Susan Anderson, By Her Conservator Rebecca Woods Et Al. v. Alexian Village of Tennessee
In this health care liability action, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice upon finding that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
IN RE ESTATE OF BETTY RUTH SHAW MORGAN
This is an appeal from a trial court’s final order entered on February 7, 2025. The notice of appeal was not mailed to the Appellate Court Clerk via certified mail until May 9, 2025, more than thirty days from the final order’s entry date. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Floyd Edward Faulkner
After the decedent’s most recent will was admitted to probate, the decedent’s grandson moved to certify standing for a will contest. The grandson claimed standing as a beneficiary of a prior will. After a couple of hearings, he came forward with signed copies of several prior wills that named him as a beneficiary. The trial court ruled the grandson lacked standing because he failed to produce an original instrument or establish a lost will. We conclude that the copies of the prior wills, standing alone, were insufficient to establish standing. So we affirm. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
JAMES E. BLOUNT, IV v. WEIGEL’S STORES, INC. ET AL.
The plaintiff sued a third party in North Carolina. During that litigation, the plaintiff learned that a Tennessee business might have information relevant to the lawsuit, so the plaintiff obtained a subpoena in North Carolina and, under the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, received a corresponding subpoena from the Circuit Court Clerk for Knox County, Tennessee. After serving the subpoena on an agent for the defendant, the plaintiff heard no response. He then brought a petition to enforce the subpoena against the company and its agent. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for Rule 11 sanctions, which the trial court granted. Because we find that the trial court did not adequately explain its decisions to dismiss the petition, grant attorney’s fees, and order Rule 11 sanctions so as to allow for meaningful appellate review, we vacate the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Darryl Whisnant v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
This appeal concerns a decision by the Tennessee Board of Parole (“the Board”). Following a hearing, the Board denied parole to inmate Darryl Whisnant (“Whisnant”). The Board said that, going forward, Whisnant should complete his programming as recommended by his Strong R Assessment, namely by continuing his positive behavior, remaining drug free, and taking a few minutes each day for positive reflection. Whisnant filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court upheld the Board’s decision. Whisnant appeals. According to Whisnant, the Board violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b)(2)(B) by failing to state in writing how he could improve his chances of being released on parole. Whisnant argues that his recommended tasks were open-ended and impossible to complete. We find, as did the Trial Court, that the tasks given to Whisnant clearly were meant to be complied with up to his next parole hearing, at which time the Board can consider Whisnant’s compliance or non-compliance as part of its decision-making. The recommended tasks are neither open-ended nor impossible to complete. We hold that the Board complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b)(2)(B). We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lakeesha Nicole Dixon-Starnes v. Ascension Saint Thomas Hospital Midtown
This matter is a petition for recusal of the trial judge pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B. The inadequacies of the petition require this Court to affirm the trial court’s denial of the recusal motion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Alexis F. et al.
A mother and a father challenge the juvenile court’s finding of two grounds for the termination of their parental rights and its finding that termination was in the best interests of the two children. We find that the juvenile court failed to make sufficient findings regarding one ground and vacate that ground. We affirm in all other respects. |
Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Lola-Rayne D.
Mother appeals the trial court’s decision terminating her parental rights. She challenges the termination ground, which is severe child abuse, as well as the best interest determination. We have concluded that clear and convincing evidence supports both of these rulings by the trial court and, therefore, we affirm. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Lucas S.
This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The father appeals the judgment of the trial court that terminated his parental rights to his minor child based on abandonment by willful failure to visit. The trial court further concluded that termination was in the child’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
STACIE SMITH v. GARY MEEK
This appeal arises out of a landlord-tenant dispute between Appellant Stacie Smith and Appellee Gary Meek. In response to a plumbing issue in her rented home, Ms. Smith sought injunctive relief from the Knox County General Sessions Court requiring Mr. Meek to make certain repairs to the home. The General Sessions Court granted the requested injunction, which Mr. Meek appealed to the Knox County Circuit Court. Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court entered judgment in favor of Mr. Meek and dismissed Ms. Smith’s complaint. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Annajoel Sullivan v. Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security
Following an alleged failure to properly assess whether a driver was impaired as part of an investigation of a car crash, the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security fired a probationary employee trooper. The trooper filed suit, claiming that the Department actually fired her because of her age, sex, and national origin. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Department. The trooper appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Samson K. Orusa et al. v. First National Bank of America
Homeowners sought to void the foreclosure sale of their home, asserting that the bank did not advertise the sale as required. The trial court granted the bank summary judgment, concluding that the bank was not properly served and that the foreclosure had been properly advertised. The homeowners appeal. We affirm based on failure of service of process. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
ROBERT A. MARTIN ET AL. v. ROBERT E. MARTIN ET AL.
Robert A. Martin (“Father”) and Donna Saas (“Daughter”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”), seeking the removal of Robert E. Martin (“Son”) as trustee of the Martin Irrevocable Trust (“the Trust”) and making claims of breach of fiduciary duty and conversion of assets against Son and his wife, Karen Martin (“Son’s Wife”) (collectively, with Son, “Defendants”). The Trial Court struck Defendants’ defenses and denials in their answer given their failure to provide an accounting of the Trust’s assets despite the Trial Court’s orders to do so. After a hearing on damages, the Trial Court awarded Daughter half of the asset that was supposed to have been put in the Trust, half of the funds that Son had converted from Father’s accounts, attorney’s fees, punitive damages, and lost wages. Defendants appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Jackie Mansfield Broyles v. Calvin C. Herrin, Jr., individually and d/b/a Hickory Creek Barbecue et al.
After slipping and falling on accumulated snow and ice at a restaurant, a man filed a premises liability lawsuit against the owner of the restaurant. The trial court granted summary judgment to the owner based on its finding that the owner owed no duty to protect the man from accumulated snow and ice because the incident occurred during an ongoing winter storm. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE KENNA R., ET AL.
This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Hawkins County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Rikiya P. (“Mother”) to her minor children Annabelle, Jasmine, and Liam (“the Children,” collectively), as well as the parental rights of Daniel R. (“Father”) to Liam.1 The Children had been removed from Mother and Father’s custody because Mother starved and beat Kenna, Father’s daughter by another mother.2 Father was aware of the abuse but failed to protect Kenna. The Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse. Mother and Father appeal. We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that the ground of severe child abuse was proven against Mother and Father by clear and convincing evidence. We find further, as did the Juvenile Court, that clear and convincing evidence supports termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights as being in the best interest of the Children. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
ESTATE OF MARTHA HARRISON BANE v. JOHN BANE
In this declaratory judgment action, the trial court denied the appellant’s motions, filed one year after a decision from this Court affirming the trial court’s final judgment, seeking to intervene as a party in the lawsuit and to “correct” the trial court’s previous order. The trial court also awarded sanctions to the opposing party pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The appellant timely appealed these rulings. Following our thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s motion to intervene as untimely. However, we vacate the trial court’s award of Rule 11 sanctions and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to make the appropriate findings concerning its adjudication of the Rule 11 motion, including the ability to hold a hearing, if necessary, regarding the factual analysis required by Rule 11. The appellant’s other issues are pretermitted due to his status as a non-party. We decline to award attorney’s fees incurred on appeal to the appellee, and we further decline to impose sanctions against the appellee’s counsel for representations made during oral argument. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Mykeena C. et al.
Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their two shared children. We conclude the trial court properly found that the Department of Children’s Services proved by clear and convincing evidence at least one ground for termination as to each parent and that termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s termination of parental rights. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
BIOBELE GEORGEWILL V. CMH HOMES, INC.
The plaintiff seeks recusal of the trial judge pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B. The trial judge denied the plaintiff’s sixth motion to recuse. The plaintiff’s Rule 10B petition fails to comply with the rule, and the grounds for recusal offered are without merit. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Hannah Development, LLC v. Maverick General Contractors, LLC et al.
A Tennessee residential homebuilder alleged that a Floridian general contractor and its principal fraudulently disguised the painting of fencing at the principal’s personal residence as a legitimate business expense on a fraudulent invoice submitted to and paid by the Tennessee company. The company brought a tort suit in Tennessee. The trial court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We conclude that the homebuilder’s allegations and the Defendants’ contacts with Tennessee are sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction, and that exercising personal jurisdiction would not violate the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, we reverse. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Krystopher C. et al.
In this case involving termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights to their two minor children, the trial court determined that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven as to each parent by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father and mother have each appealed and have proceeded pro se upon waiving their rights to appointed counsel. Having determined that clear and convincing evidence did not support the trial court’s finding of the statutory abandonment ground of failure to support as to the mother, we reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to this ground as to the mother. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
Celeste Lachapelle as the beneficiary of the will of James Russell Pace v. Blanchard E. Tual, et al.
Appellant sued the law firm that prepared a will on behalf of her fiancé for professional negligence after an out-of-state will contest resulted in the invalidation of the will. The trial court concluded that Appellant’s claim accrued when she was forced to respond to the will contest and not when the will was actually held to be invalid. Thus, Appellant’s action was filed after the one-year limitations period had expired, and the trial court granted summary judgment for the law firm. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
CHARLES J. BEARD ET AL. v. WILLIAM ODOM ET AL.
This appeal arises from the purchase of a residential home. The plaintiff homebuyers asserted claims against the defendant sellers for intentional or negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure Act (“TRPDA”). The plaintiffs’ claims were based solely on the defendants’ TRPDA disclosure statement, which said there were no known defects in the home’s floor structure. The trial court summarily dismissed all claims on the basis that the plaintiffs knew or should have known about the alleged defects because the plaintiffs had every opportunity to discover the defects and were made aware of the defects by their own observations and inspection reports. On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they reasonably relied on the defendants’ misrepresentation. But the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof on summary judgment to establish that they actually or reasonably relied on the disclosure statement. For this reason, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Xingkui Guo v. State of Tennessee
Professor appeals from the Tennessee Claims Commission’s Rule 41.02(2) involuntary dismissal of his breach of contract action against Tennessee State University. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Kelly M. Et Al. v. Agness M.
Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Ridgeview Partners, LLC d/b/a Ravelle at Ridgeview v. Michelle Okoreeh-Baah Keister
In this unlawful detainer action, the landlord obtained judgment in the general sessions court against a tenant for failure to pay rent. The tenant, who remained in possession of the subject property, appealed the judgment to the circuit court without posting a bond for possession as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-18-130(b)(2)(A). In the absence of a bond, the landlord sought immediate possession of the property. The tenant moved to proceed on appeal without a bond, arguing that the affidavit of indigency she had filed with the general sessions court sufficed in lieu of a surety bond for her appeal. The circuit court ordered the tenant to either surrender possession of the property or post a possession bond. After the tenant failed to surrender possession or post a bond, the circuit court issued a writ of possession in favor of the landlord, which the landlord executed shortly thereafter. Having regained possession of the property, the landlord filed a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01. The trial court accordingly entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice. The tenant has appealed the dismissal to this Court, arguing that because she had filed an affidavit of indigency in the general sessions court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-5-103, she should have been permitted to retain possession of the property pending resolution of her appeal to the circuit court without posting a bond. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
