Richard Moreno v. City of Clarksville - Dissenting

As early as 1799, the Superior Court of Law and Equity of Tennessee adopted the principle that the courts of this state should interpret the law in a manner that elevates “the justice of the case” over “technical formality.” Glasgow’s Lessee v. Smith, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 144, 151 (1799). It is equally well established that “Tennessee law strongly favors the resolution of all disputes on their merits,” and that remedial statutes must “be given a broad and liberal construction in order to achieve this goal.” Henley v. Cobb, 916 S.W.2d 915, 916 (Tenn. 1996). This case involves a claim brought pursuant to the Claims Commission Act and hinges on the construction of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20 1 119, a remedial statute intended to provide plaintiffs with a fair opportunity to add a non-party when a defendant alleges that the non-party was comparatively at fault for a plaintiff’s injury. Becker v. Ford Motor Co., 431 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tenn. 2014). The majority has concluded that in this instance Richard Moreno (the “Plaintiff”) cannot invoke section 20 1 119 because it applies only when the defendant alleging comparative fault is named in a pleading described as a “complaint” rather than a “notice of claim,” the latter being the statutory term used to describe the pleading that commences an action under the Claims Commission Act. In my view, the majority’s interpretation of section 20 1 119 is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, elevates form over substance, and violates the principle that claims should be decided on the merits whenever possible. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.