Naqusha L. Metcalf v. Darnell Woodard, et al.
This appeal arises from a personal injury action following a motor vehicle collision in Shelby County, Tennessee. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the remaining negligence claim after concluding that plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence as to breach of duty and causation. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
ROBERT C. SIMMONS v. MICHAEL D. BLACK, ET AL.
In the Chancery Court for Bledsoe County (“the Trial Court”), Robert Simmons (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against his neighbors, Michael and Anna Marie Black (“Defendants”) to establish the correct common boundary line between their two properties. Two competing surveys were presented to the Trial Court, but only one surveyor testified. The Trial Court found Plaintiff’s surveyor, the testifying surveyor, credible and established the common boundary line in accordance with Plaintiff’s survey. Defendants have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
PHILIP J. BRYCE ET AL. v. NATHAN PARTIN ET AL.
This case concerns a ground lease for real property upon which a business maintained a billboard. After the landowner sent a letter to the business purporting to terminate the lease, the business sought a declaratory judgment that the lease remained valid and requested damages. The landowner filed a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that the lease was void or had been breached by the business. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that the lease had expired and awarded the landowner the rental income from the billboard minus the business’s expenses. On appeal, the business asserts that the trial court erred by denying its equitable defenses and in its award of damages. We conclude that several of these defenses were waived in the trial court and that the business failed to prove the remaining defenses. However, we also conclude that the trial court erred in its award of the rental income and vacate this portion of the order. Because the record does not contain sufficient evidence for this Court to determine the proper distribution of the rental income, we remand the matter for further proceedings. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darryl Deshields
A Henderson County jury convicted the Defendant, Darryl Deshields, of evading arrest, reckless endangerment, reckless driving, and speeding, and the trial court imposed an effective three-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. He also asserts that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence and that the trial court erred in approving the verdict as thirteenth juror. Finally, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence regarding the tip that led investigators to his whereabouts. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Marlinee Iverson, County Attorney for Shelby County, Tennessee v. Wanda Halbert
A complaint for ouster was filed nominally on behalf of the Shelby County Attorney against Shelby County Clerk Wanda Halbert. The defendant clerk filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing because the complaint was being prosecuted by a deputy county attorney and outside counsel due to a personal conflict of interest by the named county attorney. The plaintiff then filed a motion for default judgment, arguing that a motion to dismiss was not a proper pleading under the ouster statutes. The trial court denied the motion for default judgment and permitted the defendant clerk to file an answer. The trial court then dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff’s lack of standing. We affirm the denial of the motion for default judgment, reverse the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald L. Shoemake v. Ann L. Shoemake
In this post-divorce action, the wife, Ann L. Shoemake (“Wife”), filed a petition against the husband, Ronald L. Shoemake (“Husband”), in the Sumner County Chancery Court (“trial court”) to receive her marital share of Husband’s pension payments through the Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System (“TCRS”). Wife had been awarded a portion of Husband’s TCRS payments in the final decree of divorce (“Final Decree”). Husband filed a counter-petition seeking, inter alia, a reduction of his alimony in futuro obligation. After the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Wife for her portion of his TCRS payments, Husband unilaterally ceased paying his alimony in futuro obligation to Wife and failed to pay the court-ordered TCRS arrearages. This caused Wife to file two motions for contempt against Husband, one in February 2024 and the other in August 2024. In the February 2024 motion, Wife requested that the trial court find Husband in “willful contempt” until he purged himself of the TCRS shortage and alimony arrearage. On March 4, 2024, the trial court ordered Husband to pay the TCRS shortage and ruled that Husband should continue to pay the $600.00 monthly alimony but declined to rule on the motion for contempt, stating that the court “reserves the issue of granting a judgment pending the approval of the QDRO to be submitted.” Despite the trial court’s ruling, Husband did not resume his alimony payments and did not comply fully with the order concerning his TCRS obligation, and Wife accordingly filed a second motion for contempt in August 2024. In that motion, Wife requested that the trial court find Husband “in civil contempt for his failure to make payments for [Wife’s] share of TCRS up to August 14, 2024, alimony payments to date of $600.00 per month, and judgment be granted accordingly.” The trial court entered an order on October 9, 2024, granting to Wife a judgment of “$4,812.75 to be paid within 30 days” for Husband’s TCRS obligation and arrearage, but the trial court did not specifically address Wife’s two motions for contempt or her request for alimony arrearage. On October 11, 2024, the trial court entered a second order, denying Husband’s request for a reduction of alimony and granting to Wife her attorney’s fees as the prevailing party pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c). Again, the trial court did not address Wife’s motions for contempt or her request for alimony arrearage. Husband has appealed. Because the trial court did not fully rule on Wife’s outstanding motions for contempt and did not render a decision regarding Wife’s request for an alimony arrearage in the amount of $3,000.00, there is no final judgment entered by the trial court, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal and remand the case to the trial court for further action. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
STATE EX REL ADOLPHUS PELLEY v. BO PERKINSON
The trial court awarded attorney’s fees as sanctions against a petitioner and his attorney in this ouster proceeding, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-47-122(b), following a voluntary nonsuit of the petition. The trial court based its award of sanctions upon, inter alia, its determination that the petition’s allegations were unsupported and that the petitioner’s attorney had acted recklessly when filing the petition by purporting to represent individuals with whom he had neither met nor spoken. The petitioner and his counsel have appealed. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s award of sanctions against counsel, but we vacate the court’s award of sanctions against the individual petitioner. We decline to award additional attorney’s fees on appeal. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
BILL W. GENTRY v. CINCO RESEARCH CORPORATION ET AL.
