaintiff's attorney a 2% fee from the medical expenses awarded and stated that plaintiff's attorney may have to look to plaintiff's attorney in the third-party action for the rest of his fee. The plaintiff below appeals the trial court's judgment raising the following issues: 1) Whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that plaintiff retains 5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. 2) Whether the trial court erred in allowing the defendant a credit against the portion of the third-party tort recovery which is attributable to plaintiff's spouse's recovery for loss of consortium. 3) Whether the trial court erred by not crediting the full amount of medical expenses against the net recovery because the plaintiff's group hospitalization insurer had not filed a subrogation claim. 4) Whether the trial court should have required the defendant to pay the plaintiff's attorney's fees. We affirm the judgment of the trial court except as to the issue of medical expenses, for which the defendant is liable in full. The plaintiff was injured in a car accident on August 1, 199 while he was traveling in the course of his employment with the Sevier County Board of Education. The plaintiff, who was 53 years of age at the time of trial, continues to work for the 2