Harold C. Bowden, IV v. Amber Crutcher
In this custody case, the trial court adopted a parenting plan that ordered equal parenting time. The father appeals, seeking a reversal of the award of equal parenting time, an increase in the mother’s monthly income for child support purposes, payment of one-half the childcare costs, custody on alternating July the fourth holidays, and attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley Buckley ET AL v. Jackson Radiology Associates, P.A. ET AL
This is a healthcare liability/wrongful death case. Appellees, healthcare providers, alleged that appellant abused the discovery process in failing to make her expert available for deposition within the time set by the trial court’s scheduling order. Appellant moved for amendment of the scheduling order and for continuance of the trial date. The trial court denied appellant’s motions and granted appellees’ motion to exclude appellant’s expert. The exclusion of appellant’s expert resulted in the trial court granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment, thus dismissing appellant’s lawsuit. Under the circumstances, the trial court’s exclusion of appellant’s expert (and the resulting dismissal of her lawsuit) was too harsh a punishment. Vacated and remanded. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Lee v. Jonathan Richardson et al.
This appeal arises from a legal malpractice action filed by Terry J. Lee (“Plaintiff”) on July 11, 2024, against several attorneys who represented him at various times and in different aspects of his defense of a multi-count indictment and the appeal of his 2020 conviction on all counts, including kidnapping. Plaintiff asserted a cause of action for legal malpractice against the defendants, claiming that they “failed to investigate plaintiff’s [criminal] case to know that the court [Williamson County Criminal Court] did not have territorial jurisdiction to prosecute him on the kidnapping charge.” Plaintiff was convicted in 2020 and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction on all grounds effective January 26, 2023, when mandate issued. See State v. Lee, No. M2021-01084-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 16843485 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2022). After noting that the statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims, codified in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(c)(1), requires that the action be filed “within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued,” and that the claims accrued more than one year prior to the commencement of this action, the trial court dismissed the complaint as time barred. Plaintiff contends that this was error. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Builders FirstSource, Inc. Et Al. v. Axis Dynamics, Inc. Et Al.
Appellant, as personal guarantor for a third party, signed a credit agreement with appellee. After obtaining a default judgment against the third party in a separate lawsuit, appellee filed suit in the general sessions court to collect the judgment from appellant as the third party’s guarantor. Appellee obtained a default judgment against appellant, and appellant appealed to the circuit court. Appellant did not respond to appellee’s request for admissions. Appellee moved for summary judgment, arguing that appellant’s failure to respond to the request for admissions deemed them admitted and the admissions provided the basis for the undisputed material facts in support of the motion. Appellant failed to respond to the motion for summary judgment, and the trial court granted it. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, and award appellee damages for frivolous appeal, including appellate attorney’s fees |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sandi Dawn Cunningham et al v. Bryan Truck Line, Inc. et al.
Following a mechanical failure, an employee parked his tractor-trailer on the shoulder of an interstate highway. As result of delays in the repair of the tractor-trailer, the vehicle had been on the shoulder for at least seven hours when a driver crashed into the parked tractor-trailer. Two of the driver’s passengers, the driver’s son and his son’s fiancée, died. The estates of the deceased and their shared minor child (the Plaintiffs) filed a tort suit against the driver and also against the driver of the tractor-trailer and his trucking company employer. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant tractor-trailer driver and his employer. In doing this, the trial court based its decision upon what it termed a special rule of Tennessee tort law called the Carney Rule, a reference to this court’s decision in Carney v. Goodman, 270 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954). In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied upon an understanding of the Carney decision set forth in several federal court decisions. The Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in its application of the Carney Rule. We agree and reverse the trial court’s decision, remanding for further proceedings. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Aniya B. Et Al.
In this case involving termination of the parents’ parental rights to their three minor children, the trial court found that two statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence: (1) abandonment by failure to financially support the children and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the children. The trial court further found that termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Heavenly M.
In this parental termination case, the mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, Heavenly M. The trial court found that four grounds for termination had been proven and that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interests. The mother appealed. We affirm the trial court’s finding that four grounds were properly pled and proven: the grounds of abandonment for failure to support, abandonment for failure to visit, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child. We also affirm the finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Patterson v. Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security et al.