This case originated as a breach of contract action for the sale of a business. Eventually, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in which the defendants agreed to pay $1,000,000.00 by a specified date. A few days before the deadline, the defendants attempted to gain an extension and/or renegotiate the terms. The negotiations did not result in written modification of the settlement agreement, the defendants failed to pay the agreed-upon sum by the deadline, and the plaintiff sued to enforce the settlement agreement. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that there was no meeting of the minds as to modification, no written modification, and no breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The defendants appeal only the claim that the plaintiff did not breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing. We affirm the decision of the trial court and award the plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to the settlement agreement |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Antonio Weston, Sr. v. GP Memphis, LP, et al.
This appeal stems from the dismissal of a premises liability action. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s first amended complaint as time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations, finding that the amended complaint, which was filed more than a year after the incident, did not relate back to the original complaint under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley Golden v. Tennessee Board of Parole
This action arises from the Tennessee Board of Parole’s revocation of an inmate’s parole. Following the inmate’s filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking judicial review, the trial court dismissed the action for failure to make partial payment of the required filing fee. We conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for dismissal on this basis. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
JOHN A. WATSON, JR. v. WATCO COMMUNITIES, LLC ET AL.
A member of a Tennessee limited liability company filed a complaint seeking the appointment of a receiver to operate the company and the dissolution and winding up of the company. The trial court appointed a receiver, the receiver moved to sell the company’s assets, and the member objected to the sale. The member also sought to amend his complaint to add additional claims against additional defendants. The trial court entered an order approving the receiver’s proposed sale of the assets and denying the member’s motion to amend his complaint. The trial court ordered that the proceeds of the sale are to be paid into the trial court’s registry and certified its order as a final judgment. We conclude that the trial court’s order was not a final judgment and that the trial court improvidently certified it as such. Thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and we dismiss this appeal. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
ANDREW ROGERS ET AL. v. VICTORIA COX
Property owners brought an action seeking an injunction to prohibit an adjoining property owner from blocking access to their properties. The trial court granted the request for an injunction after concluding that the land at issue was a public road that had not been abandoned. The adjoining property owner appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
731 Real Estate Group, LLC D/B/A Town & Country Realtors v. Joseph T. Fuzzell
Appellant, homeowner, appeals the trial court’s grant of Appellee, real estate company’s, motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim arising from Appellant and Appellee’s contract for the sale of Appellant’s property. After the expiration of the initial period of the listing agreement, Appellant transferred the property by quitclaim deed to himself and another party. Appellee sought compensation under the contract. Appellant failed to respond to Appellee’s requests for admissions, and the trial court deemed the requests for admissions admitted. Appellant also failed to respond to Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, and Appellee’s statement of material facts for purposes of summary judgment was undisputed. Despite the admitted facts, the trial court erred in finding that Appellant breached the plain language of the contract. Because Appellee was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, we reverse and remand. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE ESTATE OF BOBBY HAIR
Appellant filed a petition to probate the will of her former husband, asking that she be awarded a life estate in the former husband’s residence, per the terms of the will. The estate was eventually closed by agreed order, which granted Appellant a life estate in the subject property. Appellant thereafter filed a motion to set aside the agreed final order, arguing that her and the decedent’s marital dissolution agreement awarded her at least a one-half ownership interest in the property. The trial court denied the motion after concluding that Appellant did not meet her burden under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Due to profound deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we dismiss this appeal and award Appellees their reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defending this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Lay'La R.
In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals only the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance. Although Father does not appeal the termination of his parental rights, we are required to review that decision. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by failure to visit, failure to support, and wanton disregard; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child. The trial court also found that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE BENTLEY W.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found two grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support. The trial court also concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
Keith Dessinger v. Sally McIver
A self-represented petitioner seeks accelerated interlocutory review under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Because the filing does not comply with Rule 10B, we dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
ROBERT L. DAVIS, ET AL. v. KAREN EDWARDS, ET AL.
This appeal concerns a driveway easement. Robert Davis and Lala Davis (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) sued their neighbor Karen Edwards (“Edwards”) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) to enforce an oral agreement whereby Edwards agreed to build her own driveway on her property. Edwards had been using Plaintiffs’ driveway under the terms of the Driveway Easement and Maintenance Agreement (“the DEMA”), an express easement agreed to by Plaintiffs and Jeanette Schlaeger (“Schlaeger”), the previous owner of Edwards’ property. After a hearing, the Trial Court found that Edwards had reached a verbal agreement with Plaintiffs to build her own driveway, and that she must build it. Plaintiffs filed a motion for additional findings asking that the DEMA be terminated even though that was not an issue at trial. The Trial Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion on grounds that the DEMA was meant to be temporary despite the DEMA’s unambiguous language to the contrary. Edwards appealed. Subsequently, Joe Hamby and Amber Hamby (“Defendants”) bought Edwards’ property and were substituted as appellants. We hold, inter alia, that the DEMA is permanent and runs with the land. The Trial Court abused its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for additional findings. We reverse the Trial Court’s judgment nullifying the DEMA. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Karl Robert Kokko et al. v. Thomas L. Moore, Jr. et al.
This is an action for breach of contract, unlawful procurement of breach of contract, and civil conspiracy arising out of a purchase and sale agreement related to real property in Moore County, Tennessee. The buyers, Karl and Beth Ann Kokko, alleged that the sellers, Thomas and Wendy Moore, breached the contract by failing to fulfill their obligation to close. The Kokkos further alleged that Gregg and Daffney Driver induced the breach by conspiring with the Moores to sell the property to the Drivers’ company, MOCAR Enterprises, Inc. The listing realtor, Crye-Leike of Nashville, Inc., intervened to collect a commission. The trial court took several actions that are at issue on appeal. First, the court granted the Kokkos’ Motion for Sanctions against the Drivers and MOCAR and entered a default judgment against them on the claims for unlawful procurement and conspiracy. Second, the court granted the Kokko’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and entered judgment against the Moores on the claims for breach of contract and conspiracy. Third, the court set aside the MOCAR deed and ordered specific performance of the contract. And fourth, the court granted Crye-Leike’s claim against the Moores for a commission. This appeal followed. We conclude that summary judgment was inappropriate on the Kokkos’ claim for civil conspiracy but affirm the trial court in all other respects. Thus, we vacate the trial court’s judgment in part, affirm it in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Moore | Court of Appeals | |
Senior Pastor Charles Dowell, Jr. et al. v. State of Tennessee Macon County Assessor's Office
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, filed by Senior Pastor Charles Dowell, Jr. and Priest Baldwin Hutchinson (“Petitioners”) seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioners and finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
ANTWAIN SALES v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
Petitioner, an inmate incarcerated by the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of disciplinary proceedings held at Morgan County Correctional Complex. Because the petition was not notarized and because a notarized petition was not filed within sixty days of the denial of his administrative appeal of that decision, the trial court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction. For these reasons, the trial court dismissed the petition. The petitioner appeals. Finding no error with the trial court’s decision, we affirm |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Evon Kay Creger v. Daniel William Creger
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right. The petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s denial of his motion for recusal. Discerning no error upon our review of the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
THOMAS J. TABOR, JR., ESQ. v. GLORIA JUANITA MILTON
Gloria Juanita Milton (“Milton”) hired attorney Thomas J. Tabor, Jr. (“Tabor”) to defend her as an appellee in Milton v. Powell. After successfully defending her in the appeal, a disagreement arose between Tabor and Milton over the attorney’s fees she owed him. Tabor filed a complaint in the General Sessions Court for Claiborne County (“the General Sessions Court”), which found that Milton owed Tabor $10,030 in unpaid attorney’s fees. Milton appealed to the Circuit Court for Claiborne County (“the Trial Court”), which came to a different conclusion than the General Sessions Court. The Trial Court determined that any remaining amount owed by Milton above and beyond what she already had paid was excessive and unreasonable. Tabor appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Ruby Smith
This appeal arises from the sale of certain real property by a custodian for the benefit of two minor children pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. The custodian sold the property without having it appraised, hiring a real estate agent, or listing the property for sale on the open market. Rather, the custodian reviewed an appraisal published by the county’s property assessor and then sold the property for a price slightly exceeding the listed value. The children’s mother filed a lawsuit on their behalf, alleging that the custodian breached his fiduciary duty of care. The trial court determined that the mother failed to prove that allegations and dismissed the case. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
LINDSEY A. JORDAN v. EAST TENNESSEE HUMAN RESOURCES AGENCY, INC.
The plaintiff appeals the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of her personal injury negligence action against a social services organization. The trial court found that the action was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations and that the discovery rule did not apply to toll the statute of limitations. Because the plaintiff’s action accrued more than one year before she filed the lawsuit, we conclude that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was properly granted. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
