AARON CREGATI v. BREANNA NICOLE PETET
This appeal concerns the trial court’s granting of a petition to extend an order of protection for ten years after finding that the respondent violated the original order of protection multiple times and failed to appear for hearings throughout the litigation. Because none of the issues the appellant raises were raised in the trial court, we dismiss the appeal. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-617(a)(1), we award the appellee’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in defending the appeal and remand for calculation of the amount. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE ZAIMEON M.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish several statutory grounds of termination as applied to the mother. The court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We now affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Scott Materials, Inc. v. S.T.A. Financial, Inc., et al.
This is an action for breach of contract and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (the “TCPA”). The defendants, who are Minnesota residents and who have no business activities in Tennessee except for this one transaction with the plaintiff, responded to the complaint by filing a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion on both grounds. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
TOWN OF GREENBACK, TENNESSEE, ET AL. v. M&M STONE FARMS, LLC, ET AL.
This action involves the proper use and zoning of a parcel of real property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the property owner, determining that the owner’s use of the property as a quarry was not prohibited because the subject property was unzoned. The trial court based its ruling on the municipality’s inability to produce a validly enacted zoning ordinance that applied to the specific parcel. The municipality and its planning commission have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We also find that the property owner’s motions to consider post-judgment facts and to dismiss the appeal are not well taken, and we deny those motions. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Shelby County, Tennessee v. Stephanie Taylor ET AL.
Appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her petition for writ of mandamus. Because Appellant improperly joined her original mandamus action with Appellee’s petition for judicial review, an appellate action, we affirm the dismissal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Juleah Marie Barrettsmith v. Christopher James Jeffers
Petitioner seeks to appeal a denial of her motion to recuse. Because she did not include her trial court motion and supporting documents, the record is insufficient to determine this appeal. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
MATTHEW L. ARMITAGE v. GINNY HALE
Finding good cause, a trial court issued an ex parte order of protection. Following the subsequent contested hearing, the trial court did not determine whether the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence the underlying offense predicate for issuance of an order of protection pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b). Instead, the trial court determined that extension of the ex parte order of protection was unwarranted because the petitioner had failed to prove ongoing existing danger posed by the alleged perpetrator. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court, while noting a seeming tension between this approach and the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36- 3-605(b), concluded the result followed from this court’s decision in Dulaney v. Chico, No. E2022-00047-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2253373 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2023). Noting that this court’s prior decision is unpublished, the petitioner appeals, asserting that the trial court’s approach is inconsistent with the statute. We agree with the petitioner that the statute mandates extending an existing ex parte order of protection upon finding that a predicate act was proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we vacate and remand. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
MATTHEW L. ARMITAGE v. ANDREA L. KASULIS
A trial court declined to grant an ex parte order of protection. Following the subsequent contested hearing over whether to issue an order of protection, the trial court did not determine whether the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence the underlying offense predicate for issuance of an order of protection pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b). Instead, the trial court determined that issuance of an order of protection was unwarranted because the petitioner had failed to prove ongoing existing danger posed by the alleged perpetrator. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court, while noting a seeming tension between this approach and the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b), concluded the result followed from this court’s decision in Dulaney v. Chico, No. E2022-00047-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2253373 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2023). Noting that this court’s prior decision is unpublished, the petitioner appeals, asserting that the trial court’s approach is inconsistent with the statute. While our understanding of the statutory scheme diverges from that set forth in Dulaney v. Chico, we affirm the trial court’s decision. We do so because we conclude that the absence of existing ongoing danger is a proper consideration under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b) when no ex parte order has been issued and because the trial court properly understood its discretion in this case. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Fred M.
This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish statutory grounds of termination. The court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We now affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
MATTHEW L. ARMITAGE V. ANDREA L. KASULIS
JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., concurring. The majority provides a well-researched analysis of the interplay between the legislative purpose of a statute and its actual operation in the court system. However, I depart from the majority’s thoughtful conclusion as applied to the order of protection statutes, which I view as a statutory anomaly with a distinct objective and purpose that requires judicial adherence. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
MATTHEW L. ARMITAGE v. GINNY HALE
JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., dissenting. The majority provides a well-researched analysis of the interplay between the legislative purpose of a statute and its actual operation in the court system. However, I depart from the majority's thoughtful conclusion as applied to the order of protection statutes, which I view as a statutory anomaly with a distinct objective and purpose that requires judicial adherence. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Brandon Shane Wooley v. Dickson County et al.
This appeal concerns jail behavior credits. Dickson County Jail inmate Brandon Shane Wooley (“Plaintiff”) sued Dickson County and several officials (“Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Dickson County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that he was wrongfully denied credits for good behavior. When Defendants failed to respond within 30 days, Plaintiff moved for default judgment. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Trial Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. In addition, the Trial Court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s complaint because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Trial Court stated, therefore, that it was unnecessary to address Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the Trial Court’s holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remand for the Trial Court to determine whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies and what those remedies were. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Keith R. Prather v. Yvonne R. Prather
The parties obtained a divorce in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”). On appeal, the wife disputes the Trial Court’s calculation of her portion of the husband’s military retirement pay. Upon our review, we determine that the Trial Court miscalculated the wife’s portion given that it calculated her portion based on the parties’ date of informal separation, rather than the date of the husband’s retirement from the military. In doing so, the Trial Court misclassified marital property as separate property. We, accordingly, vacate the Trial Court’s classification of the husband’s military retirement pay as partially separate property acquired during the marriage and the Trial Court’s division of the entire marital estate, insofar as the Trial Court’s improper classification of this marital asset affects the equitable division of the marital estate as a whole. We remand this cause to the Trial Court for it to properly classify the husband’s military retirement pay as marital property acquired during the months of the marriage, recalculate its division of this marital asset, and re-access its division of the entire marital estate in light of its reclassification and recalculation of its division of this marital asset. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Abdoulaye Mamadou v. Gatti, Keltner, Bienvenu & Montesi, PC
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant law firm in this legal malpractice action on the basis that the plaintiff failed to present expert proof in support of his claim that the defendant law firm breached the standard of care. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Cynthia Allen West v. Roderick Jay West
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court found that the wife was economically disadvantaged, that it was not feasible for her to be rehabilitated, and that she had no meaningful earning capacity. Therefore, the court awarded the wife alimony in futuro. The court also conducted an equitable division of the couple’s marital property. The husband appealed. We have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the wife could not be rehabilitated. However, the court failed to consider all of the wife’s sources of income and to make sufficient findings. Therefore, we vacate the court’s alimony award and remand for further proceedings. We decline to award the wife her appellate attorney’s fees. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley Hester Ayers v. John Robert Ayers
This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding. Husband asserts that the trial court erred in assigning the entire amount dissipated to Husband. Husband further assigns error to the trial court’s classification of an insurance settlement stemming from the theft of Husband’s pre-marital vehicle. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified by this Opinion. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
MARK KLEINMAN v. RHONDA LAWSON
This appeal concerns the trial court’s findings of six counts of criminal contempt against Mother following a contentious, years-long custody battle. Due to the lack of a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
CATHERINE AMANDA MULLIS v. SAI CHATTANOOGA N, LLC
After discovering that the roof of her new car leaked, the owner returned to the dealership several times for repairs, but the leaks persisted. Later, when she began feeling sick, the owner suspected that mold growing in the car was the cause. The ownersued the dealership claiming, among other things, that negligent repairs led to the mold growth and caused her health issues. The dealership moved for summary judgment, asserting that the owner could not prove causation. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mohamed Miray