An administrative law judge entered an order of default against Appellant for failing to appear at a resetting of his contested case hearing on a civil asset forfeiture. On appeal, the Commissioner’s Designee for the Department of Safety and Homeland Security affirmed the administrative law judge’s entry of default, denying Appellant’s request to set aside the same order. Appellant appealed the Commissioner Designee’s decision to the Chancery Court, raising that the administrative officials lacked authority to default his case because they did not swear an oath of office commensurate with that sworn by judicial branch judges of the Tennessee state judiciary. The Chancery Court affirmed the administrative officials’ decisions. Appellant appealed to this court. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Clarke v. State of Tennessee
State employee Insured received radiation treatment for tongue cancer. Insurance Company denied authorization of the treatment as “investigational” and not “medically necessary” pursuant to the insurance plan and its medical policy. After two direct appeals of the denial to the insurance claim administrator, Insured appealed to the Tennessee Claims Commission. The Claims Commission found that the treatment was investigational under the plain language of both the plan and the policy and thus not a covered expense. As the denial of coverage did not amount to a breach of contract, the Claims Commission granted Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
James Elton Gillies et al. v. Rebecca Noelle Mitchell Gillies
Father was held in criminal contempt for withholding visitation from Grandmother. The trial court found 28 counts of contempt and imposed a sentence of 280 days. The trial court also revoked the suspension of a prior 100-day sentence and ordered that sentence to be served consecutively to the 280 days. We conclude that because the visitation was withheld while an order of protection prohibiting contact between the child and Grandmother was in place, the trial court’s findings and the evidence presented are insufficient to support a finding that Father acted willfully. Accordingly, we reverse the finding of contempt and the revocation of the suspended sentence. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
William Joseph Robinette Et Al. v. Tina Robinette Et Al.
William Joseph Robinette and his daughters, Delores Reynolds and Jody Stewart, (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed suit in the Sullivan County Chancery Court (“the Trial Court”), seeking a declaration of their rights as the lawful owners of Fuller Enterprises, LLC against the right of ownership by Tina Robinette (“Widow”), the widow of Mr. Robinette’s son and Ms. Reynolds and Ms. Stewart’s brother, Will Robinette (“Decedent”). Plaintiffs later added Decedent’s estate and Fuller Asphalt Material, LLC, as additional defendants (collectively with Widow, “Defendants”). Widow filed abusive civil action (“ACA”) motions against Plaintiffs, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiffs appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Marcelle Antonio Tatum v. Leslie D. Tatum (Henderson)
This appeal arises out of a divorce action filed by the appellee/husband. Following a course of inaction by the appellant/wife, the trial court granted a final decree of divorce by default in favor of the husband. The wife filed multiple motions seeking to have the trial court alter or amend the final decree. The trial court ultimately granted in part, and denied in part, wife’s post-judgment motions. The appellant appeals the ultimate judgment of the trial court. Having determined that the appellant’s brief is not compliant with the relevant rules of briefing in this Court, we conclude that her issues purportedly raised on appeal are waived. The appeal is dismissed. Additionally, the appellee requests his attorney’s fees incurred on appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122. In the exercise of our discretion, we decline to find this appeal frivolous and further decline to award appellee his attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
People First Auto Sales, LLC, et al. v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, et al.
A business sought a special use permit from the City of Memphis to operate a used car lot. At a meeting of the city council, the council voted to remand the business’s application back to the local land use control board. At the next meeting, the council reconsidered the application and denied it. The business filed a writ of certiorari challenging the denial, alleging due process violations and stating that the council failed to follow its rules of procedure. The trial court found that no due process right applied and that the council had properly followed its rules of procedure. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Connor A.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to support; (3) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (4) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (5) persistence of conditions; and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the child. Because the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services does not defend the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home or substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, we reverse as to those grounds. And because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings that returning the child to Mother would pose a likelihood of substantial harm, we vacate the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the child. Otherwise, we affirm the decision of the trial court to terminate Mother’s parental rights. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Aveille on behalf of E.A. v. Bobby Moore
This appeal concerns the entry of an order of protection. The alleged victim’s father filed the initiating petition based upon an allegation of stalking. We vacate the entry of the order of protection, finding no evidence to sustain the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Formby Holmes v. George David Holmes
This appeal arises from a divorce. The former husband challenges the classification and division of the marital estate. Because the husband failed to comply with our procedural rules, we deem his issues waived and dismiss the appeal. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Allen, individually and surviving spouse and next-of-kin of Donald A. Allen, Deceased et al. v. Benjamin Dehner, M.D. et al.
A husband and wife commenced this health care liability action by filing a complaint against a medical doctor and his practice. Along with their complaint, the couple filed a “Certificate of Good Faith” as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122(a), which requires certification that an expert has reviewed the available medical records “for the incident or incidents at issue” and that the expert believed there was “a good faith basis to maintain the action consistent with the requirements of § 29-26-115.” The original complaint alleged that the defendants caused severe permanent and physical injuries when they failed to properly diagnose and treat the husband’s cancer. After the husband died, the wife filed an amended complaint that alleged that the defendants’ negligence also caused the husband’s death. But the wife did not file a new certificate of good faith. For this reason, the defendants sought dismissal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122(c). The trial court granted the motion, and this appeal followed. The issue is whether § 29-26-122(a) requires plaintiffs to file a new certificate of good faith with an amended complaint that alleges a new injury based on already-alleged negligent acts by existing defendants. In Sirbaugh v. Vanderbilt University, 469 S.W.3d 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) we held that a new certificate is required when adding new defendants to existing claims. And in Estate of Vickers v. Diversicare Leasing Corp., No. M2021-00894-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 2111850 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 13, 2022), we held that a new certificate is required when adding new allegations of negligence against existing defendants. Accordingly, we conclude that a new certificate is required when adding an injury based on existing claims against existing defendants. For this and other reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Justin M. Finch v. 28th Judicial District IV-D Child Support Agency, et al.
The trial court dismissed the appellant’s petition on a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion. Because the appellant’s brief falls well short of the requirements of both the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rules of this Court, we dismiss the appeal. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Allen, individually and surviving spouse and next-of-kin of Donald A. Allen, Deceased et al. v. Benjamin Dehner, M.D. et al. (concurring in part/dissenting in part)
In considering this appeal, the majority thoughtfully moves through the labyrinthian requirements of Tennessee health care liability actions. While the majority’s analysis presents a well-considered direction to go, I cannot follow their route for its full course. Holding onto statutory language that hopefully serves the role of the thread used by Theseus in navigating out of the labyrinth, 1 I believe that the proper way back through the maze follows that statutory thread along a different path. Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ina Grace Jacobi v. VendEngine Inc.
Ina Grace Jacobi sued VendEngine, Inc. (“VendEngine”), alleging that she was wrongfully arrested due to VendEngine’s negligent design and operation of an inmate messaging system. The trial court determined that the gravamen of Ms. Jacobi’s claim was for malicious prosecution and granted summary judgment to VendEngine after concluding she failed to prove the elements of that claim. Ms. Jacobi appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Nehad Abdelnabi v. Fatma Adel Sekik
This appeal concerns the trial court’s grant of a petition for civil contempt for failure to comply with orders regarding the division of marital assets and awards of spousal and child support against the husband and his relatives, who held an interest in the properties at issue. We affirm the trial court’s grant of orders of civil contempt against all parties. We also conclude that this appeal is frivolous and remand for an assessment of damages. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Thompson School Road Neighborhood Association Et Al. v. Knox County, Tennessee, Et Al.
This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action regarding a decision of the Knox County Commission to amend zoning for the subject property. The trial court affirmed the rezoning. Finding no error, we affirm the ruling of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Glenya Cole-Jackson v. Costco Wholesale Corporation d/b/a Costco
This is an appeal from a directed verdict in a personal injury lawsuit. Glenya Cole-Jackson (“Plaintiff”) sued Costco Wholesale Corporation d/b/a Costco (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) over an incident in which she was hit by a shopping cart pulled by one of Defendant’s employees. The case went before a jury. At the close of Plaintiff’s proof, Defendant moved for a directed verdict. The Trial Court granted the motion, finding that Plaintiff failed to submit evidence that the shopping cart incident caused her injuries. Plaintiff appeals. Contrary to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Rule 6 of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Plaintiff’s brief fails to cite the record. In addition, the record contains no transcript or statement of evidence of the trial, hence we have no basis for determining that the Trial Court erred. We find that Plaintiff has waived her issues. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brendan Todd Negron v. Andrew Nicholas Roach
Petitioner’s ex-wife became romantically involved with the Respondent. The Petitioner sought an order of protection for himself and his children against the Respondent, asserting that the Respondent stalked him and his children. The Respondent opposed the petition, asserting that he had only ever been near the Petitioner for the legitimate purpose of protecting Petitioner’s ex-wife and children from Petitioner, who has a troubling history of violence and who allegedly continued to emotionally harm the children during their online visitation. The General Sessions Court concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove stalking and declined to grant an order of protection. Petitioner advanced the petition to Circuit Court. The Circuit Court also refused to grant an order of protection and found that the Petitioner made knowingly false allegations at the time of filing his order of protection petition. Accordingly, the Circuit Court awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the Respondent. The Petitioner appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Katherine Poling Robeson v. Travis Wilson Robeson
In this divorce action the husband appeals the classification of two substantial assets as marital property, each of which he contends are separate property because they were gifted to him by his father. The husband also challenges the trial court’s determination of his income for purposes of child support and alimony. On different grounds, the wife challenges the trial court’s determination of the husband’s income for child support purposes. The wife also appeals the trial court’s denial of her request for attorney’s fees as alimony in solido based upon its finding that her fees had been paid out of marital assets pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121 and that an award of alimony in solido would constitute “double dipping.” She further seeks an award of her attorney’s fees on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s determination of the husband’s income for purposes of child support and alimony. Moreover, we affirm the classification of the 7.6-acre parcel with the cabin as marital property but reverse the classification of the husband’s partnership interest in Berry’s Chapel Ventures, LLC, as marital property and remand with instructions to classify it as Husband’s separate property. We further find that the appreciation in the value of the husband’s interest during the marriage is his separate property. Resultingly, on remand, the trial court is to reconsider the equitable division of the marital estate and enter judgment accordingly. Because of significant changes in the marital estate, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand with instructions to reconsider this award upon settling the marital estate and to enter judgment accordingly. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Wife’s request for attorney’s fees as alimony in solido, albeit on different grounds. Each party shall be responsible for their attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |
