State of Tennessee v. Gary Rollins
Gary Rollins, Defendant, was charged with one count of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery in September of 2020. At the conclusion of the first trial, the jury found Defendant not guilty of rape of a child but could not reach a verdict on the lesser-included offenses of rape of a child. The jury could not reach a verdict on either count of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court granted a mistrial for the remaining lesser-included offenses of rape of a child and the two counts of aggravated sexual battery. In a second trial on the same presentment, Defendant was again tried for rape of a child. The jury found Defendant guilty of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. At sentencing, Defendant challenged the rape of a child conviction for the first time on the basis that it violated double jeopardy. The trial court agreed, entering a judgment for the lesser-included offense of attempted rape of a child. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years for the attempted rape of a child conviction and fifteen years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to introduce evidence of a prior bad act in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), that his second trial for rape of a child violated his right against double jeopardy, and that the trial court had no authority to modify the conviction on the jeopardy-barred offense to attempted rape of a child. Because the Defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted of the attempted rape of a child absent the presence of the charge of rape of a child and because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to introduce evidence of a prior bad act, we affirm the convictions. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Estate of David Alan Beddingfield
This appeal arises from an order requiring a petitioner to pay a filing fee or face dismissal of his case. Because the order is not final, we lack subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Lori Jean McKee Kelly v. Christopher Roberts Kelly
In this divorce, the trial court sanctioned Husband for failing to participate in discovery. After a final hearing at which Husband failed to appear, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce that awarded Wife monetary judgments and alimony, divided the marital property, adopted Wife’s proposed parenting plan, and set child support. Husband filed a motion to set aside, alter, or amend the final decree, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Husband challenges the sanctions and complains that the trial court failed to consider the statutory best interest factors when fashioning the permanent parenting plan. Although the trial court’s factual findings concerning the children’s best interest are deficient, we can “soldier on” by conducting a de novo review of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. After that review, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
ROBERT "WOODY" DEW ET AL. v. ADRIAN'S INC. ET AL
Following mediation, family members signed a settlement agreement resolving their business dispute. One party then sought to withdraw from the agreement. The trial court determined that the party’s ability to withdraw was limited and ordered him to close on the transactions contemplated by the agreement. Because we conclude that the settlement agreement’s language was ambiguous, we vacate and remand for an evidentiary hearing. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Dorothy Ann Britton
This appeal involves of the administration of an estate. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final order closing the estate as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Brasfield
The Defendant, Tony Brasfield, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of violating the rules of community supervision for life, a Class A misdemeanor; and violating the sexual offender registry for failing to register or report in person within 48 hours of establishing or changing a primary or secondary residence, a Class E felony. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his felony conviction of violating the sexual offender registry, arguing that a plain reading of the statute shows that the State failed to prove the essential elements of the offense. We agree with the Defendant. Accordingly, the Defendant’s misdemeanor conviction for violating community supervision is affirmed, but we reverse and vacate his felony conviction for violating the sexual offender registry. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Langford Farms Common Facilities Association, Inc. v. Paul A. Clark
A homeowners’ association sued a resident for violations of neighborhood regulations. The resident did not answer requests for admission. The trial court found that the requests were, therefore, admitted and granted a judgment for the association. The resident appealed. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Kyle Leath v. Angelea Nicole Flowers
Mother and Father entered into an Agreed Permanent Parenting Plan. Thereafter, Father learned of information he allegedly was not privy to before, namely, that the Mother’s new husband was physically abusive, had been using drugs, and has an extensive criminal record; additionally, new incidents involving domestic violence and other criminality occurred involving Mother’s new husband. In response, Father sought to modify the parenting plan. The Juvenile Court modified the plan, reducing the number of days of Mother’s visitation and limiting Mother to supervised visitation. Mother appeals the trial court’s modifications. We affirm. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mario Albanese
The Defendant, Mario Albanese, pleaded guilty to three counts of reckless aggravated |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Keith Riddle v. Andrei Miclaus
A plaintiff was awarded a judgment against a defendant who failed to complete home improvement work. The defendant appeals; however, he has failed to provide an adequate record to allow for consideration of his arguments on appeal and has asked this court to perform fact-finding that is beyond the scope of our authority. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
Milcrofton Utility District of Williamson County, Tennessee v. Non-Potable Well Water, Inc.
A utility district sued a private corporation alleging that the corporation was illegally providing water services to customers in the utility district’s service area. The trial court ruled in favor of the corporation. On appeal, the district asserts that the trial court erred in requiring the district to prove that the company qualified as a “public utility” under the pertinent statute. We have concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statute. We, therefore, reverse and remand. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicholas Cornelius Conner
Defendant, Nicholas Cornelius Conner, pled guilty to one count of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II drug. He received a nine-year community corrections sentence which was later transferred to probation. Thereafter, Defendant was arrested for new drug offenses. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his original sentence incarcerated. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his probation and by denying credit for time he successfully served on probation. Upon review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnny Tate v. Grady Perry, Warden
Petitioner, Johnny Tate, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kimberly M. Smart
The Defendant, Kimberly M. Smart, was convicted by a Hamilton County Jury of reckless aggravated assault, for which she received a sentence of three years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting extrinsic evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent statement for impeachment, (2) the trial court erred in admitting a body camera recording depicting the victim shortly after she was stabbed, and (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct by attempting to shift the burden of proof to the Defendant during closing and rebuttal arguments. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
IN RE GABRIEL M.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found clear and convincing evidence to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home and (2) the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We now affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Kelly et al. v. Thomas A. Stewart
This case involves allegations of malfeasance by several members of a family business against another member. The plaintiffs asserted both derivative and individual claims. We affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the merits of the case but vacate and remand the portion of the trial court’s decision regarding damages and attorney fees. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Casey Lee Anderson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Casey Lee Anderson, pled guilty to second degree murder and received a sentence of nineteen years’ imprisonment. He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that the State had violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose a witness statement before he entered the plea. After a hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief, finding that the State had violated Brady by failing to disclose the statement. On appeal, the State argues that the post-conviction court erred in granting relief, asserting that the Petitioner failed to prove that the statement was material. Upon our de novo review, we agree with the State. As such, we respectfully reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand the case to reinstate the Petitioner’s conviction. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bryant Ward v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Bryant Ward, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, in exchange for a twenty-year sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that he was on a medication that inhibited his ability to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
DONALD CHARLES BACHMAN V. JOANNE EVE MASSAS
Plaintiff sued Defendant for divorce. Defendant appeals challenging the trial court’s failure to award alimony. Without a transcript or statement of the evidence, appellate courts presume the record supports the trial court’s findings. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Victor Valle v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Victor Valle, of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of twenty-two years imprisonment. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. In relevant part, the Petitioner alleged that his attorneys were ineffective by (1) calling the victim’s mother and his former spouse as witnesses at trial; (2) failing to explain his right to testify and advising him not to testify; and (3) failing to advise him of his right to have the jury instructed regarding lesser-included offenses. The Petitioner also asserted that he was entitled to relief due to cumulative error. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derek Morse
Defendant, Derek Morse, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of three counts of premeditated first degree murder and one count of attempted premeditated first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to three terms of life imprisonment without parole for the first-degree murder convictions, and he was ordered to serve a concurrent sentence of fifteen years for the attempted first degree murder conviction. In this direct appeal, Defendant contends that: 1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions because the State failed to establish his identity as a shooter; 2) the trial court erred by allowing evidence of a prior bad act; 3) the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody for evidence of gunshot residue on Defendant's clothing; 4) the trial court should have granted a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; 5) the trial court should have granted a new trial based on proof that a State's witness gave false testimony that he did not receive favorable treatment from the State for his testimony against Defendant; 6) the State made improper comments during its opening statement and closing argument; and 7) the cumulative effect of these errors entitles Defendant to a new trial. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs and arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vanessa Faddoul v. Edward James Beyer