Mohamed Miray, Defendant, was indicted for and convicted of first degree murder. He was sentenced to life in prison. Defendant was identified and charged in part based upon a match to DNA found at the scene of the murder. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress in which he argued that his DNA was not properly in the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) because he was acquitted of a charge for which he was required to give a DNA sample when arrested and that his DNA should have been removed from the database as a result of the acquittal. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Defendant was convicted by a jury and filed a motion for new trial. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, and this appeal followed. On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress and the sufficiency of the evidence. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Bryan Hibdon v. Danielle Goynes
A father petitioned a Tennessee court to modify its previous parenting plan. The father lived in Tennessee, but the mother and the child lived in Arkansas. Claiming Tennessee was an inconvenient forum, the mother moved to transfer the case to Arkansas. The court denied the transfer request. Later, the court entered a default judgment against the mother as a sanction for her failure to appear for her deposition. After hearing proof, it adopted the father’s proposed parenting plan. On appeal, the mother contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the parenting plan. She also challenges the court’s denial of her transfer request, its refusal to set aside the default judgment, and the adoption of a modified plan. We conclude that the court erred in modifying the parenting plan without conducting a best interest analysis. So we vacate the adoption of a modified plan and remand for further proceedings on this issue. In all other respects, we affirm. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Kelly, et al. v. Thomas A. Stewart
This appeal concerns the garnishment of an inherited Individual Retirement Account. Advanced Hearing Aid Group, LLC (“AHAG”), Gary Kelly, Kenneth Kelly, and Matthew Kelly (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) filed an application for writ of garnishment in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”) against Thomas A. Stewart (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs sought to collect a judgment against Defendant stemming from a lawsuit over AHAG. Specifically, Plaintiffs sought to garnish an IRA that Defendant inherited from his mother (“the Inherited IRA”). Defendant is both a fiduciary and beneficiary of the Inherited IRA. Defendant filed a motion to quash, citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-105(b) and its exemption of certain retirement plans from garnishment. The Trial Court held that, while the Inherited IRA was exempt from garnishment initially, it lost its exempt status because Defendant made prohibited transactions from the Inherited IRA to a disqualified party, a revocable trust of which Defendant is a 50% or more beneficiary (“the Revocable Trust”). Defendant appeals, arguing that he essentially transferred the funds to himself, which all sides agree is permitted. We hold, inter alia, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-105(b) never applied to the Inherited IRA in the first place. We hold further that, even if the Inherited IRA had once been exempt, it stopped being exempt after Defendant’s prohibited transactions. We affirm as modified. Pursuant to AHAG’s operating agreement, AHAG is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal, the amount of which the Trial Court is to determine on remand. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas West v. David Gerregano, Tennessee Commissioner of Revenue
Appellant, an attorney residing in Kansas but licensed in both Kansas and Tennessee, filed a complaint challenging the constitutionality of Tennessee’s professional privilege tax. A three-judge panel granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant commissioner of revenue, ruling that the tax did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE MAISYNN Y.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother to her daughter. The juvenile court found that the grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody were proven by clear and convincing evidence. The juvenile court also determined that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
AMONETT’S EAGLE AUCTION & REALTY, LLC v. NORRIS BROS. PROPERTIES, LLC, ET AL.
In this action between parties to an auction contract, the trial court determined that the defendant property company and its individual members had committed intentional fraud, intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, and civil conspiracy. The court found that during an auction of the defendants’ property, they had bid to increase the price, caused a “shill bidder” to cast bids, and then refused to purchase the property after the defendants’ company cast the highest bid. The court additionally found the defendants liable for damages incurred by the plaintiff auction company and awarded to the plaintiff a total judgment in the amount of $91,825.00. The defendants have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Autumn L. et al. v. James C.
Mother and Stepfather sought to terminate Father’s parental rights to two minor children, alleging abandonment by failure to conduct more than token visitation. The trial court determined that the regular video-call visitation exercised by Father was not token, but that to the extent that the visitation could be considered token, Mother’s interference prevented a finding that such abandonment was willful. Father’s rights were not terminated. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals |
