In a unanimous opinion, the Tennessee Supreme Court has modified the state’s approach to collateral estoppel – a legal principle governing the relationships and issues between parties that are involved in successive legal proceedings. The decision will prevent a person who has been convicted of a criminal offense from contesting guilt in a subsequent civil lawsuit brought by the victim of the crime.
The ruling comes in a lawsuit filed by the mother of a child crime victim, on behalf of herself and her son, against William E. Arnold, Jr., who was convicted in 2013 of aggravated sexual battery and three counts of rape of a child. The civil lawsuit sought damages from Mr. Arnold and several agencies that facilitated a mentoring relationship between Mr. Arnold and the victim for the injuries the victim sustained.
The mother asked the trial court to rule that Mr. Arnold’s guilt had been established by the criminal convictions and could not be relitigated in the civil proceeding. Mr. Arnold argued that the civil proceedings were separate from the criminal trial and that the parties lacked mutuality, meaning because the child was not a party to the criminal proceedings – where the state prosecutes a defendant – he should be allowed to advocate again for his innocence.
The trial court disagreed with Mr. Arnold and precluded Mr. Arnold from contesting his guilt in the civil action, ruling that the child was in privity with the state in the criminal case, fulfilling the mutuality requirement that the parties had a legal relationship on the issues in the earlier case.
Although the civil case was not concluded, Mr. Arnold appealed the trial court’s ruling on the mutuality issue to the Court of Appeals, which declined to hear the case. Mr. Arnold then sought permission to appeal to the Supreme Court, which granted the request.
The Supreme Court determined that the mutuality requirement previously followed in Tennessee should be abandoned in favor of an approach used in many other states that a party should be allowed to relitigate an issue in a subsequent proceeding only if the party did not have an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue in the earlier proceeding.
The court concluded that Mr. Arnold had a full and fair opportunity to mount a vigorous defense against the charges in the criminal proceeding and pointed out that the criminal trial afforded him “numerous safeguards aimed at protecting his liberty interest.” The case now returns to the trial court for further proceedings in the civil lawsuit, with the issue of Mr. Arnold’s guilt of rape and sexually battery established by his criminal convictions.
Read the unanimous opinion in Ms. Bowen ex rel. John Doe, “N” v. William E. Arnold, Jr. et al., authored by Justice Cornelia A. Clark.