Vanessa Faddoul sought an order of protection as a stalking victim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617 against her neighbor, Edward James Beyer, in Williamson County General Sessions Court. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the general sessions court issued a one-year order of protection prohibiting Mr. Beyer from contacting or coming about the victim, Mrs. Faddoul, or her family, and restricting Mr. Beyer’s second amendment rights. Mr. Beyer appealed to the Williamson County Circuit Court. Upon a pre-trial motion of Mr. Beyer, the circuit court modified the general sessions order by restoring Mr. Beyer’s second amendment right to possess firearms. Following three days of hearings on the petition, but before the circuit court could rule on the merits of the de novo appeal, Mr. Beyer filed a “Notice of Voluntary Nonsuit and Dismissal of Appeal” to dismiss his appeal of the general sessions court ruling against him in Case No. 2022OP-176, purportedly pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41.01(1). Because Mr. Beyer dismissed his appeal, the circuit court entered an order “affirming” the judgment of the general sessions court, save the second amendment issue, dismissing the appeal, and granting Mrs. Faddoul leave to apply for an award of attorney’s fees. Thereafter, Mrs. Faddoul requested attorney’s fees in the amount of $168,112.50 under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1), discretionary costs in the amount of $5,248.62 under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2), and $2,579.37 in “non-discretionary cost expenses.” The circuit court denied her request for attorney’s fees and discretionary costs in toto based on several findings. It found that she was not entitled to an award of mandatory attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617 because, inter alia, stalking victims are not entitled to the same “enhanced protections” as domestic abuse victims, that it did not complete the hearing on the petition, which it found to be a prerequisite for fees, and that the amount of attorney’s fees requested was unreasonable. The circuit court also declined to award Mrs. Faddoul any discretionary costs. Both parties appeal. Contrary to Mr. Beyer’s argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to take any action after he purportedly “nonsuited” his appeal, we find that the circuit court retained jurisdiction and that it did not err in affirming the judgment of the general sessions court and granting Mrs. Faddoul leave to request attorney’s fees. Because Mrs. Faddoul, as a stalking victim, is entitled to the same rights afforded to domestic abuse victims, and as mandated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1), we hold that Mrs. Faddoul is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees she incurred in the general sessions court and the circuit court proceedings. Thus, we reverse the circuit court’s decision regarding attorney’s fees and remand for the circuit court to award Mrs. Faddoul her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in the general sessions court and the circuit court proceedings under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1). We affirm in part and reverse in part the denial of Mrs. Faddoul’s request for discretionary costs, finding that some of the court reporters’ invoices clearly delineate the discretionary costs that she is entitled to recover pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). We also conclude that Mrs. Faddoul is entitled to her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1). |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Nancy Riss
This appeal arises from a will contest. Appellant David Riss (“Respondent”) and Appellee Adam Riss (“Petitioner”) dispute the validity of a typewritten codicil and holographic document that purportedly amended the last will and testament their mother, Nancy G. Riss (“Decedent”), executed on September 25, 2018 (“the Will”). After petitioning to admit the Will to probate and set aside the purported codicils, Petitioner filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. He argued that the typewritten codicil and holographic document do not meet applicable statutory requirements and thus should be given no testamentary effect. The trial court agreed with Petitioner and granted his motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court held that the typewritten codicil failed to meet the statutory requirements of a valid testamentary instrument under Tennessee Code Annotated § 32-1-104 because the witness signatures were affixed to an attesting affidavit but not to the codicil. The court further held that the holographic document failed to meet the statutory requirements of a valid holographic testamentary instrument under Tennessee Code Annotated § 32-1-105 because it did not contain any material provisions directing the distribution of Decedent’s estate. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Joel Lauper
The Defendant, William Joel Lauper, was convicted by a Rutherford County Jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, four counts of aggravated assault, domestic assault resulting in a bodily injury, and preventing another from making an emergency call, for which he received an effective sentence of fifty years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days of confinement. In this direct appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the State established the essential element of serious bodily injury to sustain the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. After review, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terence S. Roberts, et al. v. Kentucky National Insurance Co., et al.
The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against seven defendants. Their complaint asserted various counts arising out of the defendants’ involvement with a water loss claim the plaintiffs had reported to their insurer. Four of the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court granted their motions and simply stated at the end of its order of dismissal, “This is a final and appealable order and there is no just cause for delay.” The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. This Court entered two show cause orders, directing the appellants to either obtain a final judgment or show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed. We then entered an order deferring the matter to the panel of the Court deciding this appeal. We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified its order as final and dismiss this appeal. |
Madison | Court of Appeals |