Tennessee Rand, Inc. v. Automation Industrial Group, LLC et al

The first time this case was before us, see Tennessee Rand, Inc. v. Automation Industrial Group, LLC, No. E2009-00116-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3852317 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Sept. 29, 2010) (“Rand I”), we reversed that portion of the trial court’s judgment decreeing that Automation Industrial Group, LLC (“Automation”) was not entitled to recover on its counterclaim due to its fraud and we reinstated the trial court’s earlier judgment awarding Automation $2,270,759.22 plus prejudgment interest of $256,705.19. The trial court had entered its earlier judgment against Tennessee Rand, Inc. (“Rand”) on Automation’s counterclaim, and then set it aside on Rand’s motion to alter or amend. Although the parties had not addressed in the first appeal the prejudgment interest portion of the trial court’s earlier judgment, we, without extended discussion, reinstated the prejudgment interest as originally calculated by the trial court. What the parties did not put at issue or otherwise stress in the first appeal was the fact that Rand had challenged, in its motion to alter or amend, the accuracy of the trial court’s calculation of prejudgment interest. In that motion, Rand had argued that the trial court had obviously miscalculated prejudgment interest. In Rand I, we also reversed an award of discretionary costs to Rand because we concluded that Automation was the new prevailing party. Upon remand following our decision in Rand I, Rand asked the trial court to correct the miscalculation of prejudgment interest. Rand also asked the court to start the accrual of post-judgment interest from the date of entry of the trial court’s judgment on remand. Automation filed a motion for discretionary costs as the new prevailing party. The trial court on remand determined that it had miscalculated prejudgment interest but held that our opinion in Rand I prevented it from granting Rand any relief with respect to the miscalculation as well as with respect to the other relief requested by Rand. The trial court also denied Automation’s motion for discretionary costs, based, at least in part, on Automation’s substantial windfall award of prejudgment interest due to the miscalculation. Rand now appeals the denial of its motions, and Automation challenges the denial of its request for discretionary costs. Automation also asks us to determine an issue pertaining to interest on the unpaid portion of the judgment entered on remand. We conclude that, in the interest of justice, we must take corrective action pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 36 by granting Rand relief from the miscalculation of prejudgment interest. Since the erroneous and inflated award of prejudgment interest was one of the reasons given by the trial court for denying discretionary costs, we vacate that denial and remand for further consideration of Automation’s request. We affirm that part of the judgment, as modified by us, holding that Automation is entitled to post-judgment interest from the date of entry of the original judgment in its favor. Rand obtained a stay of collection of Automation’s judgment pending appeal upon posting a bond to cover interest accrued between the original judgment date and the date of the judgment on remand. The amount set by the trial court to obtain a stay did not include interest accrued on the unpaid portion of the judgment. We hold that Automation is entitled to recover post-judgment interest accrued on the judgment. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is vacated in part and modified in part. As vacated and modified, the judgment is affirmed.