Erskine Leroy Johnson v. State of Tennessee

I acknowledge that the majority opinion does not grant error coram nobis relief to this defendant but merely remands the case to the trial court for the purpose of the trial court applying the proper standard of review. I simply disagree with the majority’s conclusion; therefore, I dissent. The State argues that the one-year statute of limitations bars proceeding with the petitioner’s claims. The majority is unsure as to what date the statute began running under the facts of this case but has concluded, in any event, that due process requires the tolling of the statute. I conclude that the statute began to run thirty days after the judgment of conviction was entered on June 27, 1985. Our supreme court has specifically held that, as to a petition for writ of error coram nobis, “[a] judgment becomes final in the trial court thirty days after its entry if no post-motions are filed” and that “[i]f a post-trial motion is timely filed, the judgment becomes final upon entry of an order disposing of the post-trial motion.” State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 670 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c); State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. 1996)). The petitioner did not file his petition for writ of error coram nobis until April 22, 2005. Because I agree with the State that the so-called new information either could or should have been discovered during the first trial, I disagree with the majority that due process requires tolling the statute of limitations. Thus, I would dismiss the petitioner’s claim as time barred.