State of Tennessee v. Robert Collier

On July 12, 2019, Defendant-Appellant, Robert Collier, entered a guilty plea to criminal attempt aggravated sexual battery and indecent exposure, for which he received an effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days, all of which was to be served on supervised probation. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, 39-13-504 (2019). As part of his sentence, the Defendant was also ordered to register as a violent sex offender and placed on community supervision for life. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-524 (2014). Within three months, on October 15, 2019, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s supervised probation based on a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(d)(1)(B) (2019), which restricts movement of violent sex offenders, and ordered the Defendant to serve the original sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals the order of the trial court arguing that subsection (d)(1)(B) is unconstitutional in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because certain terms including “playground,” “any other specific or legitimate reason,” “stand,” “sit idly,” and “remain” are not defined and ambiguous.” He additionally argues that subsection (d)(1)(B) is overbroad in violation of his First Amendment rights because (1) it applies to all sex offenders even if the offense did not involve a child victim; and (2) the term “playground” can include a church, an offender’s front yard, and places where other adults are present. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.