David New v. Lavinia Dumitrache, Et Al.

A general sessions court entered a one-year order of protection prohibiting the plaintiff from having contact with the defendants, who are the plaintiff’s ex-wife and the couple’s minor child. The plaintiff failed to appeal the order within ten days as required by statute. Forty-two days later, he filed a document in the chancery court titled “Petition to Enroll and Certify A Foreign Judgment and Appeal in Nature of Writ of Error.” The plaintiff attached to his pleading an incomplete copy of the couple’s 2008 Texas divorce decree that granted him parenting time with the minor child and asked the chancery court to hold a new hearing and determine whether the general sessions court erred by issuing the order of protection. The plaintiff later filed a motion asking for interim parenting time with the child. The defendants filed a notice of limited appearance, and among other things, asked the chancery court to dismiss the action for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. They also requested attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending the action, relying on statutes to support these requests. The chancery court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the appeal untimely and the method of appeal obsolete, and also determining that the petition for enrollment was defective on its face because the defendant had attached an incomplete copy of the Texas decree. The chancery court initially denied the defendants’ request for attorney’s fees and costs but granted their motion to alter or amend and ultimately awarded attorney’s fees and costs totaling $25,398.21. The plaintiff appealed, challenging only the award of attorney’s fees. The defendants asked for an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. Before reaching these issues, however, the Court of Appeals sua sponte held that the chancery court erred by dismissing the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the “writ of error remains an avenue for review of judgments of general sessions courts.” Rather than remanding the matter to the chancery court for consideration of the merits of the plaintiff’s writ of error appeal, however, the Court of Appeals also addressed the defendants’ challenge to the award of attorney’s fees. The intermediate appellate court ruled that a statute authorized the chancery court to award the defendants’ attorney’s fees for defending against the plaintiff’s writ of error appeal but not for fees incurred defending against the plaintiff’s petition to enroll the Texas divorce decree. As a result, the Court of Appeals vacated the award of attorney’s fees and remanded to the chancery court for a hearing and a determination of the fees incurred solely in defense of the plaintiff’s writ of error appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the defendants’ request for attorney’s fees on appeal. This Court granted the defendants’ application for permission to appeal. We hold that the chancery court correctly concluded that the writ of error is no longer a viable method of appeal in this State and dismissed the untimely appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We also hold that the chancery court correctly dismissed the plaintiff’s request to enroll the Texas decree because he provided an incomplete copy of the decree. Finally, we hold that the chancery court correctly awarded the defendants’ attorney’s fees for defending against the plaintiff’s pleading and did not err by failing to limit the award to the writ of error appeal. For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the judgment of the chancery court in its entirety, and remand to the chancery court for a determination of the reasonable attorney’s fees the defendants have incurred and should be awarded for this appeal.